A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY (KIERKEGAARD AND TILLICH) AND MODERN DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY (FREUD AND SULLIVAN) CONCERNING GUILT FEELINGS

by

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF GUILT

Guilt as a Psychological Problem

1. Guilt as experiential fact.--That guilt, however defined or accounted for, is a problem for man is patent. A sense of guilt is an experiential fact and seems to have been such as long as man has been capable of self-awareness. As Rollo May has said: "Man is the ethical animal."[1] May suggests that the psychological significance of the Biblical myth of Adam and his fall lies in the insight it gives into the close genetic relationship between the rise of self-awareness and the rise of ethical awareness. May states:

> This remarkable story is actually describing . . . what happens in every human being's development some time between the ages of one and three, namely, the emergence of self-awareness. Before that time the individual has lived in the Garden of Eden. . . The Garden stands for that state of innocence reserved for infants, animals, and angels, in which ethical conflict and responsibility do not exist; it is the period of innocence in which one "knows neither shame nor guilt."[2]

We need not concern ourselves at this time with the adequacy or acceptability of May's interpretation of the important Biblical story in Genesis, because the issues involved in this matter constitute one of the major foci of this study. The single point we wish to make now is that guilt is an experiential fact. Using May's analogy, it can be said, with considerable accuracy, that mankind as a whole has lived "east of Eden." The experience of guilt is a universal human experience except, possibly, in the most disturbed forms of what is called "the psychopathic personality." In short, feelings of guilt are a normal part of human experience.[1]

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[1] Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1953), p. 180.

[2] Ibid., pp. 181-182.

This fact, however, is not a simple fact, inasmuch as it gives rise to some very complex questions. One of the least complex of these questions is: Why should the experience of guilt constitute a "problem" for man? The obvious answer is that guilt is experienced as pain; that is, to feel guilty is an unpleasant experience. The truth of this descriptive statement can be verified not only by introspection, but also by a study of the various pathological syndromes in which guilt is an etiological factor. Bergler, in his book, The Battle of Conscience, asserts: "The neurotic feeling of guilt is one of the cornerstones of neurosis. . . . Neurotic symptoms and feelings of guilt are closely interconnected."[1] In other words, the experience of guilt often gives rise to over-compensatory and therefore maladaptive patterns of behavior. It is for this reason that guilt feelings have been of particular interest to medical psychology.

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[1] By this sentence, I do not intend to be trying to settle or evade the difficult question as to whether guilt feelings are normal or abnormal, neurotic or healthy; nor do I mean to ignore the social and cultural factors involved in the rise of both self-awareness and ethical awareness. Both these issues will be discussed subsequently.

Bergler reflects the views of Freud. Since the entire third chapter of this study will be devoted to an analysis of Freud's views on guilt, only incidental references will be included here. In his clinical practice, Freud frequently confronted the phenomena of guilt. He wrote: "The feelings of inferiority so well known in neurotics are presumably closely related to it [guilt]."[2] The obsessional neuroses, melancholia, and masochism, as well as a number of psychosomatic disorders, all manifest guilt and have guilt feelings as prominent etiological factors, according to Freud.[3] Otto Fenichel, whose book, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis,[4] is regarded as a dependable contemporary representation of Freudian views, also acknowledges the prominent role played by guilt in the various neuroses. Fenichel states:

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[1] Edmund Bergler, The Battle of Conscience (Washington, D.C., Washington Institute of Medicine, 1948), p. 16.

[2] S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, trans. J. Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1948), p. 73.

[3] See, for example: S. Freud, "A Child Is Being Beaten," The Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud, ed. E. Jones (5 vols.; London: The Hogarth Press, Ninth Impression, 1956), p. 184; S. Freud, "Dostoevsky and Parricide," ibid., V, 229f; S. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," ibid., IV, 152f.

[4] Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945) p. 113.

> Certain persons with a particularly intense sense of guilt . . . labor under the "necessity of paying off a debt to their conscience. The extreme representatives of this type are the personalities described by Freud under the headings "those wrecked by success," the "criminal from a sense of guilt," and the moral masochists.[1]

The import of the above representative statements is simply that feelings of guilt do constitute a common human problem. The breadth of the problem is indicated in words of Ernest Jones: "The trouble from which the world suffers at present can, in my opinion, very largely be traced to the manifold attempts to deal with the inner sense of guiltiness."[2] War, criminality, marital disruption, suicide and many of the ills which have plagued mankind for centuries have been attributed to guilt and its expressions.[3] It is not surprising, therefore, that such a universally powerful trouble-maker as guilt seems to be is of considerable interest to scientific psychology, particularly to clinical psychology. As a psychological problem, however, guilt becomes very complex. Some aspects of this complex problem will be introduced.

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[1] Ibid., p. 183.

[2] Earnest Jones, M. D., Proceedings of the International Conference on Medical Psychotherapy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), III, 26. cf., Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1955).

[3] Edward V. Stein, "An Analysis of the Theory of Guilt Formation in Personality and Some Implications for Christian Thought" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Religion, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1953), p. 3.

2. Guilt as a psychological problem.--One aspect of the psychological problem of guilt concerns the origin and function of guilt in human personality. Stein finds little unanimity of opinion among psychologists concerning these matters. He writes:

> There exist, at present, many different conceptions of the origin and function of guilt. It is not uncommon to find psychologists who consider most guilt feelings a regressive kind of behavior that should be removed. Alongside these professionals, one may find men in the same field with equally recognized reputations claiming that the guilt process is the raison d'etre of a high level of culture.[1]

Stein documents this contention by a careful examination of psychoanalytic theory,[2] the theory of Andras Angyal,[3] the phenomenalistic theory of Snygg and Combs,[4] and other "eclectic theories."[5] He summarizes his analysis of the various theories by stating: "It was concluded from the foregoing analyses that guilt feeling is the name for tension, threat, anxiety or internal aggression aroused through organismic activity, mental or physical, which is opposed to the superego."[1] However adequate or inadequate Stein's "broad eclecticism" may be, there is no doubt that psychologists are not in agreement as to the theoretical foundations of guilt. The differences are as great as the differences between their various "theories of personality." It seems to this investigator, however, that what Stein was really calling attention to, in the first paragraph quoted above, is the sharp difference in value judgments about guilt made by various psychologists. Is guilt to be considered mainly as a regressive, infantile kind of behavior which ought to be removed, or is guilt to be considered an unpleasant but highly valuable experience which produces desirable cultural values? This, I submit, is an important question which divides not only psychologists but seems also to be a point of contention between psychology and religion. The following words of Rollo May are equally applicable to this aspect of the problem of guilt, even though he writes about anxiety:

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[1] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[2] Ibid., Chapter II. In his analysis Stein relies heavily on the views of Fenichel and the Swiss psychoanalyst-clergyman, O. Pfister.

[3] Ibid., pp. 45-53. [4] Ibid., pp. 53-60.

[5] Ibid., p. 60f.

> The most crucial issue in contemporary psychotherapy, in my judgment, is whether the aim is to help the person gain freedom from anxiety or rather to help him confront anxiety experiences with the aim of enlarging his freedom. In the former view anxiety and conflict . . . are seen as neurotic and evil in themselves, experiences one should avoid at all costs, something to gain relief from in therapy. In the latter view, on the other hand, conflict and anxiety are seen as the inescapable concomitants of any human being's struggle toward authentic selfhood and fulfillment of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 63-64.

> his potentialities for creative interaction with his world.[1]

Since psychotherapy is the clinical side of psychological theory, and since guilt is closely related to anxiety,[2] May's observations are relevant to the point under consideration, namely, that guilt is a problem for psychological theory. There is disagreement not only as to the origin and function of guilt, as Stein has stated, but also as to its value and role in the achievement of "authentic selfhood."

Reference has been made already[3] to some of the clinical aspects of the problem of guilt. The reference is repeated here in order to make the further point that guilt constitutes not only a theoretical but also a therapeutic problem for psychology. Freud himself acknowledges that an unconscious sense of guilt makes for a very difficult therapeutic problem. He writes: "People in whom this unconscious sense of guilt is dominant, distinguish themselves under analytic treatment by exhibiting what is so unwelcome from the point of view of prognosis--a negative therapeutic reaction."[1] Freud found that the unconscious sense of guilt is a "resistance" which is extremely difficult to overcome. Contemporary psychoanalysts continue to be restricted to only moderate success in dealing with unconscious guilt.[2] Wolberg, who directs the Postgraduate Center for Psychotherapy, New York City, where a variety of techniques are used, presents the following protocol as an example of resistance to therapy:

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[1] Rollo May, "Introduction" to Henry Guntrip, Psychotherapy and Religion (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 7.

[2] This fact will be substantiated subsequently in the chapters on Freud and Sullivan.

[3] Supra, p. 3f.

Th.	I wonder what the long silences mean.
Pt.	Nothing comes to my mind, that's all. I kind of wish the time were up.
Th.	Perhaps you are afraid to bring up certain things today.
Pt.	Like what?
Th.	Well, is there any event that happened since I saw you that you haven't mentioned to me?
Pt.	(Silence) Yes, there was. I met a man last Wednesday who sent me. I made a big play for him and am going to see him Sunday. (The patient's infidelity to her husband is one of her symptoms, of which she is ashamed.)
Th.	I see.
Pt.	I have wondered why I did this. I realized you wouldn't tell me not to, but I feel guilty about it.
Th.	Was that the reason you were silent?

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[1] Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. W.J.H. Sprott (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1933), p. 149.

[2] See, e.g., F. G. Worden, "A Problem in Psychoanalytic Technique," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, III, No. 2 (April 1955).

Pt. (Laughing) Honestly, I thought there wasn't much to talk about. I minimized the importance of this thing. But I realize now that I didn't want to tell you about it.[1]

This particular excerpt, of course, demonstrates nothing more than that guilt feelings frequently cause resistance to psychotherapy, a fact already acknowledged by Freud. However, it is well to realize that guilt as resistance to therapy is a common phenomenon.

Such guilt-oriented resistances are not impossible to overcome, but as Freud observed, "in dealing with this resistance we are obliged to restrict ourselves to making it conscious and attempting the gradual demolition of the hostile superego."[2] It is unlikely that less intensive types of psychotherapy would have an "easier" time with guilt-oriented resistances than psychoanalysis. Although Sullivan views "true guilt" as primarily a conscious phenomenon,[3] he, too, acknowledges that such "complex emotions" as guilt are particularly difficult to analyze and treat. The circumstances under which such complex emotions occur and how they develop "are particularly hard to observe and analyze accurately," says Sullivan.[1] Furthermore, what Sullivan calls "crazy guilt"--that is, anxiety masquerading as guilt--presents an annoying and difficult task to the psychiatrist.[2]

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[1] Lewis R. Wolberg, The Technique of Psychotherapy (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954), pp. 474-475.

[2] Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, trans. J. Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1949), p. 5.

[3] Harry Stack Sullivan, Clinical Studies in Psychiatry, ed. H. S. Perry, M. L. Gowell, and M. Gibbon (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 112-114. Chapter IV of this study will be devoted to a careful analysis of Sullivan's views on guilt.

The foregoing introductory remarks serve to indicate that guilt phenomena do constitute a theoretical and therapeutic problem for psychology. There is one further dimension of guilt as a psychological problem, however, which must be touched upon, because this dimension moves us closer to the specific problem of this study. Historically, guilt has been considered to be a moral problem. As will be discussed more fully in the next section, it is for this reason that guilt has been a perennial problem for theology, particularly Judaeo-Christian theology. The reason this aspect of guilt confronts psychology with a problem is that, historically, psychology, particularly medical psychology, has eschewed moral questions. Fenichel reflects the Freudian ideal when he says:

> A scientific psychology is absolutely free of moral valuation. For it, there is no good or evil, no moral or immoral, and no what ought to be at all; for a scientific psychology, good and evil, moral and immoral, and what ought to be are products of human minds and have to be investigated as such.[3]

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[1] H. S. Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1953), p. 379.

[2] Sullivan, Clinical Studies in Psychiatry, op. cit., p. 112f.

[3] Fenichel, op. cit., p. 5.

But guilt implies moral valuation, whether or not this fact fits the psychoanalytic ideal. Erich Fromm, along with others, has recognized this "blind spot" in orthodox Freudianism. He writes:

> Psychoanalysis, in an attempt to establish psychology as a natural science, made the mistake of divorcing psychology from problems of philosophy and ethics. It ignored the fact that human personality cannot be understood unless we look at man in his totality, which includes his need to find an answer to the question of the meaning of his existence and to discover norms according to which he ought to live.[1]

In a later chapter, an attempt will be made to analyze the full significance of this question of the supposed moral neutrality of scientific psychology. The point to be noted here, however, is that this question is further evidence that guilt is an intra-discipline problem for the science of psychology. Can psychology remain morally neutral?

3. Some psychodynamic questions concerning guilt.--Thus far, in attempting to identify guilt as a psychological problem, reference has been made to the following facts:

A. A sense of guilt is an experiential fact so far as man is concerned. Since psychology is one of the disciplines which seeks to analyze human experience, it is legitimate to conclude that psychology will want to concern itself with the guilt-aspect of human experience.

B. Medical psychology, in particular, has concerned itself with guilt phenomena because guilt appears as an etiological factor in many personality disorders. This observation was documented by references to the writings of Edmund Bergler, Sigmund Freud, Otto Fenichel, Ernest Jones, and Erich Fromm--all of whom are recognized medical psychologists.

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[1] Erich Fromm, Man For Himself (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1947), pp. 6-7.

C. Guilt is both a theoretical and a therapeutic problem for psychology. On the theoretical side, it was noted that psychologists differ widely as to the origin and function of guilt in human personality and as to the value of guilt experiences. As a therapeutic problem, it was noted that guilt, particularly the unconscious sense of guilt, operates as a strong resistance and a negative therapeutic reaction to psychotherapy.

D. Guilt implies moral valuations, but psychoanalysis in particular has the ideal of absolute neutrality so far as moral questions are concerned. Not all psychotherapeutic theories subscribe to the Freudian ideal, however, and this disagreement is another reason that guilt is an intra-discipline problem for the science of psychology.

It is now necessary to move beyond these general observations about the psychological dimensions of guilt and raise some of the more specifically dynamic questions. Before raising these issues, however, the writer feels it is necessary to digress briefly into the matter of terminology.

No doubt the reader has been troubled by the fact that the terms "guilt," "sense of guilt," "guilt feelings," etc. have been used interchangeably. This lack of consistency and preciseness is confusing and unfortunate. However, this sin, if such it be, is not peculiar to the writer. The fact is that psychologists commonly use these terms interchangeably and synonymously, assuming that the reader understands that they are talking only about the psychological--not the metaphysical--aspects of the subject. As Fromm has indicated, whether this is an adequate context for discussing "guilt" is a point of serious dissension, both among psychologists and between psychologists and other analysts of human experience, such as philosophers and theologians. Nevertheless, in the psychological sections of this study, the writer will continue to use the aforementioned terms interchangeably but always referring only to the subjective experience. When the terms are used otherwise, and when philosophical and theological dimensions are being discussed, the departure from the usual practice will be clearly indicated either by specific references or by the context of the discussion. As psychological data, "guilt," "a sense of guilt," "guilt phenomena," and "guilt feelings" all refer to an experiential reality, namely, the painful experience of feeling condemned, unworthy, and disapproved.[1]

Returning now to some of the dynamic questions about guilt, three basic questions come to mind immediately. These are:

1. How does guilt arise in personality; i.e., what is the genesis of guilt?

2. How does guilt manifest itself in personality? What are its symptomological manifestations? How does the human organism attempt to cope with guilt problems?

3. What are the effective methods and techniques of psychotherapy with respect to guilt problems?

A number of questions refer both to constitutional-developmental factors and to cultural-social factors. With respect to the first set of factors, one of the important questions would be: Are there biological determinants--predisposing factors--of guilt? The point at issue is, in part, whether or not guilt is an inescapable aspect of human experience. Seward[2] has pointed out that the Kenya native seems to be completely devoid of the sense of guilt, but she also indicates that this absence of guilt is related to the native's inability to handle responsibility.

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[1] Cf. the definition in English and English, A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1958), p. 234.

[2] Georgene Seward, Psychotherapy and Culture Conflict (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956), p. 18.

While the Kenya native does not suffer from psychotic depression or obsessional neurosis, he does suffer "a special kind of anxiety-state, 'frenzied anxiety,' something like 'running amok,' and this state seems directly correlated with the inability to sustain tension in the face of threatening situations."[1] Seward implies, in other words, that the absence of the sense of guilt in the Kenya native is a kind of malformation of personality, related to his inability to handle responsibility, and resulting from "his failure to internalize group mores."[2] This view coincides with the general view of psychodynamics which sees the absence of all guilt feelings, or pangs of conscience, as at least indicative of arrested personality development. Cameron and Magaret[3] take the view that the so-called "psychopathic personality" is but a new term for the "outmoded category of 'constitutional psychopathic inferiority,'"[4] but their "bisocial" view is by no means universally accepted. The problem remains a crucial one in the psychology of personality.[5] The issue is the relative roles of constitutional and developmental factors in the production of such deviant types as exemplified by the Kenya native. In any case, the person who is incapable of feeling guilt is regarded as being seriously deviant and maladjusted.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] N. Cameron and A. Magaret, Behavior Pathology (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 190f.

[4] Ibid., p. 191.

[5] For an historical summary of this problem, see P. W. Preu, "The Concept of Psychopathic Personality," Personality and the Behavior Disorders, ed. J. McVie Hunt (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1944), Chap. 30.

A second important question with respect to constitutional-developmental factors refers to the developmental aspects of the problem. Precisely, what developmental experiences and stages are most significant so far as the rise of guilt feelings and conscience are concerned? If, as Stein indicates, some psychologists view guilt as essentially a regressive kind of behavior, is all guilt, then, "infantile"? Do guilt feelings represent a "fixation" in the Freudian sense? If so, will the mature person be free of all guilt, or only free from "neurotic" guilt? The developmental aspects of guilt are obviously very important.

With respect to the second set of factors, the social-cultural factors, equally important questions need to be answered. Referring again to Seward's Kenya native, and granting her contention that his difficulties stem from "his failure to internalize group mores," the question arises: What are the psychodynamics of this process of "internalizing the group mores"? It is fairly well known that Freud, in discussing the formation of the superego, lit upon the process of "identification" by means of which parental prohibitions and ideals are "introjected," or "incorporated," and thus become part of the child's own personality.[1] Freud, however, acknowledged that this very important process, by whatever name it is called, is a little understood process.[2] Later personality theorists, such as Adler, criticized Freud for his lack of clarity and his relative neglect of socio-cultural factors, but they in their turn failed to throw much new light upon the exact ways in which these socio-cultural factors become a part of the individual's psychic make-up. Hall and Lindzey have raised some of the more significant questions. They ask:

> How does a person acquire his social character? How does he learn to be a member of society? . . . Is it enough just to be exposed to a condition of society in order for that condition to affect the personality? Is there a mechanical stamping out of socially disapproved behavior? Or does the person react with insight and foresight to the social milieu, selecting those features which he thinks will produce a better organization of personality and rejecting other features which he feels are inconsistent with his self-organization?[3]

These are important questions for psychology to try to answer. They are especially important so far as the dynamics of guilt are concerned.

Another question is, of course, the relative role of socio-cultural factors. Is guilt purely a socio-cultural product, or are there other factors? If there are other factors, what might they be? Or does this latter question lie outside the realm of psychological investigation? Such questions are not avoided by adopting, for example, the "interpersonal theory" suggested by Sullivan. As will be indicated in the chapter on Sullivan, he insists on the interpersonal nature of all psychic phenomena. However, even if it be granted, as Sullivan contends, that "a large part of mental disorder results from and is perpetuated by inadequate communication, the communicative processes being interferred with by anxiety,"[1] the questions suggested above remain pertinent and crucial. Sullivan contends that anxiety is mainly "empathized" by the infant from the mothering one;[2] but he confesses that "the rationale of this induction--that is, how anxiety in the mother induces anxiety in the infant--is thoroughly obscure."[3] Furthermore, the dynamics of the communicative processes, and the relative roles of the various communicative processes with respect to the production of guilt and anxiety, need to be explored. Sullivan's discussion of the role of culture and the beginnings of the self-system are particularly relevant in this connection.[1] These matters will be investigated more fully in the chapter on Sullivan.

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[1] This matter will be discussed fully in the chapter on Freud.

[2] See, e.g., S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 90f.

[3] C. S. Hall and G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 154.

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[1] Mabel B. Cohen, "Introduction" to H. S. Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, p. 12.

[2] Ibid., p. 41f.

[3] Ibid.

Not only is the relative role of socio-cultural factors important, but also the relative roles of the various socio-cultural factors are equally important. Are there specific events, experiences, developmental epochs and/or persons which are more influential and determinative than others? If so, what are these and why are they more influential? Another interesting question is: Are some cultures more guilt-oriented than others? If so, which and why? Probably, Erich Fromm has delved more deeply into such matters than any other psychologist.[2] Fromm contends that Calvinism played a determinative role in shaping the predominantly Protestant culture of Western Europe and Colonial America, and this culture was characterized by widespread anxiety and feelings of guilt.[3] Again the question must be asked, however, what are the exact dynamics of the "introjection" or "incorporation" of such cultural features?

The second question--how does guilt manifest itself in personality?--gives rise to an equally large and equally perplexing set of questions. The problem of identifying and describing more or less common guilt-oriented syndromes is not particularly difficult. As indicated previously in the discussion of some of the clinical dimensions of the problem of guilt,[1] Freud, Fenichel and Bergler have identified many of the more common, pathological manifestations of guilt. The more difficult questions from the point of view of psychodynamics involve the following aspects: the relation of guilt to anxiety, the dynamic reasons for transforming anxiety into guilt, the relation of guilt to other mechanisms of defense, the relation of guilt to the structural components of personality, the role of guilt in the achievement of what Rollo May calls "authentic self-hood," and the dynamic and economic (in the Freudian sense) difference between neurotic and normal guilt. These are some of the important dynamic questions with respect to the psychopathology of guilt. While all of these questions seem to be important, the question of the role of guilt in normal personality is particularly relevant to the relationship between psychology and religion in general, and between psychotherapy and pastoral counseling in particular.

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[1] Ibid., p. 158f.

[2] See, e.g., Fromm, Man For Himself; and "Individual And Social Origins of Neurosis," American Sociological Review, IX (1944), pp. 380-384.

[3] Fromm, Man For Himself.

The third basic question, which has to do with the psychotherapeutic treatment of guilt, is not raised primarily as a question of preferred clinical procedures or techniques. The question of which is the most effective therapeutic technique has been discussed by competent authorities[1] and lies beyond the immediate concerns of this investigation. Rather the concern of this investigator with this aspect of the problem has two major foci: (a) What are the explicit or implicit value judgments of guilt in a given psychotherapy; and (b) What is the relation of a given psychotherapy to Christian methods for coping with guilt?

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[1] *Supra*, p. 3f.

The first focus arises out of the assumption that every psychotherapy implies value judgments and, further, that these value judgments do affect both the process and the end results of any given psychotherapy. With respect to this point, Karl Menninger has written recently:

> We cannot ignore the fact that what the psychoanalyst believes, what he lives for, what he loves, what he considers to be the purpose of life and the joy of life, what he considers to be good and what he considers to be evil, become known to the patient and influence him enormously. . . . No matter how skillful the analyst in certain technical maneuvers, his ultimate product, like Galatea, will reflect not only his handicraft but his character.[2]

Nor is Menninger alone in this contention. Harold Vogt has studied some of the presuppositions underlying current therapeutic practices. Vogt asserts:

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[1] See, e.g., J. L. McCary and D. E. Sheer (eds.), Six Approaches to Psychotherapy (New York: The Dryden Press, 1955), and L. R. Wolberg, op. cit.

[2] Karl A. Menninger, "The Character of the Therapist," Pastoral Psychology IX, No. 88 (November 1958), p. 14.

> While the presuppositions of psychotherapy may not be less explicit or greater in number than those of other sciences, it is probably more important that the psychotherapist be conscious of them, for these underlying premises, whether they are conscious or unconscious, will influence deeply the life of the patient. It is very important that the therapist be aware of the presuppositions of his various techniques and goals.[1]

Other investigators have voiced similar opinions.[2] This important matter will be discussed in detail later. It has been introduced here in order to indicate the specific concern of this investigation insofar as psychotherapy is concerned.

A similar limitation applies to the second major focus--the relation of psychotherapy to Christian methods of coping with guilt. In the next section, guilt as a religious problem will be discussed. It will be shown that Christianity in particular offers an "answer" to the problem of guilt. A later chapter will compare psychotherapeutic and Christian methods for coping with guilt. The reason the subject is introduced here is simply to indicate that it is this aspect of psychotherapy which is of particular concern to this investigator. Such questions as the following are in his mind: Is psychoanalysis, for example, essentially antithetical to the Christian care and cure of souls? Is pastoral counseling supposed to content itself with supportive and ameliorative therapy so far as guilt is concerned, and leave remedial and curative therapy to the professional psychotherapists? To what degree is Runestam objective when he makes a radical distinction between psychiatry and Christian soul care?[1] On what basis can the answer to the last question be made? These are the kinds of questions which concern this writer when he asks: What are the effective methods and techniques of psychotherapy with respect to guilt problems?

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[1] Harold W. Vogt, "The Presuppositions Underlying Therapeutic Practice in Some Current 'Schools' of Psychotherapy: An Analysis from the Standpoint of Religion" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Religion, University of Southern California, 1954), p. 19.

[2] See, e.g., Albert C. Outler, "A Christian Context for Counseling," Journal of Pastoral Care, II, No. 3 (Spring, 1948); Rollo May, "Historical and Philosophical Presuppositions for Understanding Therapy," in O. H. Mowrer, Psychotherapy: Theory and Research (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1953), pp. 9-43; Helene Papanek, "Ethical Values and Psychotherapy," Journal of Individual Psychology, XIV, No. 2 (November, 1958); and Henry Guntrip, op. cit., p. 154f.

4. Summary of the Section.--This section has discussed guilt as a psychological problem. The purpose of this discussion has been to create a background and a frame of reference for the specific research problem of this study, which problem will be delineated in the next chapter. The frame of reference will be completed in this chapter by a brief discussion of guilt as a religious problem and of guilt as an interdiscipline problem between psychology and religion. Before going on to these discussions, however, a

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[1] Arvid Runestam, Psychoanalysis and Christianity (Augustana Book Concern, 1958), especially the final chapter.

summary of the psychological aspects of the problem of guilt will be given.

The general observations made with respect to guilt as a psychological problem have already been summarized on page nine (following) above. The more specifically dynamic questions raised may be summarized as follows:

A. Three basic questions concerning the dynamics of guilt were raised. These were, in brief form: (1) How does guilt arise in personality? (2) How does guilt manifest itself in personality? (3) How is guilt to be handled therapeutically? (See page eleven above.)

B. With respect to the first question, two sets of factors, constitutional-developmental and socio-cultural, were discussed. In each category a number of questions were raised. (See pages eleven to sixteen above.)

C. In discussing the question of the manifestations of guilt in personality, it was suggested that the more difficult dynamic questions have to do with the relation of guilt to anxiety, to the mechanisms of defense, to the structural components of personality, and to the achievement of "authentic selfhood." The question of the role of guilt in normal personality was singled out as being of particular relevance to the concerns of this investigation. (See pages fifteen and sixteen above.)

D. The third question was discussed in terms of the implicit value judgments of guilt in a given psychotherapy and in terms of the relationship of psychotherapy and what Runestam calls "Christian soul care." It was suggested that these aspects of the problem are more central to the particular concerns of this investigation than would be the matter of deciding which therapeutic techniques are most effective in dealing with guilt. (See pages sixteen to eighteen above.)

Guilt As A Religious Problem

1. A brief, historical survey.--For anyone familiar with the Bible and the history of Judaeo-Christian theology, it is hardly necessary to contend that at least Hebrew-Christian religious tradition has concerned itself greatly with the problem of sin and guilt.[1] It is significant that in the first book of the Bible, Genesis, this problem is treated in the opening chapters.[2] The fact that scholarship postulates that Genesis, in its present form, is a comparatively late book does not vitiate the significance of the assertion. The problem of sin and guilt runs through the Old and New Testaments as an unbroken thread. Unlike its Greek and Oriental counterparts, the Hebrew-Christian religion is concerned primarily with the consequences of, and deliverance from, sin; and the fact of sin

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[1] A convenient summary is John T. McNeill, A History of the Cure of Souls (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951), especially Chapters I through IV.

[2] Genesis 3.

is, according to Biblical tradition, what makes man guilty. The chief evil from which man needs to be and seeks to be saved is sin and its concomitant sense of guilt. This is the controlling presupposition underlying both Judaism and Christianity, and it accounts for the overwhelming concern with "righteousness," "atonement" and "salvation."[1] H. R. Mackintosh in an old but still valuable book, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, contends that the central *motif* of Christianity is forgiveness and that Christianity triumphed by reason of its message of pardon.[2] Whether Dr. Mackintosh's second contention be accepted or not, there is some validity to his contention that forgiveness is the central *motif* of Christianity. The supreme question in both Judaism and Christianity is: How can man "get right" with God; i.e., how can man be delivered from guilt, be forgiven, and be restored to fellowship with his Creator? It is in the light of this supreme concern that the sacrificial system of Judaism, its Day of Atonement, and its complicated ritualistic prescriptions may be understood as ways and means of confronting and resolving the problem of guilt. Through such means, the individual and the nation may "get right" with God; i.e., be "righteous," escape blame and punishment, and so be delivered from the burden of sin and guilt. A similar rationale has been carried over into Christianity and helps to account for the crucial role played by the doctrines of atonement in the history of Christian thought.[1] In fact, it is probably not too strong an assertion to say that, from one point of view, Christian theology as a whole may be viewed as a systematic attempt to explain and to expiate the facts of guilt--the fact that man _is_ guilty, and that he _knows_ he is guilty, and that he wants to be delivered from guilt, and that in Christ salvation from sin and guilt is provided by God's grace. This is why the doctrine of atonement is central and crucial to any system of Christian theology; and the doctrine of atonement, whatever form it may take, finds its focus and significance in the problem of guilt.

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[1] Oliver C. Quick, Doctrines of the Creed (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1938), discusses this point in painstaking detail, pp. 189-203.

[2] H. R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), Ch. 1.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

2. _The nature of guilt in Christianity_.--Inasmuch as ascertaining what existential Christian theology means by guilt is one of the definitive tasks of this study, all that will be done at this juncture is to suggest the types of questions for which answers will be sought. Like psychology, Christian theology has also been interested in the question of origins. It has been noted that the Genesis

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[1] The point can be verified by reference to any of the standard histories of Christian doctrine. I relied heavily upon Paul Tillich, _A History of Christian Thought_, privately printed by Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1953.

myth of Adam and his "fall" confronts this problem. Traditional Christian theology, except in all but the most conservative and fundamentalistic camps, sees this story as true history even though the literal account may not be historically true.[1] That is to say, the Genesis myth gives the essential truth about how sin and guilt entered the world. The myth also suggests answers to other important religious questions about guilt, such as: Of what is man guilty? Why is he guilty? What are some of the consequences of his sin, beyond the mere knowledge of his guiltiness? These questions will be discussed more fully in the chapters on Kierkegaard and Tillich.

Christianity has also been concerned, of course, about how man may be delivered from sin, from the consequences of his sin, and from guilt. In other words, Christianity has always had its therapeutic side. A succinct summary of much Christian thinking regarding this matter is to be found in the story of Jesus' healing of the paralytic man.[2] To the paralytic, Jesus says, "My son, your sins are forgiven."[3] This approach, according to the Marcan account, offended some of the scribes; not, be it noted, because they found fault with Jesus' therapeutic technique, but rather because his assumption of the perogative to forgive sins appeared blasphemous to them. Their criticism was not, "You are silly and ignorant to assume that the man's paralytic condition is due to his sinful state." Rather they cried: "Why does this man speak thus? It is blasphemy! Who can forgive sins but God alone?"[1] Whereupon Jesus effected a "cure" by assuring the paralytic that his sins were forgiven and ordering him to "rise, take up your pallet and go home."[2] A number of elements, important to a Christian understanding of this relation of sin, guilt, sickness and health, are contained in this little story. While it is not necessary to attempt a complete exegesis and exposition of this and many similar stories recorded in the Gospels, since these are available in any good Commentary, it is worthwhile to note a few basic points. First, it is to be noted that man's fundamental sickness, so Christianity teaches, is moral sickness--sin, in other words. There is a radical "wrongness" in the soul of man for which man himself is responsible. This is, Runestam asserts, the anthropology and psychology of the New Testament.[3] This may be what the Apostle Paul meant when he cried: "Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?"[1] This moral sickness, in the second place, can be manifested in physical and mental sickness. Obviously, the New Testament is not a case-study book in psychosomatic illness. Obviously, too, the New Testament writers could have had little scientific understanding of psychosomatic disturbance, although there is some indication that they may have had an intuitive grasp of these principles. At any rate, the New Testament viewpoint is that moral and spiritual sickness is often exhibited in physical sickness, as in the case of the paralytic man. It must be understood, however, that the New Testament view will admit of no "psychologism"; i.e., the attempt to explain religious experience through psychological categories without remainder. From the Christian point of view, such concepts as "psychogenic" and "psychosomatic" are not irreducible. Neither is guilt or anxiety.

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[1] This is essentially the position taken by Reinhold Niebuhr, David E. Roberts, Albert Outler and many others. A review of this interpretation will be found in Albert Outler, Psychotherapy and the Christian Message (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954), pp. 99-146.

[2] Mark 2: 1-12.

[3] Mark 2: 5-6.

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[1] Ibid., vs. 7.

[2] Ibid., vs. 11.

[3] Runestam, op. cit., p. 53.

The third element to be noted in the Christian view of sin and guilt is the belief that God in Christ has provided the only ultimate answer to the "human quandary," to use Outler's phrase. Paul gives the Christian answer to his own question: "Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus

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[1] Romans 7:24. The entire seventh chapter of Romans is most relevant to the point under discussion.

Christ our Lord!"[1] In Paul's words, the Christian man is "justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ."[2] In short, and until further elaboration in subsequent chapters, it can be affirmed that Christianity has both a theory and a therapy of guilt. Guilt is the result of sin. The stain and sting of sin and guilt is done away by the agape of God in Jesus Christ.

3. Some other facets of the religious problem of guilt.--There are other facets of guilt as a religious problem which may be mentioned at this point in an introductory way. A careful and comprehensive explanation of some of these factors is part of the major task of this heuristic effort; therefore, they will be merely outlined at this time.

A. One aspect concerns the actual effectiveness of the Christian solution to guilt problems. Sherrill has described this aspect of the problem sharply in the following passage:

> The habits of thought in much theology have grown so remote from felt reality as to make it seem almost a heresy to turn theology toward guilt as it is actually experienced in modern life. And as for the guilty themselves, hopeless, or defiant, or hostile, they have learned the bitterest lesson which modern Christianity teaches, namely, that it has a remarkable metaphysical doctrine of redemption which in practice, in the hands of many of its servants, cannot reach down into the recesses of the human soul and set that

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[1] Romans 7: 24-25a.

[2] Romans 5: 1.

soul free from guilt.[1]

In other words, Christianity seems somewhat deficient as a therapy for guilt. Of course, the crucial issue still remains as to whether or not setting the soul free from guilt is the goal of Christianity. Does Christianity aim at relieving the sense of guilt or does it, as May suggests, aim at helping the individual to confront his guilt and take it up in what Tillich calls "the courage to be"?[2] This is a crucial problem insofar as the religious problem of guilt is concerned and one about which there is no more agreement in theology than there is in psychology.[3] Nevertheless, there is little doubt that many devoutly religious people do not find in their faith an effective method for keeping the sense of guilt within healthy bonds.

B. How does Christ "save" from sin and guilt? This question obviously involves psychodynamics quite as much as it does theology. Nevertheless, it has been a recurring theme in the history of Christian doctrine; for Christian doctrine has concerned itself not only with the meaning but also the method of salvation. As Runestam has observed recently:

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[1] Lewis J. Sherrill, Guilt and Redemption (Committee on Publication of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., 1945), p. 14.

[2] Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).

[3] Supra, p. 7f.

> Christ intends salvation. We shall never have done with this concept. . . . All Christian soul care aims, in the final analysis, at bringing the soul to Christ and into discipleship with him, with all its implications. . . . All Christian soul-care bears salvation in its hands . . .[1]

The question is, however: How does Christian soul-care "deliver" the salvation it brings? In traditional Christian theology this question is discussed under such headings as Redemption, Regeneration and the Doctrine of the Church. A less hoary way of raising the question is to inquire: How is Christ appropriated by the individual? Fairchild has investigated some ramifications of this problem in terms of a critical evaluation of the Freudian concept of identification and its relation to Christian experience.[2] He concludes that the Freudian concept is not adequate to explain the process by which the Christian appropriates the grace and virtues of Christ to his own benefit, and suggests an enlarged concept to which he gives the label "introjection." The dynamic questions involved in this matter are, however, very complex; and when the subject is approached as a theological problem, it loses nothing at all of its complexity. In general, the Christian answer is that Christ and his salvation is appropriated by "faith," but the exact meaning of faith is almost as varied as there are Christian theologians. Yet, if Christ does bring salvation and deliverance as Christian theology insists he does, then any systematic theology cannot ignore or evade the questions herein suggested. The Christian person not only wants to know _that_ Christ can save from sin and guilt. He also wants to know _how_ he can avail himself of this salvation.

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[1] Runestam, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

[2] Roy W. Fairchild, "A Critical Evaluation of the Freudian Concept of Identification and Its Function in the Analysis of Christian Experience" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Religion, University of Southern California, 1956).

C. A rather frequent charge made by both friends and foes of Christianity is that it is used, in the hands of many of its servants, to increase the sense of guilt--even to the extent of causing serious personality disturbances. Guntrip, who is no foe of religion, observes: "Ministers of religion generally aid people's defences against the dangers menacing them from their unconscious, either by giving comfort or support, _or else by arousing guilt_ and so increasing the forces of repression."[1] The context of the above quotation makes it clear that Guntrip is censuring, not praising, ministers of religion for these practices. This is clear from his later discussion of the depressed person, who, full of self-condemnation, is "an easy target for the condemnatory preacher who may foster depression by handling themes of sin, guilt, repentance and judgment without insight."[1]

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[1] Guntrip, _op. cit_., p. 26. (Italics are mine.)

With arresting insight, Anton Boisen has discussed how the sense of sin and guilt is often a factor in religious conversion phenomena which may result either in a creative reconstruction of life or in "those unhappy solutions which we term psychoses and psychoneuroses."[2] Boisen, while certainly aware of the role guilt may play in causing mental illness,[3] rightly affirms that "the consciousness of sin, according to Christian theology, is the first step in the process of salvation."[4] It is not surprising, therefore, that representatives of the Christian religion, zealous to bring men "unto salvation," have sometimes been over-zealous in making men feel sinful and guilty. Strict Calvinism probably represents the extreme pole of this zealousness to bring men "unto salvation," although it certainly is not difficult to find many ministers in all denominations and of all theological persuasions who, on occasion, handle "themes of sin, guilt, repentance and judgment without insight." The cumulative effect may be to lead their listeners to salvation, or it may be to increase their sense of guilt and sin to neurotic or even psychotic proportions. If the latter condition results, then guilt is a peculiarly embarrassing problem to religion.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[2] Anton Boisen, *The Exploration of the Inner World* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), p. 92.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-27, 28, 40-43, 53-56, 60, 102-106, 149, 266, 273.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 307.

D. The Freudian position on religion is fairly well known and has been discussed by a large number of psychologists and religionists.[1] The characteristic feature of the psychoanalytic view of religion is the tendency to look for the sources of religion in the dynamic unconscious of the individual, namely, in the desire for unlimited support, and in the inner need to obtain relief from guilt due to the oedipal conflict.[2] Freud felt that the guilt factor was particularly significant insofar as the rise of religion is concerned. As Ernest Jones has said: "Freud traced religion, civilization, law, morality and the very beginnings of community life to man's reaction to his conflict over the primordial oedipus complex."[3] Filial guilt, Freud insisted, was the foundation of the religious feeling;[4] and religion is "the mass neurosis of mankind."[1] Therefore, if Freud's contentions are true, religion arises as an attempt to deal with the sense of guilt; but religion is an essentially ineffective and immature means of dealing with guilt. Without, at this time, attempting to criticize Freud's assertion as to the neurotic character of all religion, it does seem permissible to accept his insight that guilt is a source of both the religious sentiment and many religious practices. Guilt, therefore, is of interest to religion both as a source and as a "target" for many of religion's ministrations. Both of these aspects of the religious problem of guilt call for investigation and clarification.

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[1] Four representative works may be cited here: W. Earl Biddle, The Integration of Religion and Psychiatry (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1955); Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); R. S. Lee, Freud and Christianity (New York: A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1949); Ian D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate (New York: Julian Press, 1935, American ed., 1952).

[2] W. R. D. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (London: Tavistock Publishers, Ltd., 1952), pp. 2-3.

[3] Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, 3 vols. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1953-1957), III, p.354.

[4] Freud, "Dostoevsky and Parricide," op. cit., p. 234.

E. A final dimension of guilt as a religious problem concerns the distinction between "existential" and "pathological" guilt. As we shall see, Paul Tillich,[2] among others, insists that existential anxiety must be distinguished sharply and clearly from pathological anxiety. Since guilt is considered by Tillich to be a form of existential anxiety, the same logic may be applied to guilt. This distinction, if admitted, poses some significant questions for religion as well as for psychotherapy. The practical problem is how to distinguish normal, existential guilt from pathological guilt. Obviously, too, questions of therapy are involved. Are the two forms of guilt to be "treated" differently; or, is existential guilt not to be "treated" at all? Which is the more effective treatment of existential guilt, religious or psychological?

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[1] Jones, op. cit., III, 365.

[2] Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 65f. Cf. Rollo May (ed.), Existence (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958), p. 50f.

The theological problems posed by the distinction of existential and pathological guilt are equally challenging. Philosophically and theologically, such a distinction moves the understanding of guilt and anxiety over into the realm of ontology.[1] Such a shift suggests that theology itself may once again find its firmest foundations in ontology. Furthermore, if anxiety and guilt are not something man has but are, as Kurt Goldstein[2] has suggested, something man _is_, then theology must wrestle yet more seriously with the ancient problem of original sin. For one thing, the knotty problem of the relation of finitude to sin comes into prominence once more. From a new quarter, that of psychology, there may come a need to "justify the ways of God to man." If man is _by nature_ guilty, and if he is not solely responsible for his nature, then what real meaning is left to such concepts as sin and guilt? From this point of view, it is possible to charge quite seriously that God is ultimately culpable. At any rate, such questions are pushed to the fore once again by the existential analysis of anxiety and guilt.

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[1] A thorough discussion of the ontological nature of anxiety and guilt can be found in Rollo May, _The Meaning of Anxiety_ (New York: The Ronald Press, 1950). For a completely different analysis, see Sigmund Freud, _Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety_, trans. Alix Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1948).

[2] Quoted in May, _Existence_, p. 50.

4. Summary of the section.--This section has discussed guilt as a religious problem, as a further step in constructing a frame of reference for the specific research problem. The principal elements of the religious problem of guilt will now be summarized.

A. A brief, historical survey was given in order to suggest that sin and guilt has been a major theme in the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition.

B. Introductory observations were made with respect to the nature of guilt in Christianity. It was noted that Christianity, like psychology, has been interested in the questions of the origin and function of guilt in personality. Christianity has been very much concerned also as to how man can be delivered from sin and guilt, and it has contended that its gospel is the only ultimate solution to the problem.

C. The final part of this section discussed a number of facets of the religious problem of guilt. Among these, the following questions were raised: Is Christianity actually effective in delivering man from sin and guilt? How does Christ save man? Does Christianity, in the hands of some of its practitioners, increase the sense of guilt, sometimes to neurotic and psychotic proportions? Is Christianity itself largely a neurotic scheme to allay the sense of guilt? What is the theological significance of the distinction between existential and pathological guilt?

Guilt As A Problem Between Religion and Psychology

This section will attempt merely to suggest some of the reasons that guilt has become an interdisciplinary problem between psychology and religion. A number of the reasons have been mentioned already in previous sections. Therefore the discussion at this time can be quite summary and brief.

It has been said that "the problem of guilt brings us to the point where psychotherapy and Christian pastoral care come very close together, but where at the same time the disagreement between these two disciplines emerges most clearly,"[1] and that "no problem has so blocked an understanding between religion and psychology as the problem of guilt and sin."[2] Some of the reasons for this are not hard to find.

In the first place, whatever conflict has arisen between psychology and religion at the point of understanding and treating problems of guilt is part and parcel of the larger historical development. The last half of the nineteenth century witnessed the blossoming out of the physical and biological sciences. Above all, it was the Age of Darwinianism, and, as is well known, the advent of Darwin's evolutionism wreaked havoc in the religious world generally. One product was the Science vs. Religion battle, with all its attendant sad results for both disciplines. Freud's attacks upon religion did not help matters.[1] While psychologists may have disclaimed any interest in metaphysical matters, theologians generally were alert enough to see that psychoanalysis did imply a theory of man, and a theory, furthermore, which was quite opposed to orthodox religious views. Moreover, psychiatry was encroaching on the time-honored perogatives of the church as the sole guardian of man's soul. Freud's views on sex and morality in general scandalized many Christians, and the Roman Catholic Church, at least, forbade its members to be psychoanalyzed. What was the fear? One can hardly reduce it simply to vested interests. No, the Church and Christianity in general feared lest psychoanalysis would cut the very nerve of the moral fibre of mankind. Libertinism loomed large on the horizon as the avowed aim of psychoanalysis. On both the theoretical and practical levels, therefore, dynamic psychology appeared, and still appears to many, as the polar opposite of religious ideas and idealism. Furthermore, certain developments within theology itself--loosely known as "liberal theology"--also seemed to seek to undermine the ancient faith. Fundamentalism arose as a reaction, and the battle lines were drawn more clearly. Thus, historical events within both psychology and religion have helped to create a problem between the two disciplines. In the understanding and treatment of guilt, this tension and conflict finds a sharp focus.

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[1] Adolph Koberle, "The Problem of Guilt," Pastoral Psychology, VIII, No. 79 (1957), 31.

[2] Bonaro W. Overstreet, "Guilt Feelings: Creative and Uncreative," Pastoral Psychology, IV, No. 54 (1955), 19.

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[1] S. Freud, The Future of An Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson (London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd., Second Impression, 1934); and S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. K. Jones (New York: Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1939).

Most Christian theology is not content to conceive of sin and guilt as being primarily a socio-cultural acquisition or accretion. Rather, Christian theology sees sin and guilt as metaphysical problems. Sin and guilt are not something man has. They are something man is.[1] In the Christian view, man is sinful and guilty; and while his sin and guilt are generally regarded as original, they are not regarded as infantile. Insofar as psychology either refuses to consider this dimension of the problem, or tries to refute this Christian claim, conflict would seem to be inevitable.

Another way to state essentially the same point of difference is to say that for Christian theology the study of man necessarily includes ontological questions; whereas psychology has, in general, eschewed all such philosophical issues. The question which theology would pose to psychology is: Can any science of man be truly scientific if it refuses to include philosophical perspectives?

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[1] The phrasing has been suggested by Kurt Goldstein, although Goldstein uses it only with respect to anxiety. Quoted in May, Existence, p. 50.

Theology usually includes not only ontological issues but axiological issues as well. Theology is concerned with values and standards of conduct. It naturally feels ill at ease, therefore, with any science of man which treats values and behavioral norms gingerly, as psychology seems to some religious people to do. This concern expresses itself on both the theoretical and therapeutic levels. Again, the problem of guilt emerges into the center of this potential area of conflict. For many ethically sensitive individuals, be they specifically religious or not, neutrality about values implies not only neutrality about ethics but, worse, ethical anarchy. Can the question of "right and wrong" be settled intelligently without first settling the question of "good and bad," i.e., valuable and worthless? Those who think not are understandably disturbed by the sometimes declared axiological neutrality of psychology.

It can be seen, therefore, that there are fundamental issues between psychology and religion which cluster about the problem of guilt. These issues arise on both the theoretical and therapeutic levels. They imply significant questions concerning both the understanding and the treatment of guilt. This study is undertaken as an essay in clarification of some of these issues. It is an heuristic effort undertaken in the hope of increasing the growing cooperation between the disciplines of psychology and religion.[1]

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[1] For a good review of the history of the relation between the two disciplines see: "Psychiatry and Religion Number," The Menninger Clinic Bulletin, XIX, No. 6 (November 1955); also, F. Preston, "Landmarks in the Relation of Religion and Psychiatry," Menninger Quarterly, No. 1 (1956).

CHAPTER II

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

In the previous chapter, approximately fifty questions with respect to guilt were raised in the course of discussing guilt as a human problem, as a psychological problem, as a religious problem, and as a problem between psychology and religion. The purpose of the discussion was to construct a frame of reference for the specific research problem of this study. The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) to delineate the specific problem of the study; (2) to describe the methodology to be employed; and (3) to make some brief bibliographical references.

1. The research problem.--As indicated in the title, this study is an inquiry into the contemporary understanding of guilt from the point of view of dynamic psychology on the one hand, and of contemporary Christian theology on the other. It seemed proper and desirable to limit the inquiry in several ways. In the first place, not all of the fifty or so questions raised in the previous chapter can be investigated thoroughly, because of limits of space and because of lack of data in some instances. Many of the questions raised are comprehensive enough to merit extended separate treatment. Some of them would sure-

ly take the student into the deepest and most complex problems of both psychology and religion. Some of the questions lie on the very frontiers of current speculation in both disciplines; therefore, much more research must be completed before adequate hypotheses can be postulated. In the light of these facts, it has seemed best to limit this investigation to four or five basic questions and to be content simply to raise the other questions, in a heuristic spirit, and to point directions in which further research may proceed with profit.

The basic questions with which this investigation is primarily concerned are:

A. How does guilt arise in personality, i.e., what is the genesis of guilt?

B. How does guilt manifest itself dynamically in personality? What are its symptomological manifestations? How do persons attempt to cope with guilt?

C. What are some of the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt?

D. What are the effective methods and techniques of therapy with respect to guilt problems?

E. What value judgment is to be placed on the role and function of guilt in human personality?

It is to be understood, of course, that these questions are to be addressed to both psychology and theology, and that "answers" are to be sought from both disciplines. Furthermore, on the basis of the previous discussion, it will be seen that these five basic questions "go to the heart of the matter" in psychology, in theology, and in the relations between the two disciplines.

In addition to limiting the questions, it has seemed advisable also to limit the fields. Both psychology and theology are very broad fields, even when the adjectives "modern" and "contemporary" are added. A limitation on the psychological side has been introduced, of course, by specifying modern, "dynamic" psychology.[1] This narrows the field down to include mainly psychiatry, clinical and abnormal psychology and psychotherapy. Even within these limits, however, the fields are too broad. Therefore, it was decided to select representative "authorities," and the choice devolved upon Sigmund Freud and Harry Stack Sullivan. Aside from their recognized reputations and status, these two men seemed a good choice for a number of reasons. Freud is the recognized "father" of modern, dynamic psychology, and his seminal thought has influenced profoundly later thinking in the field. Moreover, his metapsychology, as he liked to call it, offers a rather complete theoretical as well as a therapeutic system. Sullivan is regarded by many as the dean of American psychiatry and as one who has laid the foundations of a rather complete theoretical and therapeutic system. Therefore, by choosing Freud and Sullivan, the Founder of dynamic psychology and a thoroughly contemporary Reconstructionist are represented on the psychological side.

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[1] As used in this study, "dynamic" refers to psychological systems which strive to explain behavior in terms of motives or drives and which attribute causal efficiency to such psychological processes. Freud and psychoanalysis have been the leading influences. Such psychological systems are frequently called "depth psychologies."

Similar considerations dictated limitation of the theological side and the selection of Soren Kierkegaard and Paul Tillich. Kierkegaard is "contemporary" in that his work has only begun to exert wide influence. He has been called "the pope of modern existentialism."[1] Tillich has been characterized also by many as the most influential Protestant theologian in the world today. He, too, is a Reconstructionist, although his views appear to be more closely related to Kierkegaard's than do Sullivan's to Freud's. A rather grave limitation imposed upon the study by the selection of Kierkegaard and Tillich, however, is the exclusion of several other highly influential strains of contemporary Christian theology. For example, what about neo-orthodoxy? No real justification for selecting Christian existentialism in preference to some other equally influential system can be made. However, some selection had to be made and Christian existentialism seemed to the writer to be a good choice. The choice, however, is not pure arbitrariness nor personal whim. The writer hopes to demonstrate that an existentialist attitude offers the most fruitful ground for future cooperation and further clarification of issues between psychology and theology. For this reason, Kierkegaard and Tillich were selected.

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[1] May, Existence, p. 18.

The specific research problem has now been defined in terms of the five basic questions listed above, and within the limitations of the views of Freud and Sullivan, on the psychological side, and of Kierkegaard and Tillich on the theological side. In the hope of clarifying the problem further, the following rough hypotheses are offered in a very tentative way:

A. It is hypothesized that not only similarities but also significant differences with respect to guilt exist between psychology and theology. These differences exist on the theoretical and on the therapeutic levels. It is further hypothesized that these significant differences will be revealed by the proposed analysis of the four representatives.

B. It is hypothesized that the major significance of these differences insofar as psychology is concerned is in the realm of theory. In short, it is hypothesized that psychology can learn some important lessons from Christian existentialism, not only with respect to the understanding of guilt but also with respect to the understanding of its own nature as a science of man.

C. It is hypothesized that the major significance of the aforementioned differences insofar as theology is concerned lies in the realm of therapy, i.e., in relation to pastoral counseling and practical theology. In short, it is hypothesized that "Christian soul care" has much to learn from dynamic psychology.

D. Finally, it is hypothesized that the findings of this investigation will be significant, at least as suggestions, insofar as the future relations of psychology and theology are concerned. In the opinion of this writer, the day of superficial, uncritical cooperation--a kind of peace at any price--is past. It is time for both disciplines to recognize honestly and vigorously wherein they differ and to continue further conversations and communication in these areas of greatest tension.[1]

With these tentative hypotheses as guide-lines and in a thoroughly heuristic spirit, this investigation is undertaken.

2. Methodology.--In accordance with the definition of the problem, the investigation employed a historico-literary method. The works of the four authorities--Kierkegaard, Freud, Sullivan and Tillich--were analyzed with a view of extracting what each had to say about guilt. The

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[1] Cf. R. Finley Gayle Jr., "Conflict and Cooperation Between Psychiatry and Religion," Pastoral Psychology VII, No. 68 (November 1956), 24-36.

analysis was guided by the five basic questions proposed in the previous section. In each case, priority was given to primary sources rather than relying on interpreters or commentators of the views under consideration. Such secondary sources were consulted only for purposes of clarification and cross-checking the investigator's conclusions. Thus, for example, the focus of the analysis was upon Freud's own writings rather than upon the works of his many commentators. The same principle was followed with respect to Kierkegaard, Sullivan and Tillich.

It should be mentioned that while the five questions served as guide-lines, care was taken not to impose them as an artificial structure on any of the primary sources. This caution was exercised in order to guard against, insofar as possible, the danger of the investigator finding only what he was seeking in the first place. Such care was particularly necessary, because none of the four authorities can be said to have a systematic theory of guilt in which the five questions posed in this investigation are answered in a neat and orderly fashion. On the contrary, what each of them has to say about guilt is an almost incidental part of his total system. For example, in Sullivan's major theoretical work, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, guilt is nowhere treated separately and systematically but merits only incidental reference. As will be seen, the reason for this is that Sullivan is most concerned with anxiety, and he views guilt as a more or less superficial manifestation of anxiety. In a similar way, Freud, while having much more to say about guilt than does Sullivan, discusses guilt mainly in terms of superego formations. Furthermore, and particularly in the case of Kierkegaard, a rigid systematization of the data would be quite misleading. Existentialism is, by nature and definition, unsystematic and paradoxical. It arose as a protest against the cold, rationalistic, and highly systematic philosophy of Hegel. Therefore, Kierkegaard does not present a coldly logical analysis of anxiety, although he writes very profoundly and insightfully about anxiety as experiential reality. So it would be quite unwarranted to impose the five-question-structure, or any other rigid structure for that matter, upon Kierkegaard's works. With varying degrees of relevance, the same kind of limitation applies to all four authorities.

The study might have been made more empirical with the inclusion of relevant case history material. The writer, for example, has a number of case files from his own pastoral counseling which contain illustrative material about the manifestations of guilt in personality and some of the religious concomitants of guilt. Other case material is available in the literature. Clinical data of this type are not included, however, for a number of reasons. So far as the writer's own files are concerned, it was not included for two reasons: (1) the desire to betray in no way the principle of professional confidence, and (2) the fact that his records do not represent verbatim reports made at the time, and therefore the subjective element could not be eliminated. This latter factor applies, in the opinion of the investigator, to most case histories in the literature. Such case records represent, for the most part, condensations and summaries made by the therapist after the therapy sessions. Unless electrical recordings have been made and are reproduced in full, such case histories are excellent illustrative material but are not strictly objective data. Besides, from the existentialist point of view, even faithful transcriptions of recorded sessions cannot possibly convey the significant nuances and meanings of the recorded content.[1] Then, too, there is, of course, the practical problem of the laboriousness of including the verbatim record of even one therapeutic session. This is not to say clinical data, such as verbatim reports of therapy sessions and case histories, are useless and non-empirical. It is simply to call attention to the large subjective element in all such data and to mention some of the practical and theoretical reasons which decided the writer against their inclusion.

The order of procedure may be indicated now. This chapter concludes with some brief bibliographical references.

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[1] An excellent discussion of this point is given in May, Existence, p. 267f.

The purpose of this bibliographical note is not to present a formal survey of the literature, because the literature on the precise topic of this investigation is scant, and, further, because significant literary references will be included in the context. The next chapter will present an analysis of Soren Kierkegaard's writings in terms of their relevance for the theory and therapy of guilt. Kierkegaard is discussed first because of simple chronological priority and also because his thoughts are believed to be a good introduction to the entire subject. Chapter IV is devoted to an analysis of Freud's works. Inasmuch as Freud's early period was relatively contemporaneous with Kierkegaard's era, chronological considerations partially determined the order. However, the order was also dictated by the desire to introduce psychodynamic dimensions before discussing the second theologian, because Tillich utilizes the insights of dynamic psychology. Considerations of logical progression dictated the decision to follow the analysis of Freud with the analysis of Sullivan's works. Chapter V, therefore, is devoted to Sullivan. Chapter VI discusses the thought of Tillich and concludes the analyses of the four authorities. Chapter VII attempts a recapitulation and critical comparison of the four main bodies of data, with special emphasis upon distinguishing sharply the essential difference between psychology and theology with respect to guilt theory and therapy. Chapter VIII is devoted to a discussion of

Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. The final chapter, therefore, will discuss the significance of the essential difference, delineated in Chapter VII, for psychology, for theology and for the future relations between the two.

The entire paper may be thought of as an essay in clarification. It is hoped that it may take its place in that growing class of investigation which is seeking seriously to combine the insights of contemporary dynamic psychology with the postulates, concerns and convictions of Christian theology into a valid synthesis and productive alliance.

3. A brief bibliographic survey.--As has been stated, this investigation is somewhat in the nature of a pioneering venture, at least as the problem has been defined. There is, of course, a growing body of literature which discusses the general problem of the relation of psychology and Christian theology. Some of these titles have been referred to already in Chapter I. More will be referred to in Chapters VII and VIII, but brief references to those most heavily relied on by the writer will be made now.

One of the pioneering works in this entire field is James' The Varieties of Religious Experience.[1] From an historical point of view, not the least value of James' very readable book was to make the psychological study of religion respectable and acceptable. Propriety was achieved by virtue of the esteem and status which James enjoyed. Acceptability was achieved partly because James turned the psychological study of religion aside from the path of reductionism down which it had been started by James Leuba and Sigmund Freud.[1] By his own witness, James demonstrated that one could analyze religious phenomena and not end up a heathenish atheist. He also introduced the use of case histories into the psychological study of religion, although most of his cases came out of books and not the clinic. Perhaps, one of the most significant contributions of James' Varieties, however, was the distinction he made between the religion of the "sick soul" and the religion of the "healthy-minded." As used by James, this distinction is worth keeping in mind, for James insisted that religion ought to be understood and judged not primarily in terms of its truth-claims but rather in terms of its function and fruit in personality. The important questions to be asked of a given religious faith, therefore, are: Does it contribute to sickness or health? Is it being used by the individual to gain more authentic self-hood, or is it being used neurotically to escape confronting self and others? This pragmatic emphasis is still valid and pertinent as a guard against the genetic fallacy. In many instances, Freud's criticism of religion seems to be guilty of the genetic fallacy, a point which religious apologists have been quick to make. James' concept of the "subliminal self" and the "over-self" are also valuable because they point to the metaphysical dimensions implied in any comprehensive theory of man. His interest in mystical experiences served to remind his contemporaries that it is not adequate to account for religious experience solely in terms of its more primitive expressions. James insisted that subjective data _are nonetheless data_ and deserve attention from psychology, an emphasis more recently echoed by Carl Jung.[1] In a sense, too, James can be classified as an "unfreudian Freud," for he also found the pathological to be a fecund source of valuable insights for understanding the normal. He also attached great importance to the deeper recesses of the _psyche_, although James' views on this unconscious aspect of experience seem closer to the views of the neo-Freudians than to those of Freud himself. All in all, James' _Varieties_ is a helpful guide in the search concerning the relationship between psychology and religion.

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[1] William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1912).

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[1] A useful historical summary of the psychological study of religion will be found in Seward Hiltner, "The Psychological Understanding of Religion," The Crozier Quarterly, XXIV, No. 1, (January 1947).

A true trail-blazer in the field of clinical data and clinical experience is the monumental study by Anton T.

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[1] Carl Jung, _Answer to Job_, trans. R. F. C. Hull (New York: Pastoral Psychology Book Club, 1955), particularly "Lectori Benevolo," pp. xi-xviii.

Boisen, The Exploration of the Inner World.[1] It is to be noted that part of the value of this work derives from the fact that so much of it grew out of Boisen's own experience as a schizophrenic. Based on his personal experience and his firsthand observation of patients, Boisen's major thesis is that the dynamics of a psychotic breakdown and a religious conversion are essentially the same and that both are attempts at reorganization. Both represent a profound shaking of the foundations of the psyche and may result either in a hopeless pathological state or in creative solutions and the reintegration of life on new and sounder foundation. Boisen's inside view of the subjective aspects of schizophrenia combined with his obvious psychological and theological sophistication make his book truly a landmark in the field of the relation of psychology to theology. His discussion of "The Problem of Right and Wrong"[2] is particularly valuable to this investigation, because it makes clear that values and moral judgments are functions of man's relationship to his environment and to his social environment.[3] Therefore, Boisen contends, the problem of values may be approached empirically on the basis of actual observations and inductive reasoning; and no human behavior is likely to throw more light upon this problem than that of individuals who are grappling with the overwhelming sense of moral failure and isolation and are breaking or broken under the strains of emotional crises.[1] A further value of Boisen's study has been referred to already, namely the excellent case material he supplies with respect to some of the psychopathological manifestations of guilt and the role played therein by religious ideas.[2] The entire second half of Boisen's book[3] is indispensable to this investigation, particularly in terms of the discussion to be presented in Chapter VIII.

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[1] Boisen, op. cit.

[2] Ibid., pp. 163-180.

[3] Ibid., p. 180.

Albert C. Outler's Psychotherapy and the Christian Message,[4] represents a class of literature written by men who are primarily theologians but who also are oriented in psychodynamics. Outler points out that both modern psychology and Christian theology are "wisdoms about life," but, he insists, it is by no means certain that they are the same or essentially reconcilable wisdoms.[5] Concerning psychotherapy and Christian thought, Outler writes:

> There is, on the one hand, an important consensus be-

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[1] Ibid.

[2] As, e.g., in the case of Albert W., Ibid., p. 21f.

[3] Ibid., Part II, p. 125f.

[4] Outler, op. cit.

[5] See especially Outler, op. cit., Chaps. I and VI.

> tween the two, especially in the practical aspect of interpersonal relations. But there is also an unresolved conflict in theory, which has created a long-standing confusion that deserves more careful attention than it has, in fact, received.[1]

To the same class belongs Roberts' Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man.[2] One of the chief values of Roberts' book is his suggestion that Christian theology needs to be reconstructed in the light of the findings of dynamic psychology. Particularly, the doctrines of sin and redemption are not only illuminated by the insights of modern psychology but also are challenged toward a thorough-going reconstruction by these insights. Roberts attempted to make some beginnings toward such reconstruction, and it is tragic that his work was terminated prematurely by his untimely death.

From Britain, there has come recently a book which also belongs to this general class of literature. The reference is to Guntrip's Psychotherapy and Religion.[3] One of the values of Guntrip's books is that it introduces to American audiences the important modifications of Freudian psychoanalysis made by the British analyst, W. R. D. Fairbairn. These modifications were made because of certain "gaps" in Freud's system, and Fairbairn's and Guntrip's criticism of Freudian theory was very helpful to the writer. Guntrip also has some useful things to say about the need for an adequate philosophical framework for psychology, about the role of guilt in religion and in personality disturbance, and about the relation of psychology to religion. Reference will be made later to many of these ideas.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[2] David E. Roberts, Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1951).

[3] Guntrip, op. cit.

A final reference is to Runestam's Psychoanalysis and Christianity, a book which has been mentioned already. This book is a revision of a work that first appeared in 1923. The author has been professor of Dogmatics and Moral Theology at Uppsala University in Sweden, and Lutheran Bishop of the Swedish Diocese of Karlstad. Runestam begins by examining the phenomenon of repression, asking what is the moral quality in the nervous anxiety which repression causes. His conclusion is that guilt is at the basis of nervousness, and that the major repression is the repression of spiritual values and goals. Thus, Runestam's views are out of harmony with general psychoanalytic theory but quite similar to certain existential views. In his view, man needs his repressions and the sense of guilt, and the aim of Christian soul care is not to extirpate the sense of guilt but to exacerbate it. In this, as well as at other points, Christian soul care diverges sharply from psychoanalysis, according to Runestam:

> My chief objection to the modus operandi of psychoanalysis is that it is based on a faulty and shallow psychology with its superficial notion of man's nature,

> and this in spite of its vaunted depth analysis. And the help it affords will be such as might be expected, even if at certain times and in certain respects it intervenes in a drastic manner.[1]

Here is a forthright criticism of psychoanalytic therapy based on the criticism of its theory of man. In Runestam's view, the main deficiency of psychoanalysis is its inadequate and essentially mechanistic theory of man. This view has much in common with the views of existentialist analysts, as we shall see. Another note sounded by Runestam also is worthy of an audience, especially by clergymen. He observes: "Even within Christian camps one can find a dizzy ecstasy over psychology and psychoanalysis with the proclamation that Christian soul care will please oblige by taking heed to, and being guided by, the findings of psychology."[2]

Against such a mood, Runestam warns:

> One must not lose one's head in adoration of psychology as such, simply because it makes many valuable observations, observations which may be of use in Christian soul care. In any case, what must not be lost sight of is that, as far as Christian soul care is concerned, it is decisively important that the basic Christian concept of man and of what Jesus Christ intends for man shall be constantly kept in view.[3]

In Chapter VIII, there will be occasion to elaborate on this contention.

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[1] Arvid Runestam, "Psychoanalysis and Christian Soul Care," Pastoral Psychology, IX, No. 89 (December, 1958), 52.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 53.

Reference was made in the first chapter to a number of books, written mainly by psychiatrists, which seek to ameliorate the tension between psychology and religion caused by Freud's attacks. The number of such books may be expanded by referring briefly to several others. W. Earl Biddle has written a book, the purpose of which is "to bring Freud's work into conformity with Christian beliefs--to integrate religion and psychiatry."[1] Biddle is a Roman Catholic, and it is interesting that an attempt at integration should come from this quarter. In the opinion of the writer, Biddle succeeds in reconciling the two only by glossing over some very important differences. Biddle insists that "Freud's basic quarrel was not with religion but with religious dogma."[2] Even if he is right in this contention, which is highly debatable,[3] one would have to ask: If Freud's quarrel were with religious dogma, would he not still find himself at serious odds with the dogma of Roman Catholicism? Nevertheless, Biddle's book is valuable because it does serve to emphasize that both religion and psychiatry are concerned with the health of man. As Biddle contends, the two approaches have much to learn from each other, and they can cooperate on the practical level. In the opinion of the writer, however, it is unfortunate that Biddle has not given more attention to the theoretical issues.

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[1] Biddle, op. cit., p. 1

[2] Ibid., p. 2.

[3] Cf. the views of E. Jones, Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, 347f.

A summary of the relation of psychoanalysis to religion can be found in Mullahy's Oedipus: Myth and Complex,[1] as well as in Jones' work on Freud.[2] Mention has been made previously of Fromm's Terry Lectures[3] at Yale University, which are a brief and careful discussion of the subject. R. S. Lee[4] has followed the general line of Freud's thought and has attempted to take an undiluted libido theory and apply it to a wide range of religious phenomena. Lee argues strongly for the distinction of super-ego religion from ego religion, and he indicates that the latter alone is basically healthy. Freud, Lee believes, erred in attributing all forms of Christian piety to superego functions. There is possible an ego religion which avoids the malevolent ambivalence of superego religion. In religion of the latter type, however, God is both feared and loved after the manner of the unresolved Oedipal conflict. The sense of sin is increased as the superego gains dominance. Conversely, the ego is made to feel its guilt and worthlessness more intensely. The more guilty the ego feels, the more the superego attacks it, thereby increasing the sense of guilt. "The only brake on the process is obtained through penances and mortification, even to the extent of self-inflicted pain. By accepting these the ego is able to regain some of its self-esteem, for they are a token of its obedience to the superego."[1] This distinction is reminiscent of James' distinction of the "religion of the sick soul" and "religion of the healthy-minded," except that Lee has formulated the dichotomy in the Freudian terms of ego and superego.

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[1] Patrick Mullahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex (New York: Hermitage Press, Inc., 1948), pp. 95-102.

[2] E. Jones, op. cit., III, Chap. 13.

[3] Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion.

[4] Lee, op. cit.

A somewhat similar dichotomy underlies the discussion by the Swiss psychoanalyst-clergyman Oscar Pfister. In Christianity and Fear,[2] Pfister distinguishes between two strains of Christian tradition, the one based on fear and the other on love. He maintains that the religion of Jesus was essentially a healthy, love-oriented religion but that this wholesome religion has been repeatedly distorted and transformed into a fear-oriented religion at the hands of Jesus' interpreters. In the latter form, Christianity has engendered much neurotic fear and guilt, and fabricated an elaborate doctrine of atonement and redemption--all of which is essentially contrary to the intent and purpose of

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[1] Ibid., p. 163.

[2] Oscar Pfister, Christianity and Fear, trans. W. W. Johnson (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948).

Jesus.[1] Stein has analyzed Pfister's book at some length and extracted its main relevance for an understanding of guilt.[2] Inasmuch as use will be made of Stein's analysis later, there is no need for an extended discussion of Pfister's work at this time.

What Pfister did with Christianity and fear (or, better, anxiety, *Angst*), Cole has done with Christianity and sex.[3] Cole has sought to analyze the relationship of sex and guilt in Christianity and to relate these findings to the viewpoints of psychoanalysis. Depending heavily upon Reinhold Niebuhr,[4] Cole points out that, rightly understood, Christianity has never contended that sex *per se* is evil. The sin attacked by Paul, Augustine, Aquinas and Luther is *concupiscence*, not simply sexuality; and concupiscence is an effect of original sin, not its cause.[5] It is not the fact that man is a sexual animal that makes him feel guilty. Rather, it is the recognition that he can, because of his freedom, so easily sin with respect to sex that makes sexuality so fecund a source of guilt. Guilt, shame and sexual difficulties, therefore, all have their source "in the same fons et origo as all other human derangement, namely, in freedom and sin."[1] Guilt due to sex is not, however, simply the unfortunate result of cultural repression. Niebuhr believes Freud was wrong in this opinion. For Niebuhr, all ethical questions are routed in anthropology, in the doctrine of man. Without an adequate ontological doctrine, therefore, neither sex nor guilt arising from sexuality can be rightly understood. There is, of course, a neurotic and false guilt, "which weeps over what cannot be changed, which does not lead to positive action but wallows in self-torture and self-negation,"[2] and Christianity, quite as much as psychoanalysis, must view such guilt as a clinical problem. The depth dimension of guilt, however, is its existential character, and to the extent that psychoanalysis fails to recognize this dimension, both its theory and its therapy are superficial.

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 157-176.

[2] Stein, *op. cit*., particularly the last chapter on "Guilt and Christianity."

[3] William G. Cole, *Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).

[4] *Ibid*., p. 188f.

[5] Reinhold Niebuhr, "Sex Standards in America," *Christianity and Crisis*, VIII, No. 9 (May, 1948), 24.

A final source from which the writer has drawn frequently for insights into the relation of psychology and theology are the monthly issues of Pastoral Psychology. Each issue of this journal contains an article or two touching upon some phase of this problem. Frequent reference is made to these articles throughout this study.

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[1] Cole, op. cit., p. 189.

[2] Ibid., p. 321.

Thus far the discussion has centered mainly on material dealing with the relation of psychology to religion. Attention is now turned more specifically to the problem of guilt. In this class is the study by Stein, which has been quoted previously. Stein's specific concern was to analyze various psychological theories with respect to guilt-formation. He has presented an analysis of psychoanalytic theory, although his analysis is more directly concerned with Freudian theory than Freud's theory. Relying heavily upon Fenichel's exposition,[1] Stein concludes that from the psychoanalytic viewpoint guilt may be defined as a "specialized form of anxiety," or "a topically defined anxiety."[2] He discusses "the experiential minutiae connected with conscience formation,"[3] and concludes that Freud placed too great reliance on the objective fear of castration as the motive power of the superego. In Stein's view, the phenomenological theory of Snygg and Combs, and the views of Andras Angyal, offer a more adequate context for understanding guilt-formation than does the psychoanalytic theory, and he believes that a "broad eclecticism" provides the most adequate theoretical foundation for understanding guilt.[4] With respect to guilt and Christianity,

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[1] Fenichel, op. cit.

[2] Stein, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

[3] Ibid., pp. 67-101.

[4] Stein, op. cit., p. 62f.

Stein assigns validity to Pfister's analysis and finds in the thought of the Swiss analyst-clergyman a clue to the Christian solution of the problem of guilt, namely, "the *agape* concept."[1] Stein says, "The *agape* concept is the only adequate restorative principle in the treatment of guilt on any psychological or theological level."[2] This *agape* concept, he points out, is the solution offered by Pfister, Boisen and Sherrill.[3] Basically, it consists of "the emphasis on the free, forgiving love and grace of God, mediated in a freely loving fashion, which refrains from the temptation to project the desire for revenge into the concept of God, and the desire to dominate by some kind of penance-demand." Stein also discusses "the problem of guilt-productive authoritarianism."[4] This problem concerns the ambiguous role of the average clergyman, who is cast in the role of both prophet and pastor. On the one hand, the clergyman must emphasize the demanding righteousness of God, and appear as an authoritarian; but on the other hand, the clergyman must emphasize the mercy and grace of God and appear as permissive and forgiving. Stein offers a solution to this dilemma; namely, a reinterpretation and reorientation of the minister's role. The clergyman must see that "even though Christianity holds up a perfectionistic ethic, when rightly presented (analytically) it is held forth within the context of permissiveness and forgiveness."[1] The minister's role is not to increase fear and the concomitant sense of guilt. It is, rather, to emphasize so the forgiving love of God as to allay fear and alleviate destructive guilt. The final problem, touched upon by Stein, is "the problem of psychological vs. theological norms."[2] He asks: "Supposing a certain theological teaching stimulates profound psychological difficulty: which category is to have prior normative value?"[3] Stein does not attempt to settle the problem, acknowledging that it "is sufficiently an issue to warrant an entire research project."[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 124-154 and the whole of Chap. V.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 143-154.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 154f.

Guilt and Redemption by Sherrill[5] contains much that is relevant to this study. Sherrill, as already noted, points out how much Christian theology and practice is relatively ineffective in relieving the intense sense of guilt, despite its "remarkable metaphysical theory of redemption."[6] Sherrill, a religious educator and Episcopal bishop, does not go into great detail insofar as the psychodynamics of guilt are concerned: "As feeling, 'guilt' refers to the emotional aspect of the experience of one who stands in judgment upon himself, and condemns himself or at least acknowledges others' condemnation of himself as deserved."[1] While this is an accurate description of the experience of guilt, it may not be an adequate psychodynamic explanation. Perhaps, this "inadequacy" is due to the fact that Sherrill approaches the problem of guilt mainly from the religious viewpoint. Guilt, he believes, arises from man's capacity for moral discrimination,[2] and this capacity is "ultimate" in human nature.[3] Sherrill is convinced that Christianity, with its agape concept, has the ultimate solution to the problem of guilt, and the Christian Church is potentially an effective therapeutic and redeeming fellowship.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 156

[2] Ibid., p. 160f.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Sherrill, op. cit.

[6] Ibid., p. 14

Dodson has made an empirical study in which he found that guilt is often a factor in choosing the ministry as a profession.[5] Using standardized tests and rating procedures, Dodson studied fifty seminarians and fifty graduate students in an effort to determine unconscious factors which play a role in choosing the Protestant ministry as a vocation. He found that ministerial students were significantly[1] more guilt-ridden than the control group, which consisted of non-ministerial students. Dodson concludes that "one of the motives for entering the ministry is the unconscious alleviation of guilt feelings."[2] Dodson also found that ministerial students tend to have more trouble than others in handling sexual and hostile feelings.[3] One of the ways they handle these conflicts is to turn sexual and hostile feelings inward and feel guilty over them. "Such behavior would be expected to contribute to the general reservoir of guilt feelings, and it is these feelings for which they seek to atone by entering the ministry."[4] Although Dodson's samplings were small, his conclusions seem valid and reliable. His study is valuable because it is one of the few attempts to apply thoroughly empirical procedures to this aspect of the problem of guilt.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 62 [2] *Ibid.*, p. 67f.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 69

[4] Lewis J. Sherrill, *The Gift of Power* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1955).

[5] Fitzhugh J. Dodson, "Personality Factors in the Choice of the Protestant Ministry as a Vocation" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Religion, University of Southern California, 1957).

In conclusion, brief reference will be made to the literature which bears on the existentialist aspect of the problems. One book, which has been published so recently that there has not been time to digest it thoroughly, promises to be valuable. The reference is to Existence, edited by Rollo May.[1] The principal purpose of the book is to introduce the new European movement--existential analysis--to American readers. May has contributed a worthwhile introduction to the origins and significance of the existential movement in psychology, including some historical notes as to the relation between existential philosophy and existential analysis.[2] As for the essence of existentialism, May writes:

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[1] Significance as indicated by statistical methods.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 112.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 113.

[4] _Ibid_., pp. 114-115.

> Existentialism, in short, is the endeavor to understand man by cutting below the cleavage between subject and object which has bedeviled Western thought and science since shortly after the Renaissance. This cleavage Binswanger calls "the cancer of all psychology up to now . . . the cancer of the doctrine of subject-object cleavage of the world."[3]

Existentialism, therefore, seeks to bridge the chasm between what is abstractly true and what is existentially real for the given living person.[4] From this point of view, anxiety and guilt are to be understood as ontological realities.[5] Kierkegaard understood this fact well and wrote one of the most profound and psychologically penetrating analysis of anxiety of all time.[6] Following this existentialist lead, May insists on distinguishing anxiety and fear, and he identifies the former as being primarily ontological in character.[1] Guilt, too, has an ontological character. The main characteristics of ontological guilt are: First, that everyone participates in it. Second, that it does not arise from cultural prohibitions, or from introjection of cultural mores: it is rooted in the fact of self-awareness. Third, it is not to be confused with morbid or neurotic guilt. Fourth, "ontological guilt does not lead to symptom formation, but has constructive effects in the personality."[2] These, obviously, are assertions to which we shall have to return later. An additional value of Existence is the case study material it presents, more than half of its 425 pages being devoted to this material.

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[1] May (ed.), op. cit.

[2] Ibid., Chap. I

[3] Ibid., p. 11.

[4] Ibid., p. 12.

[5] Ibid., p. 50f.

[6] Ibid., p. 14. The reference is to Kierkegaard's The Concept of Dread.

An anthology of existentialist writings has been prepared by Roberts, with special attention to the relevance of existentialism to religious belief.[3] Once again, the Editor has written a succinct introduction to existentialism.[4] Included in the book are excerpts from Pascal, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel. Among the main values of existentialism for Christianity Roberts discusses are the "prophetic protest" against "an idolatrous attitude toward science";[1] its "deep-seated distrust of all efforts to compel religious belief through devising of arguments or so called 'proofs' for the reality of God";[2] and "a drastically realistic acquaintance with the stuff of which human existence is made. For it exposes and explores, just as depth-psychology has been doing, the full and often terrifying terrain of guilt, anxiety, despair and nothingness."[3]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 50-55. This point of view is expressed more fully in May, The Meaning of Anxiety.

[2] Ibid., p. 55

[3] David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

[4] Ibid., pp. 3-11.

A study of Sartre's existentialism has been prepared by Stern.[4] Sartre has proposed an existentialist psychoanalysis which differs from Freud's psychoanalysis by attempting to analyze the ontological aspects of psychological problems. This is in keeping with the general existentialist attitude. Sartre insists that such concepts as Freud's oedipus complex or Adler's inferiority complex are not irreducible. They do not, Sartre insists, constitute ultimate data. More fundamental than these is what Sartre calls man's original choice. This original choice is the choice of one's being-in-the-world. It is man's "fundamental project". Speaking of the individual, Sartre says:

> At the beginning he is not anything. He will become what he has projected to become, but there is nothing previous to his project of himself. And

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[1] Ibid., p. 333. [2] Ibid., p. 334.

[3] Ibid., p. 335.

[4] Alfred Stern, Sartre, His Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953.)

> his project expresses his original choice.[1]

Man is his choice, and the task of existentialist psychoanalysis is to determine man's original choice, his fundamental project. In this view, therefore, human existence is through and through moral. Sartre rejects Freud's concept of the unconscious, severely criticizes Freud's amorality and substitutes his own concept of "bad faith."[2] Bad faith is a lie of a specific type. It is a lie to oneself. According to Sartre, Freud was guilty of replacing bad faith by a lie without a liar. As Stern explains:

> In empirical psychoanalysis the liar, which is I, myself, is replaced by concepts of the unconscious, the id, repression, censorship, etc., which are not I. I am an ego, but I am not the id, which compels me to steal. Freud's ideas of the unconscious id and of censorship acting without our knowledge allows us to consider ourselves not as liars but as deceived persons of good faith. . . . They are nothing but vehicles of bad faith, means of practicing our bad faith in good faith.[3]

The net effect of Sartre's concept of bad faith, therefore, is to reintroduce personal responsibility once again into the very core of man's being. If one feels guilty, it is because one has chosen to project himself as guilty in order, Sartre would say, to escape the threat of non-being. For terrible as it may be to experience guilt, it is far less terrifying than to experience Angst (usually translated, anxiety[1]). Thus, in Sartre's existentialist view, it is impossible and immoral to separate psychology and values.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 103.

[2] Jean Sartre, L'Etre et le Neant (Paris: Gallimand, 1943).

[3] Stern, op. cit., p. 115.

Summary.--This bibliographical section has not sought to be comprehensive but, instead, selective. Purposely excluded, because they will be introduced in context, were the main primary and secondary sources dealing with Freud, Sullivan, Kierkegaard and Tillich. The principal categories have been literature dealing with the relation of psychology to religion, literature dealing with specific aspects of Christianity and psychoanalysis, literature dealing with guilt as a psychological and theological problem, and literature in which various aspects of existentialism were discussed.

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[1] The problems relative to translating Angst into English are discussed in Chapter III.

[2] See especially, Stern, op. cit., Chap. XXIII, p. 175f.

CHAPTER III

SOREN A. KIERKEGAARD

1. Biographical backgrounds.[1]--In many ways, Soren Aabye Kierkegaard[2] is a good "case study" for the problem of this investigation. His life and work were deeply influenced by feelings of guilt, and he exemplifies the attempt to wrestle with guilt and its concomitants on both the religious and the psychological levels.

> Every circumstance combined to make Kierkegaard suffer. His father was obsessed by guilt at the memory of having cursed God; his mother was a serving girl whom his father had seduced before marriage; the frail and nervously labile constitution he inherited was further damaged by a fall from a tree. His intellectual precociousness combined with his father's intense religious instruction gave him in childhood the consciousness of an adult.[3]

In his Journal, S. K. once wrote: "Guilt, it seemed, rested on our whole family."[4]

S. K., the youngest son of a prosperous Danish merchant was born on May 5, 1813, in Copenhagen where, except for brief visits to Berlin, he lived until his death on November 11, 1855. The critical events in his life were: a profound spiritual disturbance, cryptically referred to by him as "The Great Awakening, sometime in 1835," his engagement in 1840 to Regina Olsen, and his breaking off the engagement a year later; the attack made upon him, at his own invitation, by a newspaper all through 1846; and finally his attack on the Established Church carried out during the last nine months of his life. Bishop Martensen, a contemporary, wrote of "the melancholy Dane":[1] "He was a noble instrument who had a crack in his soundboard. . . . No one can say to what degree he is accountable."[2] While one need not concur in this judgment of S. K.'s psychic health made by an antagonist, there can be little doubt that Kierkegaard did suffer great psychic distress. In his Journal, he writes:

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[1] The most widely used biographies in English are those by Walter Lowrie. These are listed in the Bibliography.

[2] The common practice of using the initials S. K. in place of the full name will be followed.

[3] W. H. Auden, The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1952), pp. 1-2.

[4] T. H. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. xv.

> I have just returned from a party of which I was the life and soul; wit poured from my lips, everyone laughed and admired me--but I went away--and the dash should be as long as the earth's orbit------------and wanted to shoot myself.[3]

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[1] The term is suggested by H. V. Martin, Kierkegaard, The Melancholy Dane (London: The Epworth Press, 1950).

[2] Croxall, op. cit., p. 244.

[3] Robert Bretall, (ed.), A Kierkegaard Anthology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 7. The entry was made in the Journal in 1836.

A later entry made in the same year, 1836, reveals how keenly S. K. felt this cleavage in his being. He wrote: "I am a Janus Bifrons; I laugh with one face, I weep with the other."[1]

The Swiss psychologist, Pfister, describes Kierkegaard as:

> An unfortunate whose grievous fear neurosis compelled him to practice keen observation, whose father ruined all his childhood so he never tasted the joys of being a child, who was forced inside the Christian categories by well-intentioned violence, who failed to find relief from his melancholy through his engagement, to whom God became a postulate assumed in self-defence, and who at the turning-point of his life looked to Jesus to give him victory over melancholy. . . . The way to salvation he never found for himself nor pointed out to others.[2]

It is not necessary to decide at this juncture whether or not Pfister is right in his last contention.[3] The point is that in his life and work S. K. exhibited data of value to the student of the psychology of religion. He himself is a study in how guilt manifests itself in personality, how psychic distress can motivate a person to seek the resolution of personal difficulties through religion, and how personal experiences of this type can produce deep insights of a religious and psychological nature. It is quite impossible, as well as inappropriate, to understand and correctly interpret Kierkegaard's work without, at least, a rudimentary knowledge and appreciation of the man's temperament and personal experiences.

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[1] Ibid., p. 8. Entry is dated July 9, 1836.

[2] Pfister, op. cit., p. 48.

[3] Lowrie, for example, believes S. K. found "salvation" in the Easter experience of 1848. See R. Bretall, op. cit., footnote, p. 422.

2. General Notes on S. K. as an author.--"Kierkegaard is a puzzling and difficult writer who cannot be understood without patience," so writes one authority.[1] One reason is that he "is exceedingly fond of mystification."[2] Dru, one of the first to translate S. K.'s works into English, once wrote angrily to Lowrie, another translator: "One of these days I am going to say what I think of his vile, slovenly style, his clumsy, unnecessary terminology."[3]

In addition to these stylistic difficulties, there are the inherent language difficulties. Lowrie says, "I would vent my spite first of all upon the Danish language,"[4] and notes that there are some words which simply forbid translation. As in English, some Danish words have dual meanings, or are ambiguous. Thus, for example, the same Danish word means both "sensuous" and "sensual." A more serious difficulty arises when a word has no exact English equivalent. One crucial example of this problem concerns the Danish word "Angst." That the matter is not simple is indicated by the fact that the Spanish translation of S. K.'s The Concept of Dread uses angustia. Unamuno, writing in French, used agonie; but two later French translators used angoisse. Most English translators have followed the lead of Professor Hollander in using "dread"--after a desperate search for something better.[1] The problem cannot be solved, however, on the basis of linguistics alone.

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[1] Croxall, op. cit., p. i.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

[3] S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. viiif.

[4] Ibid.

Another factor to be considered in seeking to understand S. K. is his "existentialism." An exhaustive analysis of existentialism lies beyond the scope of this study,[2] but whoever would understand Kierkegaard must become acquainted with the existentialist mode of thinking, for "in any discussion of Christian existentialism, Soren Kierkegaard is by all odds the most important figure."[3] Like all existentialists, S. K. found a clue to the meaning of ultimate issues in his own experience. Very early in life he discovered that he must "find a truth which is true for me, the idea for which I am to live and die."[1] According to Kierkegaard, the real task of life is to be objective towards oneself and subjective towards all others. To know what suffering is and means, for example, one must suffer, and not simply become a professor of the fact that another has suffered. To use a favorite existentialist phrase: "Truth is subjectivity."[2] Much of Kierkegaard's writing is subjectivistic in the sense that it is conditioned by, and exhibits, his own experience. Thus, for example, Fear and Trembling contains many autobiographical details concerning his love for Regina Olsen, such details being only thinly disguised by literary masks. Related to this is his prolific use of pseudonyms, to which Martin Thrust refers as "Kierkegaard's marionette theatre."[3] It is not always easy to tell whether S. K. is really expressing his personal conviction or, like Socrates whom he greatly admired, is simply playing the role of the gadfly and provocateur.[4]

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[1] A fuller discussion of this problem will be found in Lowrie's translation of The Concept of Dread. See the introductory pages.

[2] A recent treatment, with a section on S. K., is David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief, ed. Roger Hazelton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

[3] Ibid., p. 63.

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[1] The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard: A Selection, ed. and trans. Alexander Dru (Oxford University Press, 1938), entry 1260.

[2] Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief, p. 7. He warns against misinterpreting this dictum.

[3] This point is discussed in Croxall, op. cit., p. 6. The same source has an Appendix, p. 254, which lists the pseudonyms used by S. K.

[4] Before leaving the "existentialist aspect" of S. K.'s work, it should be mentioned that a simple outline of the basic starting-points of Existentialism will be found in Auden, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

> In approaching Kierkegaard it is essential to realize that there is a definite and progressive plan in Kierkegaard's authorship, so that it is impossible rightly to understand any particular book unless it is seen in relationship to the whole. This progressive plan goes hand in hand with a progressiveness in thought content also.[1]

In Stages on Life's Way[2] S. K. presents his basic literary framework. Life may be lived on one of three levels or "stages"--the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious stage. Correspondingly, Kierkegaard's writings belong to one of these three stages. Only in his avowedly religious works does S. K. profess to be speaking for himself, and he indicates this by dropping the pseudonyms for the most part. However, there is a unifying theme running through all his work, and most authorities agree that S. K. was always religious. As he himself tells us in The Point of View,[3] his one thought was to analyze "what it means to be a Christian--in Christendom." The whole of his authorship centers about this question.

3. Kierkegaard as a theologian.--Although rather lately discovered, S. K.'s influence upon modern Christian theology has been great. Within one generation his works

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[1] Croxall, op. cit., p. 1. The first three chapters of this book contain a discussion of S. K.'s over-all plan and method.

[2] S. K., Stages on Life's Way, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: University Press, 1940).

[3] S. K., The Point of View for My Work as an Author, trans. Walter Lowrie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939).

have leaped from obscurity into international prominence, and his influence extends not only to Christians but to non-Christians and atheistic forms of existentialism such as those represented by Heidegger and Sartre. While S. K. describes with remarkable insight such psychological phenomena as dread and despair, he is basically a metaphysician and theologian. As will be shown soon, he believed that psychology can only lead one to the place where dogmatics must take over. While he thought of The Concept of Dread primarily as a psychological work and so designated it, along with Sickness Unto Death, Pfister would seem to be right in describing it as "not so much a psychological study as a metaphysico-theological speculation."[1] This is not to dismiss the keen psychological insight both works contain, insights which shall be discussed presently; but it is to place S. K. where he seems to belong--to theology primarily, and to psychology only incidentally. However, he is a theologian who reveals a dynamic sensitivity, and he is no rationalist. While S. K. had great respect for Hegel's rational powers, he hated his rationalism. On every possible occasion he attacked "the System." This again relates to his "existentialism," although he probably would have eschewed Existentialism as a philosophical system quite as vehemently as he rejected Hegelianism.

As Lowrie says, "Kierkegaard was essentially a

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[1] Pfister, op. cit., p. 46.

'Catholic Christian'--understanding the word 'catholic' in its broadest sense. . . . But Soren Kierkegaard was also a Protestant, and the whole tenor of his thought points toward a new and distinctively Protestant synthesis, parallel to the medieval Catholic one."[1] His protest, passionate and sometimes uncritical as it was, against the rationalizing theology of his day, opened the door on new vistas of greater rapport between theology and dynamic psychology. H. A. Reinhold has called S. K. "the greatest Protestant of the nineteenth century" and "the profoundest interpreter of the psychology of the religious life . . . since St. Augustine."[2] This is no little praise from a Roman Catholic. It is not the purpose of this study to expound S. K.'s theology as such,[3] except as it relates to an understanding of guilt. The main purpose of this brief comment has been to indicate the importance of S. K.'s theological contributions. The synthesis of which Lowrie spoke[4] is, perhaps, finding its beginnings in the theological work of Paul Tillich, which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

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[1] Quoted in Brettall, op. cit., p. xxiv.

[2] The Commonweal, XXXV (April 10, 1942), 608.

[3] A brief and helpful treatment can be found in H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology (London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1937), pp. 218-251. Other references are given in the Bibliography.

[4] Supra.

4. The dynamic character of Kierkegaard's work.--As an existential thinker vitally concerned with "truth for me," S. K. was primarily interested in a change in himself and others--a change in motives, feelings, and hopes--instead of a mere increase in the fund of knowledge. In this literal and general sense, therefore, his thought may be described as "dynamic." In a more specific sense, too, as anticipatory of a number of concepts later developed by Freud and dynamic psychology, Kierkegaard was "dynamic."[1] As has been said earlier, S. K. felt the task of life is to become objective toward oneself and subjective toward others.[2] Is this not akin to the modern emphasis upon developing self-awareness? "A great deal of Kierkegaard's work is addressed to the man who has already become uneasy about himself, and by encouraging him to look more closely at himself, shows him that his condition is more serious than he thought."[3] Kierkegaard knew how easy it is for a man to delude himself. "The man who pretends his view of life is determined by sheer reason is both tiresome and un-

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[1] Cf. the discussion and definition of "dynamic" in H. B. English and A. C. English, A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytic Terms (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1958), pp. 165-166.

[2] This thought is expressed especially in "The Subjective Thinker," Philosophical Fragments, trans. D. F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936).

[3] Auden, op. cit., p. 18.

perceptive . . . S. K. found him essentially comic."[1] In his Journal, under date of August 1, 1835, S. K. wrote: "One must know oneself before knowing anything else. It is only after a man has thus understood himself inwardly and thus seen his way, that life acquires peace and significance. . ."[2]

Bretall writes:

> In view of the remarkable passage, "Despair is the Sickness unto Death," it is clear that Kierkegaard understood the "death instinct" fifty years before Freud. Indeed, the whole murky realm of the subconscious is here opened up in so illuminating a fashion as to prove Kierkegaard one of the fathers of "depth psychology."[3]

It is apparent that S. K. was aware of the many phenomena subsequently analyzed in a more thorough fashion by Freud and Freudians. For example, he writes in The Concept of Dread: "Dread is the qualification of the dreaming spirit, and as such has its place in psychology. When awake the difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is a nothing vaguely hinted at."[4] Again in the same context, "Spirit is dreaming in man."[5] His discussion of "the demoniacal" as

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[1] Bretall, op. cit., p. xx.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

[3] Ibid., p. 341.

[4] Auden, op. cit., p. 163.

[5] Ibid., p. 162.

"shut-upness," of "the sudden," and of the role of silence[1] reveals a depth of dynamic understanding uncommon in the pre-Freudian era. His psychology is probably more poetic than scientific and, as Pfister[2] points out, undoubtedly colored by his own psychic difficulties; but it is nonetheless remarkably "modern." "The emergence of evil out of fear and the production of new fear out of evil agrees exactly with scientific observation,"[3] Pfister concedes.

S. K. also shows a dynamic appreciation for the role of sex. He writes: "The whole question about the significance of the sexual, and its significance in the particular spheres, has undeniably been poorly answered until now, and above all it is very seldom answered with the right feeling."[4] Breaking with much Christian tradition,[5] which saw sex as sinful, Kierkegaard declared, "the sexual itself is not the sinful."[6] Sensuousness is not sin, he insists; but "by sin sensuousness becomes sinfulness."[7] Sensuousness corresponds proportionately with dread."[8] The more sensuousness, the more dread; but it does not follow, the more sensuousness the more sin, or the more dread the more sin, nor the more guilt. Neither sensuousness nor dread, _per se_, is an imperfection, "since on the contrary the greatness of it is prophetically a measure of the perfection."[1] Those acquainted with Freud's views of anxiety and its relation to sex and guilt will recognize the kinship of thought here.

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[1] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. 110f.

[2] Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[4] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. 60.

[5] See particularly Cole, *op. cit.*, on this point.

[6] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. 61.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 57. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

Like Freud and depth psychologists in general, S. K. recognized also the solidarity of the human race. "Every individual," he writes, "is himself and the race."[2] Scattered throughout his writings are many other gems of dynamic insight, although S. K. classed only _Sickness Unto Death_ and _The Concept of Dread_ as strictly psychological works. He recognized, however, that with these two books "belonged _Fear and Trembling_, forming a trilogy: Fear, Dread, and Despair."[3] Croxall has said, _Sickness Unto Death_ and _The Concept of Dread_ show "a specially deep psy-psychologist at work."[4]

In preparation for what S. K. has to contribute to the understanding of guilt, it now becomes necessary to summarize what he has to say about dread and despair. The latter will be considered first, because dread is more closely related to guilt in Kierkegaard's thought.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 57.

[2] Auden, _op. cit._, p. 169. Also, S.K., _The Concept of Dread_, p. 16.

[3] S. K., _The Concept of Dread_, p. vi.

[4] Croxall, _op. cit_., footnote, p. xvii.

5. S. K.'s analysis of despair.[1]--Despair is a category of the ethico-religious stage, and only on this scale can it be defined.[2] The sensuous man is in despair, but since he lives in the sensuous categories agreeable/disagreeable, he is not aware of his true state.[3] Nevertheless, "every human existence which is not conscious of itself as spirit, or conscious of itself before God as spirit. . . however intensely it enjoys life aesthetically--every such existence is after all despair,"[4] says Kierkegaard. The only difference between the despairing man who is unconscious of being in despair and he who is conscious of his condition is that the former is "merely a negative step further from the truth and from salvation. Despair itself is a negativity, unconsciousness of it is a new negativity."[5] The situation is not altogether unlike the alcoholic who is unaware that he is an alcoholic, and the al-

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[1] The quotations in the following discussion will be taken largely from R. Bretall's A Kierkegaard Anthology. For justification of this procedure see, Bretall, op. cit., p. 34f.

[2] Ibid., p. 348.

[3] Ibid., p. 345. Cf. Freud's pleasure/pain principle.

[4] Ibid., p. 348.

[5] Ibid., p. 346.

coholic who knows what is his true state.[1] For S. K., despair belongs to man qua man; i.e. as "a synthesis of soul and body which is sustained by spirit."[2] Because man is what he is, he cannot settle down in the vegetative or purely sensuous life; "for he is determined as spirit."[3] This tri-partite view of man--body and soul sustained by spirit--is essential to all that S. K. has to say about man's psychic life. Again let it be noted that, according to Kierkegaard, "spirit is dreaming in man."[4]

Despair is a sickness in the self. "To have a self, to be a self, is the greatest concession made to man, but at the same time it is eternity's demand upon him."[5] The sickness of despair is that the self would consume itself but cannot. In a brilliant passage, S. K. writes: "Despair is precisely self-consuming, but it is an impotent self-consumption which is not able to do what it will. . . . The despairer is not able . . . to consume himself."[6] The despairer would die but he cannot; and this inability is precisely his despair. "When the danger is so great that death has become one's hope, despair is the disconsolateness of not being able to die."[1] The despairing man seems to be in despair over something. In fact, however, "he really despaired over himself, and now would be rid of himself";[2] but he cannot. "So to despair over something is not yet properly despair. . . . The next step is the declared despair, despair over oneself."[3] So despair is literally unto death; and "to be sick unto death is, not to be able to die----."[4]

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[1] Cf. G. Aiken Taylor, A Sober Faith (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953), especially Chaps. IV and V., pp. 45-89.

[2] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. 44.

[3] Auden, op. cit., p. 166.

[4] Ibid., p. 162.

[5] Bretall, op. cit., p. 344.

[6] Ibid., p. 342.

The first form of despair, therefore, is "the despair which is unconscious that it is despair, or the despairing unconsciousness of having a Self and an Eternal Self."[5] Unconscious despair is nonetheless despair,[6] as noted above. The progression in despair is defined by Kierkegaard as follows:

> First comes despair over the earthly or something earthly, then despair over oneself about the eternal. Then comes defiance, which really is despair by the aid of the eternal, the despairing abuse of the eternal in the self to the point of being despairingly determined to be oneself.[7]

The second major form of despair, therefore, is conscious despair.

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[1] Ibid., p. 342.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 343.

[4] Ibid., p. 341.

[5] Ibid., p. 345.

[6] Ibid., p. 346.

[7] Ibid., p. 365. S. K. is being autobiographical in all of this.

> With every increase in the degree of consciousness, and in proportion to that increase, the intensity of despair increases; the more consciousness, the more intense the despair. This is everywhere to be seen, most clearly in the maximum and minimum of despair.[1]

S. K. goes on to discuss sub-forms of conscious despair,[2] but these are not particularly relevant to this investigation. What he talks about is similar to what modern dynamic psychology discusses in terms of "self-rejection," "self-acceptance," and "self-affirmation."[3] In S. K.'s view, there would seem to be more hope for the man who is conscious of being in despair, although the road ahead for him entails suffering. The despairer who is conscious of being in despair is also "conscious of being a Self wherein there is after all something Eternal, and then is either in despair at not willing to be itself, or in despair at willing to be itself."[4] Becoming a self is, so to speak, man's destiny; but "eternity's demand" is neither easily met nor easily denied.[5] Therein lies the seed for man's despair.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 345.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 351f.

[3] Cf. R. Bonthius, _Christian Paths to Self-Acceptance_ (New York: King's Crown Press, 1948).

[4] Bretall, _op. cit_., p. 349. Cf. V. Frankl's "logotherapy."

[5] Cf. G. W. Allport, _Becoming_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

In all of this S. K. is describing an existential reality seen from the vantage point of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Yet without deciding for or against the religious presuppositions, one can realize that S. K. is also describing clinical entities. If one does not "want to be oneself," one is sick--psychoneurotically or psychotically. In Kierkegaard's own melancholia, one sees a manifestation of such "sickness unto death." His suicidal wishes reveal his despair while at the same time manifesting the impotency of despair. At that juncture of his life, his was what he called "the despair of weakness."[1] First, he was in despair over "something earthly," namely Regina Olsen. Then, he was in despair over himself, at not willing to be himself; or still lower, at not willing to be a self; or lowest of all, at willing to be another than himself.[2] Then, he progressed to being in despair over the eternal in himself, and finally to defiance. The denouement he found in willing "to be that self which one truly is," which is "indeed the opposite of despair."[3] For S. K. this is believing and believing is the opposite of being in despair. "The opposite of being in despair is believing . . . by relating itself to its own self, and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it."[1] Thus, for S. K., despair finds its cause and cure in the religious realities.[2] Thus, too, S. K. shows himself to be a keen religious psychologist.

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[1] Bretall, op. cit., p. 353.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 344.

6. Dread, sin and guilt.--As indicated above, the crucial work so far as this study is concerned is The Concept of Dread. Mention has also been made of the linguistic difficulty surrounding the translation of Angst, most commonly translated by "dread," and the fact that the problem cannot be solved on a linguistic level alone. It now becomes necessary to explore the further dimensions of this problem; namely, what S. K. meant by dread and, more specifically, how dread is related to guilt.

By way of introduction, let it be said that even though S. K. uses the pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis (the Watchman of Copenhagen), "everything we find in it [The Concept of Dread] may safely be regarded as his own way of thinking."[3] A second introductory remark is that S. K. definitely considered dread as a fitting object for psychological study. He wrote, "one almost never sees the concept of dread dealt with in psychology,"[4] and therefore he proceeded to treat it psychologically. However, what properly concerns psychology is the question of how sin and dread came into existence and not the fact that they exist.[1] The latter fact, like their resolution, is a problem for dogmatics, according to Kierkegaard.

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[1] Ibid., p. 351 [2] Cf. Psalm 139.

[3] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. x.

[4] Ibid., p. 163.

> Dread is the object of psychological study, but dread is a state posited by a qualitative leap. Every such leap is preceded by a state, which is the closest approximation to the leap psychology can attain. This state is the object of psychological study. In every state there is a possibility present, and to that extent there is dread. . .[2]

Later, S. K. writes: "One does not therefore find dread in the beast, precisely for the reason that by nature the beast is not qualified by spirit."[3] The starting point, therefore, for an understanding of S. K.'s concept of dread is his view of man. The possibility and the potential for dread is to be found in man's makeup as a spiritual being. In this quality also lies man's potentiality for sin; and dread is related to sin. The clue here is to be found in the sub-title to The Concept of Dread: "A simple psychological deliberation oriented in the direction of the dogmatic problem of original sin."[4] Only a human can be in dread, and "the greater the dread, the greater the man. . . . Dread is the possibility of freedom . . .";[5] and freedom, it may also be said, is the possibility of sin--but not the necessity of sin! S. K. rejects this latter doctrine most emphatically. Sin always entails "the qualitative leap," but once the leap is taken and sin is posited, dread arises.[1] Dread is the presupposition of original sin and explains it retrogressively by going back to its origin.[2] "Dread is the psychological state which precedes sin, comes as near as possible to it, and is provocative as possible of dread, but without explaining sin, which breaks forth by the qualitative leap."[3] One suspects S. K. came to this conclusion by way of his own experience. In his Journal for May 27, 1843, he writes: "After all, it was dread which caused me to go astray, and where might I seek support when I knew or suspected that the only man I had admired for his strength and power was wavering."[4] Dread per se, however, is not sin. It is morally neutral. "Dread is no imperfection in man, nor is dread a dread of sin." "Sin enters by dread, but sin in turn brought dread with it."[5] The existence of sin presupposes itself, just as freedom does; and it "cannot be explained any more than freedom can by any antecedent."[1] Once, however, sin is posited, dread is posited, too.

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[1] Ibid., p. 19.

[2] Ibid., pp. 100-101.

[3] Ibid., p. 163.

[4] Ibid., title page.

[5] Ibid., p. 139.

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[1] Ibid., p. 100f.

[2] Ibid. This is the burden of the entire first chapter.

[3] Ibid., p. 82.

[4] Ibid., p. xiii. Undoubtedly, the reference is to his father.

[5] Ibid., p. 47.

Dread is an "intermediate determinant" standing between possibility and actuality.[2] Logically, it is easy to pass from one to the other. Existentially, and in reality, it is not. An intermediate determinant is needed, which is dread. "Dread is the reality of freedom as possibility anterior to possibility."[3] "Dread is an alien power which lays hold of an individual, and yet one cannot tear oneself away, nor has one the will to do so, for one fears, but what one fears, one desires."[4] There is fear in dread, but there is not pure fear; for there is also desire. Hence, in S. K.'s classic phrase: "Dread is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipethetic sympathy."[5]

As to what is meant by the last statement, Pfister gives a clue. He believes that this definition "points to an inner conflict of love."[6] Dread, therefore, is ambiguous. It is not sin, but it is the presupposition of sin. "Dread is a qualification of the dreaming spirit," yet,

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

[3] Auden, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. xii.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

[6] Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

"everything turns upon dread coming into view."[1] Once dread comes into view (i.e. into consciousness), sin easily follows. In the state of primeval innocence there was dread; but this dread, which is posited in innocence, is not guilt nor sin.[2] Here, Kierkegaard is clearly differentiating between dread and guilt. "Just as the relation of dread to its object, to something which is nothing . . . is altogether ambiguous, so will the transition here from innocence to guilt be correspondingly so dialectical that, whatever it is, it evidently must be psychological, as it ought to be."[3] Guilt, however, can and does arise from dread once the qualitative leap into sin is made.[4] As Pfister says, "The connection between fear (dread, Angst) on the one hand and sin and guilt on the other is also of importance. The emergence of evil out of fear and the production of new fear out of evil agrees exactly with scientific observation"; and "that fear can occur as a substitute for the sense of guilt is one of Kierkegaard's keenest observations."[5] Dread, the ambiguous state, makes a person impotent, "and the first sin always occurs in impotence."[1] This was the case with "Adam." Until he actually sinned, he was innocent although dread was present. All psychology can do is explain the presence of the presuppositions of sin; namely, "dread or anxiety, which produce a feeling of uncertainty or dizziness, like that felt by a man on a steeple, who may well fall down under the stress of it."[2] Once sin enters by the qualitative leap, dread can lead to further sin and, to use Horney's phrase, "the vicious circle" is set in motion. Thus dread helps to explain original sin progressively.[3] "In the form in which dread existed in Adam it has never again appeared, for by him sin came into the world. Consequently that dread of his has now acquired two analogous expressions: objective dread in nature, and subjective dread in the individual--of which two, the latter contains a more and the former a less than that dread in Adam."[4]

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[1] S. K., The Concept of Dread, pp. 38-39.

[2] Auden, op. cit., p. 164.

[3] Ibid., p. 165.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Pfister, op. cit., pp. 47-48. Cf. also what is said in the chapters on Freud and Sullivan, infra.

A further consequence of sin coming into the world is that sexuality was posited. Let it be repeated here that S. K. does not believe sensuousness is sinfulness. He explicitly states: "Sinfulness then is not sensuousness, not by any means; but without sin there is no sexuality, and without sexuality no history. . . . Only at the instant when sin is posited is the generic difference also posited as propensity (Drift)."[1] Sensuous, although not sinfulness, is "an unexplained riddle which causes dread."[2] "By sin sensuousness became sinfulness,"[3] hence a fecund source of dread. Incidentally, S. K. considered the female more sensuous than the male, so more in dread than man.[4]

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[1] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. xii.

[2] Croxall, op. cit., p. 20.

[3] S. K., The Concept of Dread, Chap. II.

[4] Ibid., p. 54.

Dread, then, is also a fecund source of the sense of guilt.[5] "The concept of guilt and sin posits precisely the single individual as the single individual. There is no question of any relation to the whole world or to anything that is past."[6] Guilt, like sin, "breaks forth in the qualitative leap."[7] As the individual becomes more aware of his dread, "the easier it might seem to get it to pass over into guilt."[8] This, however, is not true. "It is not a 'more' which gives rise to the leap," and "the 'easier' does not in truth make the explanation easier."[9] Dread retains the same ambiguity. "He who becomes guilty in dread becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to be."[1] The ambiguity is precisely this: The individual becomes guilty by his own action, "and yet he must become guilty by fate";[2] i.e., in order to actualize his freedom. "In the possibility of dread, freedom succumbs, overcome by fate. Then its actuality rises up, but with explanation that it has become guilty. . . . So guilt comes neither as a necessity nor by choice, and therefore to the concept of guilt corresponds providence."[3] Dread is the dizziness of freedom, and in this dizziness, freedom succumbs. At the moment it succumbs, "that very instant everything is changed, and when freedom rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between these two instants lies the leap, which no science has explained or can explain."[4] "A man seems to become guilty merely for dread of himself. . . . That every individual becomes guilty by his own act is nevertheless perfectly certain."[5] "The individual in dread, not of becoming sinful, but of being regarded as guilty, becomes guilty."[6]

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[1] Auden, op. cit., p. 172.

[2] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. 58.

[3] Ibid., p. 57.

[4] Ibid., p. 59.

[5] Ibid., p. 54f.

[6] Ibid., p. 88.

[7] Ibid., p. 47.

[8] Ibid., p. 54.

[9] Ibid.

Guilt, like dread is ambiguous. Like the eye of the serpent, it has the power to fascinate the spirit. "The individual in dread gazes almost desirously at guilt yet fears it."[1] Hence and in a sense, guilt is peculiarly a religious phenomenon.

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[1] Ibid., p. 55.

[2] Auden, op. cit., p. 162.

[3] Ibid., this difficult concept will be discussed again in the summary section of this chapter.

[4] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. 55.

[5] Ibid., p. 48.

[6] Ibid., p. 67.

> The concept of guilt and sin does not in the deepest sense emerge in paganism. If it had emerged, paganism would have foundered upon the contradiction that one might become guilty by fate. This indeed is the supreme contradiction, and in this contradiction Christianity breaks forth. Paganism does not comprehend it; for it is too frivolous in its definition of the concept of guilt.[2]

Judaism, too, has a profound concept of guilt. "Dread in Judaism is dread of guilt. Guilt is a power which spreads abroad everywhere, and which yet no one in a deeper sense can understand, though it broods over existence."[3] The religious genius is peculiarly aware of guilt. "The greater the genius, the more profoundly he discovers guilt . . . guilt only does he fear, for that is the one and only thing that can deny him freedom. . . . The opposite of freedom is guilt."[4] Christianity particularly understands guilt, because it has a profound doctrine of sin. "Christianity teaches that a man does wrong although he understands what is right, or forbears to do the right although he understands what is right."[5] In paganism, guilt was handled by projecting it on the gods and in the "aesthetic--metaphysical conception of nemesis."[1] In Christianity, on the other hand, guilt is handled through repentance and faith. Remorse does not offer "a way out." "Remorse cannot annul sin, it can only sorrow over it. Sin goes forward in its consequence, remorse follows step by step, but always an instant too late."[2] "The one and only thing that is able to disarm the sophistry of remorse is faith . . . not that it annihilates dread, but remaining ever young, it is continually developing itself out of the death throes of dread."[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 92, cf. what is said by Freud about this aspect of guilt, infra.

[2] Ibid., p. 87. [3] Ibid., p. 93.

[4] Ibid., pp. 96-97.

[5] Auden, op. cit., p. 158. Cf. Romans 7.

The sense of guilt, therefore, is both sharpened and relieved by Christianity.

> So soon as sin is posited, and the individual remains in sin, there two formations are found: One is bondage to sin where the individual is in dread of evil: the other is the demoniacal, where the individual is in dread of the good. The bondage of sin is an unfree relation to the will, but the demoniacal is an unfree relation to the good. . . . The demoniacal is shut-upness unfreely revealed.[4]

Guilt is the negative experience of the creature's relation to his Creator. It is the way an individual experiences God when he tries to deny or banish his relation to Him.[5] In Christianity, of course, "there is no longer a question of establishing a relation between God and myself for as my Creator he is necessarily related to his creature and the relation is presupposed by my existence;[1] there is only a question of the right relation."[2] Guilt is the consciousness of being in wrong relation to God. The answer to guilt, then, as to dread, is to be found in religion. "Here this deliberation ends where it began. So soon as psychology has finished with dread, it has nothing to do but to deliver it to dogmatics."[3] In the Christian faith and its doctrine of the Atonement, the only ultimate answer to dread and guilt is given. "He who with respect to guilt is educated by dread will therefore repose only in atonement."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 161.

[2] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. 102.

[3] Ibid., p. 104.

[4] Ibid., pp. 109-110. Danish, "Indeshuttedhed," "Gemon," "Verschlossenheit."

[5] Auden, op. cit., p. 14f.

S. K. accepts the traditional, substitutionary theory of the atonement.

> He [Christ] put himself in your place, yet without sin. For if he, if the suffering and death of an Expiator is the satisfaction for your sin and guilt, if this is satisfaction, then it assumes in fact your place. In other words, he the Substitute takes your place.[5]

As Croxall says, "without arguing . . . without propounding any theories of Atonement, . . . Kierkegaard accepts the facts of Ransom and Atonement in simple faith, and reaps the fruits thereof in his own life."[1] However, it would be a serious error to assume that S. K. takes a forensic view of Christian salvation. The removal of sin and guilt through Christ's death was living truth for Kierkegaard--existential truth. Men cannot project their guilt on another, though they try.[2] Because every man has a conscience, man cannot hide his sins from himself. "Every man has a confidant who is privy to his inmost thoughts, namely conscience. . . . A man cannot hide his sins from himself. That is impossible."[3] Nor can a man hide his sin from God "inasmuch as man so soon as he is conscious of himself is also conscious of God, and God of him."[4] Conscience, the private confidant follows man everywhere and is always in league with God. It is "the true preacher"--"the confidant of thine inmost thoughts."[5]

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[1] Cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Chap. I.

[2] Auden, loc. cit.

[3] S. K., The Concept of Dread, p. 145.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Croxall, op. cit., p. 212.

"When the thought of God does not remind him of his sin but that it is forgiven, and the past is no longer in the memory of how much he did wrong, but of how much he was forgiven--then man rests in the forgiveness of sins."[6] The attempt to flee from the consciousness of one's own sin is a vain attempt which "leads only to despair or to madness" unless one is "covered" by Christ.[1] God in Christ covers sin and guilt. "Or, as the Scriptures say about what God forgives, it is hidden behind his back . . ."[2] Through forgiveness, love takes the sin away. "The lover sees the sin he forgives, but he believes that forgiveness takes it away."[3] Just so God's love, manifest in Christ, covers and takes away the believer's sin and guilt. The love of Christ "hides the multitude of sins."[4] A man can with loving speech and sympathy mitigate thy guilt in thine own eyes, and so hide it as it were from thee," but only Jesus Christ can really hide it.[5] Christ is the Pattern:

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[1] Ibid., p. 211.

[2] Bretall, op. cit., p. 320. Quoting from Works of Love.

[3] Ibid., p. 421, quoting from Two Discourses.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., p. 418, quoting from The Journals.

> But though the Biblical soteriology is all there in Kierkegaard, his emphasis, it must be admitted, tends to fall on the more practical aspect of Christ as Pattern. . . . Christ came into the world in order to become a Pattern, and in order to draw all men into himself that they might resemble him.[6]

In what is Christ the Pattern? In freedom from anxiety. Freedom from care is possible for man provided we "fill today with eternity and not the next day."[7] As an innocent sufferer, Christ is our pattern *par excellence*.[1] As poor, He makes many rich. In self-renunciation, Christ is perfect Pattern.[2] Christ is Pattern, Savior and Judge.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 425, quoting from Two Discourses.

[2] Ibid., p. 319, quoting from Works of Love.

[3] Ibid., p. 318.

[4] Ibid., p. 423, quoting from Two Discourses.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Croxall, op. cit., p. 213.

[7] Ibid.

7. *Summary*.--The background against which this summary is made is constituted by the five basic questions posed in the previous chapter. These were:

A. How does guilt arise in personality; i.e. what is the genesis of guilt?

B. How does guilt manifest itself dynamically in personality? What are its symtomological manifestations? How do persons attempt to cope with guilt?

C. What are some of the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt?

D. What are the effective methods and techniques of therapy with respect to guilt problems?

E. What value judgment is to be placed on the role and function of guilt in human personality?

These questions are, as it were, being addressed now to Soren Kierkegaard. However, because of the inherent difficulties in rigidly systematizing S. K.'s thought, no attempt will be made to formulate the "answers" on a strictly systematic or numerical basis. Before launching into the discussion proper, the introductory material will be summarized.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 214. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 216f.

A brief biographical sketch was given which revealed that the experience of guilt was very real and pervasive for S. K. himself. In Pfister's opinion, S. K.'s guilt was an etiological factor in his own melancholic temperament, and it also motivated him toward seeking a resolution to his guilt in Christianity. It was asserted that a correct interpretation of S. K.'s thought is facilitated by knowledge of his temperament and personal experiences; e.g. his relationships with his father and Regina Olsen.

Some of the stylistic and linguistic difficulties in S. K.'s writings were noted. Of particular importance are the difficulties surrounding the translation of Angst, which has been most commonly translated into English as "dread." The "existentialist" character of Kierkegaard's work was noted and some attention was given also to the definite and progressive plan of his authorship.

The theological character of S. K.'s work was remarked upon, and it was observed that within one generation his writings have leaped from obscurity into international prominence. Paul Tillich was identified as one of the leading contemporary exponents of Kierkegaardian ideas. Tillich is a theologian, but, as already noted, S. K. is also influential for Sartre, Heidegger, May, and Existential Psychoanalysis.

Moving closer to the particular concerns of this study, some general observations on the dynamic quality of S. K.'s insights were made. His emphasis upon "inwardness" and "subjectivity" was anticipatory of the modern emphasis upon developing insight and becoming aware of oneself. He also displayed an appreciation of ego-dsytonic factors (cf. S. K.'s concept of dread and Freud's thanatos), of the psychological significance of dreams, and of the significance of sexual factors. S. K. rejected the notion that sex, per se, is sinful and insisted that sex and sensuousness have not been fully appreciated nor investigated in terms of their significance for the understanding of man. Anticipating Jung's concepts, S. K. was aware that "every individual is himself and the race." He did not, however, develop a concept of phylogenetic inheritance, as Freud later did; nor did S. K. posit a collective unconscious, as Jung has.

As preparation for analyzing S. K.'s concept of dread, attention was given to a brief analysis of his concept of despair. Despair, S. K. said, inheres in man as man; because man is a synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit. That is to say, man is not simply an animal. So he is not content to live a purely vegetable-like life. In Freudian terms, it can be said that man's nature is such that he cannot live wholly by the pleasure/pain principle; for there is a polarity in the structure of his being which causes him to relate not only to the physical world (i.e., to live by the reality principle) but also to the spiritual world. On the other hand, however, man is not an angel; i.e., he is not pure spiritual being. So, while he can transcend himself, he cannot leave himself. He can, in the words of the Psalmist, "take the wings of the morning and flee to the uttermost parts of the sea"; but, having reached this place of escape or refuge, he has not left any of himself behind. Even there, man has to contend with "the downward drag of his outward nature"--with his physicalness, his finiteness, and his animality. There is no "place" where he can so leave this aspect of himself as to become pure soul; and there is no "exit." The third factor creating despair in man is "spirit." Exactly what S. K. means by "spirit" is most difficult to determine. He says, "Spirit is as dreaming in man"; but he does not make explicit what he means by this, nor does he make clear what he conceives "dreaming" to be. It is a category which is either undefined, ill-defined, or most abstruse. Nevertheless, it is clear that out of this tri-partite matrix, despair arises. Despair, which exists either on the unconscious or conscious level, is a sickness in the self. It is the experience of the polarities of existence as the potential threat of non-being. It is the experiential reality which may manifest itself as the desire not to be a self; or as the desire to be some other self than one's own self; or as the frustration at being unable to be one's own true self; or as the dedication to reach authentic self-hood by the aid of the Divine.[1] These are the forms of despair as discussed by S. K. As sickness, despair is weakness; i.e., despair is the incapacity to consume or get rid of oneself, or the inability to become one's true self without Divine assistance. In modern, dynamic parlance, S. K.'s despair is related to such concepts as ego-dystonic tendencies, self-negation, self-destruction, and the conflict between the "real self" and the "idealized self" (Horney). It is identical with none of these, but analogous to all of them. This is on the "negative" side. Positively, despair is related to such modern concepts as self-affirmation, self-acceptance, and self-assertion. Symptomologically, this despair is revealed in Kierkegaard's own psychic condition, and in such clinical entities as schizophrenic withdrawal, depressive psychosis, suicidal tendencies, and compulsive self-sufficiency.

The solution to the existential problem of despair is to be found, S. K. asserts, in believing. That is to say, that *in* faith and *by* faith, the individual is enabled to affirm his true self. In modern Existentialist language, S. K. is saying that by aid of Being-itself (God) the individual is able to actualize his own being-in-the-world. Without such finding one's own being in Being-itself, despair is literally the sickness unto death. It may be that this religious orientation of Kierkegaard's existentialism is what saves his thinking from the radical nihilism and pessimism which is characteristic of modern, non-theistic Existentialism, such as is exhibited in Sartre.

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[1] One thinks of Paul's admonition: "Work out your own salvation *with fear and trembling*." For S. K., faith has this quality of fear and trembling.

The crucial work so far as guilt is concerned is S. K.'s The Concept of Dread. Dread is Angst; i.e., it is anxiety, horror, awe, fear, and fearful desire all rolled into one. Dread, S. K. admits, is "altogether ambiguous." By this, however, he does not mean that Angst is unanalyzable or utterly mysterious. Kierkegaard means, rather, that Angst is paradoxical, bi-polar, and ultimately irresolvable on the existential level. In other words, dread like despair, inheres in man's existence qua man. It also arises because of man's tri-partite nature. Sub-human beings do not and cannot experience dread. As despair is related to the bi-polarities of self-hood, so dread is related to the bi-polarities of freedom. Experiencing his freedom, man is filled with Angst. He would renounce his freedom, yet he cannot; if he were to renounce his freedom, man would also deny his being and submit to the horror of nothingness. Man's freedom consists in the possibility of his being or his non-being. And yet in this possibility there is an element of necessity, of fate. Unless he is to choose non-being, man must exercise his freedom, leap toward the abyss, not knowing whether his "leap" will end in annihilation (wherein lies the terror), or whether his leap will end in true being (wherein lies hope). Man's freedom, therefore, has the quality of necessity about it. Contemplating upon and experiencing this freedom, man is in dread. Kierkegaard's analogy of the man on a steeple, "who may well fall under the stress of it," points directly to this ambiguous, bi-polar character of dread.

It is *Angst* which gives rise to guilt. The mere fact that homo sapiens experiences Angst--or, more precisely, that man is *in Angst*--does not make man guilty. But dread weakens man so sin can enter the more easily and take charge of his being. Dread, therefore, gives rise to guilt. The sequence is: dread → guilt → new dread, which is now dread of being guilty, → guilt, and so on *ad infinitum*. Kierkegaard does not *explain* how guilt arises; i.e., he does not attempt a psychodynamic accounting. Indeed, he insists that psychology as such *cannot explain* how guilt arises. Psychology can only *describe* the anterior state, namely, the state of dread. Guilt, like sin, enters by the "qualitative leap," the accounting for which belongs properly to dogmatics and not to psychology.

The ambiguity of guilt is like unto the ambiguity of dread, so far as its genesis is concerned. By the element of necessity, man moves toward the actualization of his freedom; but once the "qualitative leap" is taken, man experiences his freedom partly as guilt. (The "other part" of the experience of freedom would be a finite experience of true freedom; i.e., a finite experience of infinity.) In short, it is _existentially_ impossible to actualize one's freedom without also becoming aware that one is guilty. Guilt, in other words, is ontological--belonging to the structure of existence as such. For this reason, Kierkegaard seems to be saying, all experiencing of _self_ is also an experience of _guilty--self_. In S. K.'s view, therefore, guilt arises in personality by reason of the structure of existence. It is an _existential reality_. All coming-into-being means also coming-into-guilty-being. To _be_ is to _be guilty_.

Guilt, furthermore, has a specifically religious dimension, according to Kierkegaard. He affirms that the more religious a person is, the more guilt he will experience. This assertion is to be understood in terms of his prior assertion about dread; namely, that the more self-awareness, the more dread. In the same way, the more awareness of God--the guiltless One--the more awareness of one's own guilt. The "greyness" of man's righteousness becomes very black in the light of God's absolute "whiteness." To state S. K.'s concept in another way, it may be said that guilt is the way in which man experiences God. (Of course, it is not the _only_ way.) Guilt is the awareness of one's finitude and sinfulness. Hence man is driven toward wholeness, forgiveness, and relatedness to Him in Whom there is no guilt and with Whom there is "plenteous redemption."

How, then, does guilt manifest itself in human life? One manifestation has been pointed out already, namely Angst. While guilt springs from Angst, it is also true that Angst may be a sort of cover for guilt. This is observable in the neurotic patient who complains of feeling tense, anxious, nervous, and so forth. Analysis, particularly existential analysis, may reveal that such a patient is suffering from unconscious guilt. In S. K.'s understanding, no actual "sin" or "crime" needs to have been committed to produce such a situation. Nor is it necessary to attribute the sense of guilt to some neurotic phantasy or delusion. It is enough that the patient is a human being. This alone can account for the sense of guilt because guilt is an existential reality. It inheres in existence. S. K., of course, was not unaware of the depressive aspects of guilt. This fact is well-documented in his writings. Because he was not a clinician, Kierkegaard makes no reference to psychopathological manifestations of guilt. There is no reason to believe, however, that he would have disputed the relatedness of such phenomena to guilt. He would have, however, most certainly insisted on the existential nature of guilt.

S. K. displays sophistication with respect to the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt. As already noted, Kierkegaard saw the creative possibilities in guilt inasmuch as he saw that guilt sends man out in search of forgiveness. In his fragmentation, man seeks wholeness. In his isolation, he seeks fellowship. And in Kierkegaard's understanding, both fragmentation and isolation are colored by guilt. Man feels that somehow he is to blame for his fragmentation and isolation. On the other hand, it would be an error to assume that S. K. was blind to the neurotic use to which Christianity was often put. His scathing criticism of Christianity as he knew it in his own era, indicates his awareness of the hypocrisy of much popular religion. The very religion which ought to lead the Christian to experience guilt in its most excruciating form could and did lead to pharisaism and "objectivism."[1] In Hegelianism, Christians found refuge from God by being related to the System instead of to the living God. Guilt, furthermore, could lead to despair, which is the antithesis of believing. There is no guarantee that guilt will issue in "salvation" any more than there is a guarantee that piety will. It is not easy to be a Christian within Christendom. This was S. K.'s witness and personal testimony.

As for guilt-therapy, S. K. is exclusively religious. In the Christian experience of forgiveness, conveyed and dramatized particularly in the Holy Communion, the guilty experience absolution. We are not informed by Kierkegaard how this resolution of guilt is accomplished. S. K.

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[1] That is, to dealing with God as an object, another object among many objects; and to dealing with oneself in the same way.

simply affirms that it is accomplished, by the gracious love of God-in-Christ, and that this is an experiential and altogether efficacious reality.

What value judgment, then, does Kierkegaard make with respect to guilt? The answer must, of necessity, be inferential. Since deliverance from Angst and guilt is not the ultimate value for S. K., it seems justifiable to affirm that he would consider both states to be relative "goods," i.e., relatively valuable. (By the same token, it might be argued that S. K. would say that Angst and dread are relative evils; but this is mere word-play.) To what is the value of guilt related? Obviously, to salvation--both penultimately and ultimately. That is to say, insofar as guilt leads one to seeking salvation, it is good. In short, insofar as guilt emanates in faith, as S. K. understood faith, it is to be valued. The same truth may be expressed differently as follows: Man's Supreme good--the summum bonum of human existence--is to experience salvation; deliverance from Angst and guilt is an experiential aspect of salvation, although not the whole of Christian salvation; therefore, inasmuch as Angst and guilt goad men to seek salvation, they are good, hence valuable. In Kierkegaard's view, therefore, neither Angst nor guilt are evils, per se. Since no man can escape them anyway, the religious thing to do is to take Angst and guilt up into one's creative self-affirmation. In this light, it is possible to affirm that what is, is good.

The last affirmation raises the question: Then, is sin also good? S. K.'s answer, the writer believes, would be: "No! For I have made it clear that there is no necessary sin in Angst. Sin enters only by the qualitative leap--a matter that is altogether ambiguous and thoroughly obscure." This problem is, of course, most complex and lies beyond the immediate scope of the study. It is an ever-recurring problem in dogmatic theology. If the writer may venture an opinion, however, it seems that the "resolution" lies in the distinction between existence and essence. Existentially, sin is, of course, a reality; but sin belongs only to existence.[1] It does not belong to essence; i.e., it does not, in religious terms, belong to God. As part of the "fallen world," sin may be termed a negative good in much the same manner as Angst and guilt may be so designated. Insofar as sin motivates man to seek salvation, in other words, even sin may be considered a relative good. But God is not the author of sin! He did not "create" nor "intend" sin. Sin entered the world through man. Salvation is from God the father or our Lord Jesus Christ. This is, of course, pure dogma. There is no rational solution to the problem.

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[1] In part, this assertion refers to the parasitic nature of evil and to the ultimate non-reality of evil. Evil and sin are not ultimate, ontological structures, although they are existential realities.

To return again to S. K., however, it is clear that he believed that both Angst and guilt are existential "givens"--ontic structures. Guilt is a religious, existential reality related to man's consciousness and relatedness to God. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, guilt is brought into sharpest focus as sin. The "cure" for guilt is to be found in the Christian experience of God's agape.

CHAPTER IV

SIGMUND FREUD

1. Introduction.--As Soren Kierkegaard is the father of contemporary Christian existentialism, so is Sigmund Freud the father of modern dynamic psychology.[1] Freud's paternity holds in both the specific and general meanings of dynamic psychology.[2] In discussing what Freud had to say about guilt, however, we can adhere more closely to the suggested framework, be more systematic, and pay less attention to personal and biographical details than was the case with Kierkegaard.[3] This does not mean, of course, that it is possible to select what Freud has to say on any given subject, such as guilt, and disregard his total system. Mullahy has indicated why such selection is difficult. He writes:

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[1] See A. A. Brill, Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1944).

[2] For the distinction see English and English, op. cit., p. 166. Cf. A. H. Maslow and B. Mittlemann, Principles of Abnormal Psychology (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951), p. 6, where "dynamic" and "static" psychology are differentiated.

[3] A standard biographical work is Ernest Jones, op. cit. Jones makes clear that biographical events influenced Freud's thought also.

> Freudian theory, like most theories which aim at some comprehensiveness, is an inter-related network of hypotheses and ideas. . . . Freudian theory, again quite like other theories, has a history; it has a beginning and development. . . . Any particular idea of Freud's . . . cannot be understood when taken alone. It has to be understood in the light of his other ideas about human development.[1]

Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, a knowledge of the comprehensive framework of Freudian theory is assumed. It is implied but not explicated, because the purpose here is to make explicit what Freud had to say about guilt and not to make a comprehensive exposition of his general theory. A similar concentration has restricted paying too much attention to the interesting things Freud had to say about religion.[3] While most of this is broadly relevant, only that which is rather specifically relevant with respect to guilt has received major attention. It is now well known that "Sigmund Freud and his psychoanalytic psychiatry is the focal point of divergence between modern science and religion."[4] This relation has been studied many times[5] since Freud first attacked religion as an illusion.[1] In New Introductory Lectures,[2] Freud voices the strongest possible rejection and denial of religion, and Biddle can hardly be correct in saying that "Freud's basic quarrel was not with religion but with religious dogma."[3] To the end, Freud seems never to have altered his view that "the religions of humanity too must be classified as mass-delusions."[4] However, the interest of this investigation is not in Freud's general view of religion but in his views of the relation of religion and guilt. These views will be analyzed and expounded.

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[1] Patrick Mullahy, op. cit., p. 1.

[2] The Bibliography contains references for good general works, particularly those used by the author.

[3] The Bibliography also lists references relating to psychoanalysis and religion.

[4] W. Earl Biddle, op. cit., p. 2.

[5] Mullahy, op. cit., reviews the history of this discussion, pp. 95-102. cf. Cavendish Maxon, "Psychoanalytic Study of the Christian Creed," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, II, pp. 54-64.

A final introductory note of value is Freud's own comments on the peculiarity of psychology as a science. He wrote, near the end of his life:

> In no other field of scientific work would it be necessary to insist upon the modesty of one's claims. In every other subject this is taken for granted. . . . Only in psychology is it otherwise; here the constitutional incapacity of men for scientific research comes into full view. It looks as though people did not expect from psychology progress in knowledge, but some other kind of satisfaction; every acknowledged uncertainty is turned into a ground of complaint against it. Anyone who loves the science of mind must accept the hardships as well."[5]

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[1] Freud, The Future of An Illusion.

[2] Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.

[3] Biddle, op. cit., p. 2. Cf E. Jones' view, Vol.III, p. 347f.

[4] Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1930).

[5] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, etc., pp. x-xi.

Loving the science, accepting the hardships, foregoing the complaints and hoping for some progress in knowledge, the thought of Sigmund Freud is now analyzed.

2. The genesis of guilt.

A. Anxiety.[1]--Freud's first independent entry into the field of psychopathology was a paper published in 1894.[2] It bore the title, "The Justification for Detaching From Neurasthenia a Particular Syndome: The Anxiety-Neurosis."[3] His main purpose in this paper, and a subsequent reply to its criticism by Loewenfeld of Munich,[4] was to justify separating neurasthenia and anxiety-neurosis because sexual etiological factors in the two conditions were different. The view he set forth at this time was that anxiety is transformed libido. In an italicized statement he wrote: "*The mechanism of anxiety-neurosis is to be sought in the deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the psychical field, and in an abnormal use of it, due to the deflection.*"[5] In the second paper, in answer to Loewenfeld, Freud insisted that anxiety is a physical effect of blocking of the discharge of somatic sexual tension, "and that neither the anxiety itself nor any of its somatic accompaniments (palpitation, sweating, etc.) are susceptible of psychological analysis."[1] At this time, Freud was still looking for a physiological base for all psychic phenomena, a position he never completely relinquished.[2] Eventually, however, this toxological anxiety theory, as it has been called, was modified and all but abandoned. In 1926 in his book *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*,[3] Freud made the necessary rectification; but even in his first paper there is a hint of his later exposition. He wrote:

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[1] Again a problem in translation is faced. The German word is *Angst*. E. Jones says the word "is used in a wide sense in psychoanalysis, where it comprehends many forms of fear, apprehensiveness, dread, or even panic." Jones, *op. cit*., I, 257 (footnote).

[2] *Ibid*., 256.

[3] *Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud*, I, 76-106.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 107f.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 97.

> The psyche develops the affect of anxiety when it feels incapable of dealing (by an inadequate reaction) with a task (danger) approaching it externally; it develops the neurosis of anxiety when it feels itself inadequate to the task of mastering (sexual) excitation arising endogenously. That is to say, it acts *as if it had projected this excitation into the outer world*.[4]

Thus, as Jones observes, "the psyche comes into the story at the beginning, despite all efforts to replace it by physiology."[5]

Before continuing with this exposition of Freud's analysis of anxiety, a few remarks are pertinent. First, it is to be noted that Freud, like Kierkegaard, considered anxiety a subject of primary interest to the psychologist. As will be shown shortly, there is a direct relation between anxiety and guilt. Second, and as will be indicated immediately, Freud continued to work on a refinement of his theory of anxiety.[1] Third, here as in almost all of his theoretical formulations, Freud showed a remarkable ability to modify his own conclusions in the light of new data. Finally, in this earliest paper on anxiety-neurosis, he already laid primary emphasis upon the sexual factors in psychopathology, an emphasis Freud was never to forsake and for which, aside from his attack upon religion, he was most severely criticized.

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[1] Jones, *op. cit.*, I, 258.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 259f.

[3] Freud, *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*.

[4] Jones, *op. cit.*, I, 261. Italics are Freud's.

[5] *Ibid.*

Returning now to the development of Freud's understanding of anxiety, it is to be noted that further refinement was contingent upon further development of what he called his "metapsychology." The meaning of metapsychology is given by Freud as follows: "I propose that when we succeed in describing a psychic process in its _dynamic_, _topographic_, and _economic_ relationships, we should designate it as a metapsychological presentation."[2] Of particular significance so far as anxiety and guilt are concerned is the analysis given in The Ego and the Id.[1] In this book, Freud presents his topographical system, dividing the mental apparatus into Id, Ego, and Superego. The ego is the actual seat of anxiety. He writes in another place:

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[1] See also Freud, _The Problem of Anxiety_, trans. H.A. Bunker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1936).

[2] Brill, _op. cit_., p. 150. (Italics are Freud's.)

> Anxiety is an affective state and as such can, of course, only be felt by the ego. There is, as far as can be seen, no reason to assign any manifestation of anxiety to the superego while the expression 'anxiety of the id' stands in need of correction.[2]

But what is anxiety? It is the ego's reaction to a situation of danger. "Anxiety is a reaction to a situation of danger. It is obviated by the ego's doing something to avoid that situation or to withdraw from it."[3] It is, in the first place, something that is felt. "It is a special state of unpleasure with acts of discharge along particular channels."[4] An anxiety is the reproduction of some experience which increases excitation and causes a discharge of energy along particular channels. The prototype of such an experience in man is the birth trauma.[5] The "danger" against which the infant wants to be safe-guarded is one of non-gratification, of a growing tension due to need, against which it is helpless.[1] Non-gratification and being born have in common ". . . an economic disturbance caused by an accumulation of amounts of stimulation which require to be discharged. It is this element which is the real essence of the 'danger.' In both cases, the same reaction of anxiety sets in."[2] Anxiety may be thought of as an automatic phenomenon when such a danger-situation occurs and as a rescue signal when such a danger situation is perceived, i.e., anticipated. In these two aspects "anxiety is seen to be a product of the infant's mental helplessness which is a natural counterpart of its biological helplessness. *Thus the loss of object is an important determinant of anxiety.*"[3]

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[1] S. Freud, The Ego and The Id, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press Ltd., Fifth Impression, 1949).

[2] Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, p. 91f.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] But Freud did not accept Rank's theory. See discussion on pp. 103f and in Chap. X of Inhibitions, etc.

Each stage of the individual's psycho-sexual development has its appropriate determinant of anxiety. Thus the danger of psychological helplessness is appropriate to the period of life when the ego is immature; the danger of the loss of object, to early childhood when he is still dependent upon others; the danger of castration, to the phallic phase; and the fear of his super-ego, to the latency period.[4] The content of the danger-situation may be traced out thus: sense of helplessness→ fear of loss of object (mother, genitals)→moral-social anxiety, which is fear of punishment or loss of love from the super-ego projected on to the powers of destiny.[1] In New Introductory Lectures, Freud adds this important modification:[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.* (Italics are mine.)

[4] *Ibid.* cf *New Introductory Lectures*, Chap. 4, "Anxiety and Instinctual Life," Lecture XXXII.

> We have discovered two new facts . . . first, that anxiety causes repression, and not the other way round as we used to think, and secondly, that frightening instinctual situations can in the last resort be traced back to external situations of danger.[3]

What is this external situation of danger? This leads to a discussion of the Oedipus complex and the formation of the super-ego.

B. The Oedipus complex and the formation of the super-ego.--Within the scope of this paper it is not possible to go into detailed discussion of the Oedipus complex. Furthermore, this is quite unnecessary since this is adequately dealt with by Freud himself,[4] as well as by many of his commentators.[5] It was in the summer of 1911 that Freud began seriously to investigate the sources of primitive religion, studies which were incorporated in his well-known work, Totem and Taboo.[1] What caught Freud's attention was "the savage's dread of incest." He wanted to know why. Although he envisaged his query as directed to the study of the origins of religion, it proved to be equally relevant to the origin of civilization itself, "since Freud traced religion, civilization, law, morality and the very beginnings of community life to man's reaction to his conflict over the primordial oedipus complex."[2] Freud never forsook this fundamental conclusion and added little of importance to it in his later writings. Briefly stated the scientific myth of the primordial father runs as follows:[3] God the Father once walked upon earth in bodily form and exercised a despotic tyranny as chieftain of the primal human horde. In rebellion and as an act of liberation, the sons slew the father and ate him. After the father's death and the subsequent identification of the brothers with the slain father, the repressed tender feelings took the form of remorse and a sense of guilt (italics mine), which was assuaged by means of the erection of a totemic system. "By establishing certain restrictions in regard to the animal and performing sacrificial rites under the proper circumstances the enduring sense of guilt is allayed";[1] but it is not ever abolished. It survives for thousands of years and remains effective in generations which could not have known anything about the original deed. "The individual brings with him at birth fragments of phylogenetic origin, and archaic heritage."[2] Furthermore, the individual undergoes in his development, in an abbreviated form, a repetition of the most important events "which occurred long before the dawn of history."[3] This phylogenetic sense of guilt is ever renewed by the psycho-sexual development of every male,[4] and has given rise to religions and to civilization.[5] As Freud says:

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[1] Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms, etc., Chap. VIII.

[2] Cf. S. Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, trans. J. Riviere (New York: Garden City Books, 1952), pp. 341-356.

[3] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, etc., p. 124. (Italics are mine.)

[4] See especially S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; "On Narcissim: An Introduction" in Collected Papers IV; The Ego and the Id; General Introduction, pp. 288-296.

[5] Notable are P. Mullahy, op. cit., Brill, op. cit.; R. Munro, Schools of Psycho-Analytic Thought (New York: The Dryden Press, 1955), p. 202f.

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[1] A. A. Brill (trans. and ed.), The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud (New York: Random House, The Modern Library, 1938), p. 807f.

[2] Jones, op. cit., III, 354.

[3] After Mullahy, op. cit., p. 65f. Freud designates the Oedipus myth as a "scientific myth."

> . . . In 1913, under the title Totem and Taboo, I published a study of the earliest forms of religion and morality in which I expressed a suspicion that perhaps the sense of guilt of mankind as a whole, which is the ultimate source of religion and authority, was acquired in the beginnings of history through the Oedipus complex.[6]

Recourse will be had later to the relation between the Oedipus complex and religion. Now it is important to emphasize that one of the important results of the Oedipus complex is the formation of the super-ego. "The super-ego, according to our hypothesis, actually originated from experiences that led to totemism."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 66. [2] Ibid., p. 65.

[3] Ibid.

[4] The case is different in form but not essence with the female. See infra.

[5] Cf. Civilization and Its Discontents; and Freud, Moses and Monotheism.

[6] Freud, A General Introduction, etc., p. 291.

> The super-ego is the outcome of two highly important factors, one of them biological and the other historical: namely, the lengthy duration in man of the helplessness and dependence belonging to childhood, and the fact of his Oedipus complex . . .[2]

The super-ego is the outcome of the child passing through the Oedipus conflict. It is "a precipitate in the ego" consisting of a father-identification and a mother-identification "in some way combined together."[3] Given the phylogenetic factor, plus the normal practices of baby care, the boy inevitably becomes the mother's lover. "He desires to possess her physically"[4] and to get rid of his rival, the father. But this desire meets with disapproval at the hands of both father and mother, and the threat of severe punishment, namely, castration. "The effects of the threat of castration are many and incalculable; they affect the whole of a boy's relations with his father and mother and subsequently with men and women in general."[5] "The effect of the castration complex upon little girls are more uniform and not less profound."[1] One sure effect is "castration anxiety" in males, an objective fear of the loss of genitals.

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[1] Freud, The Ego and The Id., p. 51.

[2] Ibid., p. 46. cf New Introductory Lectures, p. 94f.

[3] Ibid., p. 44. cf Stein, op. cit., p. 20f, and Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 88f.

[4] Freud, An Outline, etc., p. 88.

[5] Ibid., p. 93f.

> Freud pointed out that castration fear shatters the oedipal wishes; the boy interjects the stern father into his Super Ego and avoids thus the danger of overwhelming drives corresponding to libidinous wishes toward the mother and aggressive wishes toward the father.[2]

The most feared punishment is dread of castration.

> The result is that the super-ego of the child is not really built upon the model of the parents, but on that of the parents' super-ego, it takes over the same content, it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have been handed down in this way from generation to generation.[3]

The super-ego, however, is not merely a deposit left by the earliest object-choices of the id. "It also represents an energetic reaction formation against these choices."[4] It owes its existence to the repressions of the Oedipal wishes. This was no easy task. "The strength to do this was, so to speak, borrowed from the father, and this loan was an extraordinarily momentous act."[5] The more intense the Oedipus complex and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression,

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[1] Ibid., p. 95f.

[2] Bergler, op. cit., p. 191.

[3] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 95.

[4] Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 44.

[5] Ibid., p. 45.

"the more exacting later on is the domination of the super-ego over the ego--*in the form of conscience or perhaps an unconscious sense of guilt*."[1] *The tension between the demands of conscience and the actual attainments of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt*.[2]

The super-ego,[3] therefore, arises out of the resolution of the Oedipal complex. It is responsible, as "the vehicle of tradition and all the age-long values," for the "higher levels" of the mental life.[4] It is also responsible for repression. "We can say that repression is the work of the super-ego,--either that it does its work on its own account or else that the ego does it in obedience to its orders."[5] Large parts of the super-ego, as well as of the ego, can remain unconscious, "are, in fact, normally unconscious."[6] Hence it follows that much guilt is also unconscious. The super-ego is also "the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which the ego measures itself, towards which it strives, and whose demands it is always striving to fulfill."[7] This fact accounts for "the major part of the sense of inferiority," which, like the sense of guilt, is an expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego. "The sense of inferiority and the sense of guilt are extremely difficult to distinguish. Perhaps we should do better if we regarded the former as the erotic complement to the sense of moral inferiority."[1] What the ego fears from the super-ego is punishment--"an extension of the punishment of castration."[2] This is particularly true in the case of the obsessional neuroses.

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[1] *Ibid*. (Italics are mine.)

[2] *Ibid*., p. 49. (Italics are mine.)

[3] A good summary on the formation of the super-ego is to be found in Brill, *op. cit*., pp. 154f.

[4] Freud, *New Introductory Lectures*, p. 95.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 98.

[6] *Ibid*., p. 99.

[7] *Ibid*., p. 93.

> Just as the father has become depersonalized in the shape of the super-ego, so has the fear of castration in his hands become transformed into an undefined social or moral anxiety. But this anxiety is concealed. The ego escapes it by obediently carrying out the behests, precautions and penances that have been enjoined upon it [by the superego].[3]

Thus, due to phylogenetic factors and Oedipal factors, the danger-situation to which the individual reacts with anxiety is, in the final analysis, the threat of castration. Depending upon the level of the individual's psychosexual development, this anxiety takes its appropriate forms. As Pfister says:

> Freud's final position on Angst, expressed in 1927, characterized it as dread--as the punishment of infantile Oedipal desires which are interpreted not on-

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[1] Ibid., pp. 93-94. Dr. Norman Levy distinguishes between shame and guilt. Shame arises when the ego fails to live up to the ego-ideal. Guilt is felt when the ego fails to measure up to the demands of the super-ego. (Private conversations with the author.)

[2] Freud, Inhibitions, etc., pp. 90-91.

[3] Ibid.

> ly as prohibited desires for love but also as hate (a tendency toward aggression, sadism, destruction) and consequently as guilt. . . . Side by side with this fear arising out of guilt (which must be taken as dread of severe punishment) Freud continues to admit a real dread and more particularly the fear caused the ego by the super-ego which in this context is approximately equivalent to conscience, a perfectly normal fear which, however, assumes a morbid intensity in neurotics.[1]

The ego is caught between "those two harsh masters, the Id and Superego." The individual responds to both threats, which really are reducible to one and the same, with anxiety. A special form of anxiety is guilt,[2] which is due to fear of punishment by, or loss of love of, the superego. Anxiety, it is to be noted, is genetically and phylogenetically prior to the formation of the super-ego, and of the conscience, and so to the experience of guilt.

C. The development of conscience and guilt.--It should now be clear that the superego is the product of the Oedipus conflict. This institution of the mental apparatus has the three main functions of self-observation, conscience, and the holding up of ideals.[3] "Conscience is an expression of the super-ego, though the latter has other characteristics too."[1] Conscience is one of the activities of the super-ego.[2] It is "no doubt something within but it has not been there from the beginning."[3] The child is not born with a conscience nor with a super-ego. This role is played at first by parental authority.

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[1] Pfister, op. cit., p. 50.

[2] This position corresponds closely to that taken by Stein, op. cit., p. 18f, and Fenichel who conceives of guilt as "topically defined (i.e., "topographically" defined) anxiety." Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. More detail has been offered in the interest of accuracy.

[3] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 91f.

> The influence of parents dominates the child by granting proofs of affection and by threats of punishment, which, to the child means loss of love, and which must also be feared on their own account. This objective anxiety is the forerunner of the later moral anxiety; so long as the former is dominant one need not speak of super-ego or of conscience.[4]

Again, Freud says:

> Conscience and morality arise through the overcoming, desexualizing of the Oedipus complex; in moral masochism, morality becomes sexualized afresh, the Oedipus-complex is reactivated, a regression from morality back to Oedipus-complex is under way.[5]

Through "identification," a not fully understood process,[6] the parental function gets transformed into the super-ego. The child, so to speak, "incorporates" the parental authority. "The establishment of the super-ego can be described as a successful identification with the parental function."[7] The conscience corresponds broadly to the super-ego. Freud does not make clear their difference, but some of his interpreters have attempted to clarify the distinction. Thus Fenichel writes:

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[1] Mullahy, op. cit., p. 39.

[2] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 86.

[3] Ibid., p. 89.

[4] Ibid.

[5] "The Economic Problem in Masochism," Collected Papers, II, 266.

[6] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 90f.

[7] Ibid.

> The neurotic conflict becomes more complicated when anxiety is replaced by guilt feelings. Guilt feelings represent a topically defined anxiety, the anxiety of the ego toward the super-ego. Guilt feeling proper must be distinguished from feelings of conscience. They refer to the past. Conscience refers to future actions. To summarize, the warning conscience says: "Avoid this or that action, otherwise you will experience a feeling of annihilation." Guilt feeling proper is more or less a materialization of this threat.[1]

Bergler, on the other hand, seems to feel that conscience is manifest in the infant only _after_ educative-restrictive experiences.[2] Ostow and Scharfstein, while broadly identifying the superego and conscience, point out that "conscience is conscious whereas the superego involves much that is unconscious."[3] Perhaps, Weiss is closest to Freud when he distinguishes conscience simply as a function of the superego.[4] This is the position taken by Freud in his paper on "Narcissism," published in 1914.[5] At any rate, it is clear that "the torments caused by reproaches of conscience correspond precisely to a child's dread of losing his parents' love, a dread which has been replaced in him by the moral agency. On the other hand, if the ego has successfully resisted a temptation to do something that would be objectionable to the superego, it feels self-respect raised and its pride increased, as though it had made some precious acquisitions."[1] It is also clear that Freud firmly believed that "the conscience of mankind, which now appears as an inherited power in the mind, was originally acquired from the Oedipus complex."[2]

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[1] Fenichel, _op. cit_., pp. 134-135.

[2] Bergler, _op. cit_.

[3] M. Ostow and B. Scharfstein, _The Need to Believe_ (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1954) p. 44.

[4] E. Weiss, "History of Metapsychological Concepts," _Dynamic Psychiatry_, ed. F. Alexander and H. Ross (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 60.

[5] _Collected Papers_, IV, 30f.

> Conscience is the inner perception of objections to definite wish impulses that exist in us; but the emphasis is put on the fact that this rejection does not depend on anything else, that it is sure of itself. This becomes even plainer in the case of a guilty conscience, where we become aware of the inner condemnation of such acts which realized some of our definite wish impulses. . . . Taboo conscience is probably the oldest form in which we meet the phenomenon of conscience.[3]

D. Recapitulation of Freud's theory of genesis of guilt.--Before proceeding to note how guilt manifests itself in personality and religion, and how it is to be handled, a summarization of what has thus far been said is offered. Guilt is a particular form of anxiety. Anxiety has a two-fold source: genetic and phylogenetic. The infant's mental helplessness, a counterpart of his biological helplessness, creates the danger-situation of non-gratification and loss of object. An "economic disturbance" is thus created to which the infant reacts with anxiety. In addition, the infant brings with him at birth an "archaic heritage," and in his development he repeats, in abbreviated form, the most important events of this phylogenetic history. The rubric for this phylogenetic element is the scientific myth of the Oedipus complex. To each state of the individual's psycho-sexual development, there corresponds an appropriate anxiety or fear. Every danger-situation can in the last resort be traced back to external situations of danger, namely, loss of some highly cathected object, e.g., food, mother, genitals, and love and approval of the superego and of other persons.

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[1] Freud, Outline, etc., p. 122.

[2] Freud, Collected Papers, IV, 343

[3] Freud, Totem and Taboo, pp. 859-860.

The Oedipus complex gives rise to the superego, one function of which is conscience. A part of the individual's "archaic heritage" is an unconscious sense of guilt, reactivated and reenforced by his own Oedipus complex;[1] i.e., by his own genetic development. The male child suffers "castration anxiety"; the objective danger-situation, loss of genitals, is repressed. However, this anxiety manifests itself as an unconscious sense of guilt, a sense of inferiority and as conscience. Guilt, therefore, is really fear of the superego and belongs especially to the latency period. It is due to the tension between the ego and superego. It is a "topographical" anxiety, experienced by the ego. The ego fears punishment from, or the loss of love of, the superego. This anxiety is generalized into moral anxiety and gives rise to religion among other things.

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[1] Cf. "Dostoevsky and Parricide" in Collected Papers V, p. 229. "Parricide is in any case the main source of the sense of guilt."

Ostow and Scharfstein provide a good summary of Freud's position: "Guilt, therefore, is an instrument the superego uses to impose its requirements upon the ego. Guilt, in fact is almost constant and almost universal. . . Sexual urges breed guilt as St. Augustine knew."[1]

3. How guilt manifests itself in personality.--Much has already been indicated as to how, in general, guilt manifests itself in personality; e.g., as moral anxiety, conscience and a sense of inferiority. Attention will now be turned to Freud's insights into the psychopathological manifestations of guilt. "The feelings of inferiority so well known in neurotics are presumably closely related to it [guilt]."[2] The failure of the ego to measure up to the ego-ideal results in feelings of guilt and shame. As to the difference between the two, Freud says, "We have paid but little attention to such conceptual differences in psychoanalysis."[3] "So far as I know," Freud says in one paper, "a sense of guilt is invariably the factor that transforms

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[1] Ostow and Scharfstein, op. cit., pp. 46-48.

[2] Freud, Group Psychology, etc., p. 73.

[3] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 94.

sadism into masochism."[1] In his clinical experience Freud encountered patients who could not stand praise or signs of progress without an exacerbation of their illness. About such cases he wrote:

> In the end we come to see that we are dealing with a "moral" factor, a sense of guilt, which is finding atonement in the illness and is refusing to give up the penalty of suffering. . . . But as far as the patient is concerned this sense of guilt is dumb; it does not tell him he is guilty, he simply feels ill. This sense of guilt expresses itself only as a resistance to recovery which it is extremely difficult to overcome.[2]

In two very common maladies, the obsessional neuroses and melancholia, "the sense of guilt is over-strongly conscious; in them the ego-ideal displays particular severity and often rages against the ego with utmost cruelty."[3] While there are significant differences in the dynamics of the two illnesses, the role of guilt is most important in both.

In hysteria and in states of an hysterical type, the sense of guilt is kept unconscious through repression, but is nonetheless present and operative.[4] The hysterias convert the unconscious sense of guilt into some psychic or physiological symptom. Thus, for example, Freud theorized that Dostoevsky's epileptic seizures were a form of self-punishment resembling death.[1]

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[1] "A Child Is Being Beaten," Collected Papers II, p. 184. Cf. also "Dostoevsky and Parricide," op. cit., for more on self-punishment and guilt.

[2] Freud, Group Psychology, etc., pp. 71-72.

[3] Ibid., p. 73. Cf. "Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices," Collected Papers II, pp. 25-35.

[4] Ibid., p. 75.

> It may be observed, incidentally, that unhappy marriage and bodily infirmity are the two things that most often dissolve a neurosis. They both gratify especially the sense of guilt (need for punishment) which binds many neurotics so fast to their neuroses.[2]

Thus guilt is to be seen in normal conscience and morality, and in a number of psychological illnesses. It gives rise to depression and pessimism and motivates the individual to various guilt-dissipating mechanisms.[3] Especially in the so-called narcissistic neuroses, guilt is to be seen as a rigid and inexorable critic.[4] The compulsive neurotic demonstrates by his obsessions, doubts, and phobias that he is dominated by an unconscious feeling of guilt of which he is ignorant.[5] In melancholia, guilt does some of its most damaging work.[6] The exacerbation of the unconscious sense of guilt can turn people into criminals. "In many criminals, especially youthful ones, it is possible to detect a very powerful sense of guilt which existed before the crime," and was the cause of it.[1]

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[1] Freud, "Dostoevsky and Parricide," op. cit., p. 232.

[2] "The Ways of Psycho-analytic Treatment," Collected Papers II, p. 397.

[3] Cf. Ostow and Scharfstein, op. cit., p. 73f. Cf. Fenichel, op. cit., p. 132f.

[4] Brill, Freud's Contribution, etc., p. 154.

[5] Ibid., p. 201.

[6] See "Mourning and Melancholia," Collected Papers IV, p. 152f. Freud wrote extensively on the obsessional neuroses and other illnesses in which guilt plays a role.

4. Religious concomitants of the sense of guilt.--Religion, according to Freud, arose as a means of allaying the sense of guilt of mankind stemming from the primitive Oedipal crime.[2] Filial guilt, therefore, is the foundation of the religious feeling.[3]

> A ceremonial begins as an act of defence or security--as a protective measure. The protestations of the pious that they know they are miserable sinners in their hearts correspond to the sense of guilt of the obsessional neurotic; while the pious observances (prayers, invocations, etc.) with which they begin every act of the day, and especially every unusual undertaking, seem to have the significance of defensive and protective measures.[4]

Religion, thus, arose out of totemism and retains much of its neurotic character.[5] Judaism and Christianity are particularly patent so far as their guilt-orientation is concerned.[1] The attraction of monotheism has deep roots in the unconscious.[2] In his last creative effort, written when he was over eighty, Freud goes deeply into the origins of Judaism and Christianity.[3] According to the theory propounded in this book, Moses himself was, like the primordial Father, murdered. "This great murder was fateful in history. It begat a strong reaction of guilt and remorse,"[4] and the hope that the sin would some day be undone, i.e., the belief in a Messiah. Judaism, therefore, represents a powerful reaction to guilt. It is dominated by a profound sense of sin and characterized by moral masochism. "This moral masochism led to a falling away from the pure conceptions of Moses, to the reinstatement of the ceremonial he had so eschewed, and to degeneration into the never-ending reaction-formations of obsessional neurosis."[5] In this sense, this kind of religion may be understood as a mass obsessional neurosis.

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[1] Freud, Group Psychology, etc., p. 76. Cf. "Dostoevsky and Parricide," op. cit., cf. also Bergler, op. cit., for a good discussion of effects of guilt.

[2] This is the gist of the argument in Freud, Totem and Taboo. For a vigorous criticism of Freud's view, see I. D. Suttie, op. cit.

[3] Freud, "Dostoevsky and Parricide," op. cit., p.234. cf. also "Psycho-Analysis and Religious Origins," Collected Papers V, p. 92f. For succinct summary of Freud's theory see M. Ostow and B. Scharfstein, op. cit., p. 36f.

[4] Freud, "Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices," Collected Papers II, p. 31; cf. Mullahy, op. cit., p. 98.

[5] Cf. R. Dalbiez, Psychoanalytic Method and the Doctrine of Freud, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1941), p.389.

The flaw in Judaism, however, is that it gave expression only to one-half of the ambivalent feelings--only the severe, repressive and punitive aspects found expression, the tender and loving effects being completely repressed. This flaw was subsequently remedied by a great Jew, Paul, whom Freud saw as the real architect of Christian dogma.[1] Beneath their moral masochism, the Jews wished that their murdered Father-Moses would return. Jesus appeared, a new Moses; but him also the Jews murdered. Paul, seized by an inspiration of genius, accepted Jesus as the Messiah and correctly traced back the prevailing sense of guilt to its primeval source; he called it "original sin," a mortal (i.e., murderous) sin against God the Father. "The unmentionable crime was replaced by the fault of the somewhat shadowy conception of original sin."[2] However, in place of the murderous wish itself stood the phantasy of expiation.

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[1] Jones, op. cit., Vol. III, Chap. 13 presents a convenient summary, p. 349f.

[2] Ibid., p. 351. Cf. S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism.

[3] Freud, Moses and Monotheism, published in 1939.

[4] Jones, op. cit., III, 363.

[5] Ibid., p. 365.

> A Son of God, innocent himself, had sacrificed himself--and had thereby taken over the guilt of the world. It had to be a Son, since the sin had been the murder of the Father. . . . The Mosiac religion had been a Father religion; Christianity became a Son religion. The old God, the Father, took second place, Christ, the Son, stood in his place, just as in those dark times every son had longed to do. . . . From now on Jewish religion was, so to speak, a fossil.[3]

Religion, therefore, especially as expressed in Judaism and

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[1] Cf. Pfister, op. cit., especially Chap. X.

[2] Jones, op. cit. III, p. 365.

[3] Ibid.

Christianity has its primary source in the sense of guilt, although this is not its only source.[1] Its theories of atonement, its penitential practices, its ritual and its dogma are to be understood in this light.[2] Religion contains both psychological and historical truth. It is concerned with the unconscious memory of actual happenings. It is concerned with real unconscious conflicts present in everyone.[3] Nevertheless, religion is an illusion. Religious beliefs may or may not be true, but they are illusory.[4] Freud saw no reason to believe them. Religion is infantile, unnecessary, and will, one may hope, eventually be outgrown by the more mature among men.[5] It is a non-effective means for coping with guilt and does the further disservice of encouraging an unhealthy sense of guilt.[6] If one asks to be shown the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt, Freud would simply point the inquirer to an observation of Judaism and Christianity as practiced in the world today.

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[1] Cf. Freud, The Future of An Illusion.

[2] Cf. T. Reik, The Psychological Problems of Religious Ritual, trans. D. Bryan (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Co., Inc., 1946).

[3] Cf. Boisen, op. cit.

[4] Freud is careful to make the distinction. See The Future of An Illusion, pp. 54-55.

[5] Ibid., Chap. VII. For an outspoken rejection of Freud's views see H. L. Philip, Freud and Religious Belief (New York: Pitman Co., 1956). A more balanced criticism is that by Walker. D. E. Walker, "A Survey and Critical Evaluation of the Religious Ideas of Sigmund Freud with Emphasis on Method (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1947).

[6] Cf. Ostow and Scharfstein, op. cit., p. 41.

5. The treatment of guilt.--It is clear from his general attitude and from many explicit statements, some of which have been given in the above, that Freud considered religion to be an ineffective and immature method for handling guilt.[1] His own method was, of course, psychoanalysis.[2] However, over and over again, Freud ran into problems in dealing with the unconscious sense of guilt. "People in whom this unconscious sense of guilt is dominant, distinguish themselves under analytic treatment by exhibiting what is so unwelcome from the point of view of prognosis--a negative therapeutic reaction."[3] As already noted, Freud found the unconscious sense of guilt a resistance which was extremely difficult to overcome.[4] "In dealing with this resistance," he wrote, "we are obliged to restrict ourselves to making it conscious and attempting the gradual

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[1] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 229f. Cf. the more temperate view of Ostow and Scharfstein, op. cit, p. 80.

[2] "Psychoanalysis is the method par excellence; but religion has the advantage of being applicable to a large mass of humanity." Ostow and Scharfstein, op. cit., p. 74.

[3] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 149f.

[4] Cf. Freud's discussion of guilt as a resistance to therapy in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 74f.

demolition of the hostile superego."[1] Contemporary psychoanalysts continue to be restricted to moderate success in dealing with unconscious guilt.[2] However, by assisting the synthetic functions of the ego, and thus going directly against Freud's method,[3] modern analysts are achieving some success.[4]

6. Freud's evaluation of guilt.--Freud was primarily a clinician and, aside from occasional ventures into anthropology, art, sociology and religion,[5] he was not readily disposed to making axiological judgments. His whole professional life, however, was dedicated to relieving mental suffering and understanding psychic phenomena. In following his vocation, Freud came upon the villainous role played by guilt. His clinical writings are full of descriptions of the debilitating and destructive effects of guilt, especially in its unconscious form. Reading such works, one gets the impression that Freud would have concurred in the following negative judgment expressed by a

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[1] Ibid. Italics are mine, to guard against the mistaken notion that Freud ever taught the complete demolition of the superego.

[2] Worden, op. cit.

[3] Freud, "Turnings in the Ways of Psycho-Analytic Therapy," Collected Papers II, pp. 392-402.

[4] Worden, op. cit., p. 277.

[5] Convenient summaries of Freud's forays into these fields will be found in Jones, op. cit., III.

contemporary psychoanalyst:

> One can definitely state that conscience as a whole is not a benevolent institution. It is necessary but not benevolent. Man's inhumanity to man is equaled only by man's inhumanity to himself.[1]

It is apparent that Freud did not characterize the superego as the more mature nor the "better" part of human nature. It is, like the id, essentially irrational and archaic. Freud's ideal was to free the personality from the domination of the id and the superego, and so to bring life under control of the rational ego. Yet, he did write: "The fear of the superego should normally never cease, since it is indispensable in social relations in the form of moral anxiety, and it is only in the rarest instances that the individual succeeds in becoming independent of the community."[2] Freud did not advocate immorality or libertinism. As Jones has observed,[3] Freud indicated that man is both more moral and more immoral than he knows. Nevertheless, guilt, because of the large element of archaic and unconscious, has a peculiarly pernicious power over man's psychic life. It is a "troublemaker," as witnessed by the many syndromes in which the sense of guilt is an etiological factor. It seems to be a valid inference to assert that basically Freud viewed guilt as something to gain relief from through psychoanalysis. Such a judgment would apply with complete accuracy, perhaps, only to what is generally called "neurotic guilt." But Freud seems to have little to say about "normal guilt." While recognizing the necessity of the fear of the superego, Freud has little, if anything, to say about the desirability of guilt. Perhaps, this is what a psychiatrist friend of the writer[1] had in mind when he said, "From a clinical point of view, guilt is a bastard in human personality."

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[1] Bergler, op. cit., p. 11.

[2] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 123.

[3] Jones, op. cit., III, p. 283.

Attention was called to the fact that Freud recognized unconscious guilt as a potent resistance to psychoanalytic therapy. From this, it may be inferred that for this reason also Freud would make a negative value judgment with respect to guilt. From a clinical point of view, that which renders therapy ineffective is generally adjudged "bad." This is axiomatic. Furthermore, the writer has searched in vain for any statement in Freud's writings which would indicate that he saw any creative possibilities in the experience of guilt. Unlike Boisen, Freud never seems to have been aware of such creative potential; or, if he were, he did not write about the subject. As a physician, he seems to have seen only the negative side of guilt. Whether or not there are such creative and positive aspects of guilt is, of course, another question. This question will be discussed in a later chapter. At this juncture, the point being made is simply that Freud displays no awareness of such possibilities.

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[1] Dr. Richard Freeman.

It is concluded, therefore, that Freud values guilt negatively. Containing large archaic, irrational and unconscious elements, guilt is a function of the superego, itself a less rational structure of personality. Guilt is an etiological factor in many serious mental illnesses, and is peculiarly resistant to psychotherapeutic intervention. Freud does not write of the positive role or possibilities of guilt.

7. Summary.--The chapter may be summarized by proposing Freud's answers to the five basic questions.

A. How does guilt arise in personality?

Guilt is a specific form of anxiety which arises as a result of the individual's passing through the oedipal conflict. It has both phylogenetic and ontogenetic roots, and is a function of the superego. Specifically, guilt is the ego's fear of the superego and the experience of the tension between the superego's demands (conscience) and the actual attainments of the ego.

B. How does guilt manifest itself in personality?

Because so much of the workings of guilt are on the unconscious level, its effects are peculiarly pervasive and pernicious. It plays an etiological role in such clinical entities as neurotic feelings of inferiority, the obsessional neuroses, moral masochism, melancholia, hysteric-like reactions, depression, and many less serious personality disturbances. It also manifests itself in criminality and other anti-social behavioral patterns.

C. What are some of the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt?

Freud believed that religion arose as a means of allaying the unconscious sense of guilt of mankind as a whole. Filial guilt, he stated, is the foundation of the religious feeling. This is particularly well-illustrated in Judaism and Christianity, both in their doctrinal and practical aspects.

D. What are the effective methods and techniques for treating guilt problems?

Psychoanalysis, although Freud found that the unconscious sense of guilt constituted a particularly obstinate resistance. He was convinced, however, that we should not look elsewhere--particularly to religion--for what "science" (i.e. psychoanalysis) cannot give us. Religion, itself a mass obsessional neurosis, simply aggravates and perpetuates the problem.

E. What value judgment is to be placed on the role and function of guilt in human personality?

Inasmuch as guilt is a fecund source of personality disorders, Freud recognized little or no positive value in guilt.

CHAPTER V

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN[1]

1. Major concepts of Sullivan's interpersonal theory.--The purpose of this introductory section is to present a brief outline of the major operational constructs which constitute Sullivan's interpersonal theory of psychiatry. It must be acknowledged at the outset, however, that any such attempt is foreordained to inadequacy. Mullahy, one of Sullivan's interpreters, has explained this difficulty in the following characterization of his teacher's theory:

> He is most difficult to understand. He has written very little, his language is highly technical, and his thought, as a rule, very complicated, subtle and highly compressed. . . . It is the most complicated psychiatric theory known to us.[2]

Munro has also characterized Sullivan's theory as "extremely complex" and adds that the "understanding of his views is not made easier by the fact that he introduces a new set of words for almost every psychological concept."[1] Despite these difficulties, however, Sullivan's views merit careful attention from all students of human behavior. He was the acknowledged theoretical leader of an influential school of psychological thought in the literal as well as the ideological sense--the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation. Through the continuing work of this Foundation, the publication of its journal, Psychiatry, and the posthumous publication of Sullivan's lecture notes in book form, Sullivan's influence continues to be great in American psychiatric circles and seems destined to grow. As one authority has written recently: "Sullivan's posthumous lectures, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, may well turn out to be the most seminal book in this field in this decade."[2] Insofar as this investigation is concerned, Sullivan's views are particularly worthy of close scrutiny because of the importance he assigned to modes of interaction; and guilt seems to be related etiologically to interpersonal interactions. Therefore, a theory which focuses upon modes of interaction promises to illuminate the problem of guilt.

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[1] Biographical data can be found in Clara Thompson's article, "Harry Stack Sullivan, The Man," Psychiatry, XII, No. 4 (November, 1949), 435-437; and in Hall and Lindzey, op. cit., pp. 134-137.

[2] Mullahy, op. cit., p. 279. A useful digest of Sullivan's theory will be found in same source, pp. 279-315.

A. The one identifying phrase for Sullivan's general theory is: interpersonal relations.

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[1] Munro, op. cit., p. 354. Munro's analysis is also very helpful. See pp. 354-370.

[2] Paul E. Pfuetze, "The Concept of the Self in Contemporary Psychotherapy," Pastoral Psychology, IX, No. 81 (February, 1956), p. 17.

Sullivan insists that interpersonal situations alone are the proper subjects for psychological inquiry. All we can ever observe as scientists is how the individual reacts to other people in a given situation. Furthermore, Sullivan asserts, all situations are ultimately interpersonal, since even our most private and solitary efforts are related to "fantastic personifications" developed in the course of our experience with people.[1] Thus, for Sullivan, psychiatry itself is "an expanding science concerned with the kinds of events or processes in which the psychiatrist participates while being an observant psychiatrist."[2] To speak of impulses, strivings, goals, etc. as if they belonged to the individual is a convenient but potentially misleading formulation imposed upon us by the structure of our language and the habits of common speech. For, let it be said again, all we can observe as scientists are interpersonal situations.

In keeping with the above noted insistence, Sullivan defines personality as "the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life."[3] Personality is an operational construct,[4] or hypothetical entity, which cannot be isolated from interpersonal situations; and interpersonal behavior is all that can be observed as personality. "The point Sullivan stresses again and again is the functional unity of the self developing in its interpersonal context."[1] A "pattern" is defined by Sullivan, in a rather quaint phrase, as "the envelope of insignificant particular differences."[2] Taxonomy, Sullivan notes, deals chiefly with patterns. A particular fruit may be called an orange provided it differs in no significant respect from other oranges, or from the defined ideal orange.[3] But significant variation in some respect--e.g. size, shape, color, texture, taste, etc.--would make the specimen under consideration a member of some other species of the botanical world, such as a lemon or a kumquat.[4] It is such considerations as these which leads Sullivan to assert that "everyone is much more simply human than otherwise."[5] Hence, Sullivan's theory is markedly interpersonal and humanistic, in the strictly literal sense of the latter term.

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[1] Munro, op. cit., p. 355. Cf. H. S. Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, pp. 13-30.

[2] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 13. (Italics are mine.)

[3] Ibid., p. 110.

[4] For a discussion of what he means by "operational constructs," see Ibid., p. 14f.

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[1] Munro, op. cit., p. 356. Sullivan acknowledges the strong influence of Adolf Meyer and his "psychobiology."

[2] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 104.

[3] One is reminded here of Plato's "Patterns," although, of course, Sullivan ascribes no ontological status to his patterns.

[4] The illustration is Sullivan's, Ibid.

[5] Sullivan, Ibid., p. 32.

B. Secondly, Sullivan's theory is thoroughly developmental.[1] He states: "If we go with almost microscopic care over how everybody comes to be what he is at chronological adulthood, then perhaps we can learn a great deal of what is highly probable about living and difficulties in living."[2] More than any other theoretician, Sullivan, with the possible exception of Freud, pays close attention to what he calls "the heuristic stages in development."[3] These stages are: infancy, childhood, the juvenile era, preadolescence, early adolescence, late adolescence, and adulthood or maturity. Although Sullivan spends a great deal of time discussing infancy,[4] he does not believe with Freud that personality is set at an early age. Each developmental stage has its particular significance.[5] In further contradistinction to Freud, Sullivan does not see development as being largely the unfolding of the sex instinct. Although he does not reject biological factors as conditioners of the growth of personality, he does subordinate them to interpersonal determinants of psychological development. By way of anticipation, therefore, it can be postulated that Sullivan does not link guilt to any specific "drive" (dynamism was Sullivan's term) nor to any specific developmental stage. Furthermore, Sullivan is careful to insist that his theoretical formulations, particularly about infancy, are only reasonable inferences. They are, he says, "hypotheses as to what must have occurred in the life of every person during these early months, in view of the given psychobiological equipment of the infant, the order of maturational abilities, the inevitable impact of culture, and the data of later life."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, Chap. I, "The Meaning of the Developmental Approach."

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 33. The judgment expressed in the sentence concurs with the judgment of Hall and Lindzey, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[4] About one-half of his major theoretical book, *The Interpersonal Theory, etc.*, is given over to infancy period.

[5] See discussion in Hall and Lindzey, *op. cit.*

C. Sullivan assigns a crucial role to communication. In a succinct paragraph, Cohen writes:

> This interest in communication is not a side branch but is basically related to the core of Sullivan's work. This core can be described as the study of interpersonal relations, or as the study of communication between persons. . . . It rests on the propositions that: (1) a large part of mental disorder results from and is perpetuated by inadequate communication, the communicative processes being interferred with by anxiety; and (2) each person in any two-person relationship is involved as a portion of the interpersonal field, rather than as a separate entity, in processes which affect and are affected by the field.[2]

Interpersonal relations are, in other words, primarily communicative processes. Since, moreover, intrapsychic processes are also interpersonal in nature, it follows that communication plays a key role in all intrapsychic, as well as inter-psychic, processes. It is on this basis that Sullivan postulates that a large part of mental disorder is reducible to inadequate and interrupted communication. His rather remarkable success with schizophrenics tended to validate this hypothesis. He believes that schizophrenia, in both its catatonic and hebephrenic forms, represents severe disturbances in communication.

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[1] Sullivan, op. cit., p. viii.

[2] Ibid., p. 12. Sullivan acknowledges the influence of the cultural anthropologists, general semanticists and the field-theory psychologists.

D. Related to the heuristic stages of development are the modes of experience. All experience occurs in either the "prototaxic," "parataxic," or "syntaxic" mode. (The categories are not exclusive). The relationship between these modes and the development of language ability is marked.

> Prototaxic refers to experience occuring before symbols are used; parataxic refers to experience characterized by symbols used in a private or autistic way; and syntaxic is used for experience which one person can communicate to another, for it is conceptualized in symbols which are defined alike by each.[1]

The autistic behavior commonly observed in schizophrenia, for example, may be understood as a kind of regression to the parataxic or even to the prototaxic mode of experience. In the prototaxic mode, the infant hardly distinguishes between himself and the outer world. Gradually, as the infant's experience becomes more differentiated, the parataxic mode develops. The infant becomes aware of the essential differences between himself (as the self-system develops) and the world around him. At this stage, his experiences with language play a distinctive and important role; because language serves as an important tool in the all important business of maintaining euphoria and warding off anxiety.[1] Sullivan attaches great importance to the power of words as such, in a manner close to that of the psychological semanticists (Korzbski, Chase, Burke, et al); and this peculiar valence of language is a dominant feature of parataxic experience. The syntaxic mode is characterized by full appreciation of the logical interrelatedness of the various symbols employed. Whereas the parataxic mode is akin to Freud's "primary process," the syntaxic mode is akin to his "secondary process"--the logical--empirical mode of thought at its highest stage of development.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. xiv, p. 18f, p. 36. cf. the discussion in Munro, *op. cit*., p. 399.

E. Experience, which occurs in the three modes just noted, is of tensions and energy transformations. "Tensions" are of two general types: needs, which may be general or zonal, and the tension of anxiety. The organism may be viewed as a tension system which theoretically can vary between the limits of absolute relaxation, or euphoria as Sullivan prefers to call it, and absolute tension, exemplified by extreme terror, which is closely akin to what

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[1] These important concepts--euphoria and anxiety--will be discussed below.

Sullivan means by anxiety. Needs are connected with the physiochemical requirements of life, a lack of which--e.g. oxygen and water--results in a disequilibrium in the economy of the organism. These needs arrange themselves in a hierarchial order, so that those lower down on the ladder must be satisfied before those higher on the ladder can be accommodated. For example, a starving man can hardly be expected to indulge in strenuous setting-up exercises. Needs, when met, result in satisfaction; i.e., in the experience of satisfaction.

The nature of anxiety will be discussed at length subsequently. So it is necessary at this point to say only that the tension of anxiety is connected with the interpersonal requirements of life. "Anxiety is the experience of tension that results from a real or imagined threat to one's security."[1] The reduction of anxiety results, in other words, in the experience of security.

Energy transformations are nothing more nor less than "work." Work may be overt actions involving the striped muscles of the body or it may be mental activity such as perceiving, remembering, and thinking. All these energy transformations have as their goal the relief of tension. They are conditioned to a great extent by the particular society in which the individual is raised. Hence, in contradistinction to Freud, Sullivan believes that a person behaves in a certain way, not because of innate imperatives for certain kinds of action but rather because of his particular learning experiences.

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[1] Hall and Lindzey, op. cit., p. 142.

All the above is schematized by Sullivan as follows:[1]

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                        (Tensions
EXPERIENCE is of        (
                        (Energy Transformations

                        (Prototaxic
  Occurs in 3 modes     (ParatAxic
                        (Syntaxic

                                  (General
                         (Needs   (Zonal
TENSIONS are those of    (
                         (Anxiety

                                  (Overt
  ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONS are      (
                                  (Covert
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F. *Interpersonal situations are analyzable in terms of dynamisms*. Sullivan does not accept Freud's topographical structures of personality--the id, ego, and superego. Instead, he prefers to speak of dynamisms, which are "relatively enduring patterns of energy transformation which recurrently characterize the organism in its duration as a living organism."[2] The dynamisms of particular interest to psychiatry are of two genera: "those conceptualized with primary reference to the sundry recurring tensions which manifest themselves as integrating, disjunctive and isolating tendencies; and, on the other hand, those conceptualized with primary reference to the energy transformations characteristic of particular zones of interaction."[1] Dynamisms of the first kind are exemplified in the "fear dynamism," the "self dynamism," or as Sullivan more often calls it, the "self-system" and the "lust dynamism." Of particular interest to this investigation are the "malevolent dynamism" and the "self-system." The "oral dynamism" is an example of the second kind of dynamisms. With respect to the former class of dynamisms, the tension of anxiety plays a determinative role. With respect to the second class, the tension of needs plays an important role.

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[1] Sullivan, *The Interpersonal Theory, etc*., p. 36.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 103. Sullivan builds up the concept of dynamism very carefully. See p. 62f.

2. The concept of anxiety.--So important is the concept of anxiety, both for an understanding of Sullivan's theory and the purposes of this study, that it merits separate treatment. Sullivan states:

> Insofar as you grasp the concept of anxiety as I shall be struggling to lay it before you, I believe you will be able to follow, with reasonable success, the rest of this system of psychiatry. Insofar as I fail to get across the meaning of anxiety. . . .I still have failed to communicate my ideas.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 108f.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 8. See also Sullivan's article, "The Meaning of Anxiety in Psychiatry and Life," *Psychiatry*, XI (1948), 1-13; and "The Theory of Anxiety and the Nature of Psychotherapy," *Psychiatry*, XII (1949), 5-12.

The prerequisite to an understanding of Sullivan's concept of anxiety is the knowledge that he defines it operationally, i.e., in terms of its effects in personality development.[1] Anxiety is the major educative influence in life, but its role is largely disruptive in interpersonal relations. Anxiety is, furthermore, the main factor in the development of serious difficulties in living.[2] The rise of the self-system and the malevolent transformation is traceable directly to the experience of anxiety. By referring to the schemata above,[3] it can be seen that all human experience is either of tensions or of energy transformations; and the most important type of tension experienced by the developing organism is the tension of anxiety. For all of these reasons, then, anxiety plays a major and determinative role in human personality, as Sullivan analyzes it.

What is the nature of anxiety? At the very least, it is "a very unpleasant experience."[4] So far as the vague mental state of the infant is concerned, Sullivan asserts that probably "there is no difference between anxiety and fear."[5] This similarity of anxiety and fear, however, pertains only to the probable subjective experience of the very young infant. Sullivan does not identify fear with anxiety. Fear is induced "by the rather violent disturbance" of the infant's zones of contact with "circumambient reality."[1] A sudden loud noise, for example, will evoke what we might safely infer to be a fear-like state in the infant. Anxiety, on the other hand, or rather the prototype of anxiety, is induced "by certain types of emotional disturbances within the mothering one."[2] As Sullivan puts it: "The tension called anxiety primarily pertains to the infant's as also to the mother's, communal existence with a personal environment, in utter contradistinction to the physiochemical environment."[3] Anxiety is certainly related to the infant's biological helplessness,[4] and it arises early in life. How early, Sullivan cannot say.[5] It is demonstrably manifest whenever the mothering one is "emotionally disturbed." For "whatever the infant was doing at the time will be interrupted or handicapped."[6] From the primitive fear-like state, induced by an emotional disturbance in the mothering one, "grows the whole exceedingly important structure of anxiety, and performances that can only be understood with reference to the conception of anxiety."[1]

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[1] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 14f.

[2] Ibid., p. xv.

[3] Supra, p. 164.

[4] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 8.

[5] Ibid., p. 9.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 42.

[3] Ibid.

[4] At this point, Freud and Sullivan are in agreement.

[5] Ibid., p. 8.

[6] Ibid., p. 9.

Sullivan's distinction is somewhat similar to Greenacre's distinction between basic anxiety and neurotic anxiety. Guntrip discusses Greenacre's distinction as follows:

> She regards Basic Anxiety as having no very definite psychological content, but as being largely organic in nature, while Neurotic Anxiety has a very definite psychological content. Basic anxiety originates as a result of traumatic factors impinging on the infant in the ante-natal period, in the birth-process, and in the immediate post-natal months.[2] Neurotic anxiety originates as a result of the child's further development under the influence of disturbing, traumatic, personal relationships in the family . . .[3]

The similarity in the two views consists mainly in the emphasis upon personal and familial factors. The difference is that Sullivan does not consider the second type of anxiety as necessarily neurotic. Certainly, Sullivan takes great pains to elaborate on the etiological role of anxiety in serious disturbances in living, but he does not term anxiety *per se* "neurotic." Greenacre's Basic Anxiety, Sullivan calls "fear," or, more probably, "the tension of needs." Nor are Sullivan's views more in harmony with the views of Rollo May and the existentialists.[1] For Sullivan, anxiety is purely an interpersonal phenomenon.

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] This aspect is more "Freudian" than "Sullivanian."

[3] Guntrip, *op. cit*., p. 39. The original source is Phyllis Greenacre, *Trauma, Growth and Personality* (London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1953). See also Guntrip's discussion of Melanie Klein's "persecutory" and "depressive" anxiety, Guntrip, *op. cit*., p. 47.

In a further attempt to clarify the nature of anxiety, Sullivan asked his students to think of a continuum. The one pole of this continuum would be absolute euphoria. The opposite pole would be absolute tension. Absolute euphoria, if such an ideal could ever be experienced, would be experienced as perfect satisfaction and security.[2] The experience of absolute tension would be analagous to the "uncanny emotions," such as terror, horror, loathing and dread.[3] Anxiety, as these uncanny emotions, has a paralyzing power. It is like a severe blow on the head, which no one can stand for more than a brief flash of time.[4] For the infant, anxiety is utterly unmanageable.

How, then, in Sullivan's view, does anxiety arise? Physiochemical disequilibrium (the tension of needs) is relatively unimportant. The interpersonal factors are all important. Anxiety arises in the infant by reason of the existence of anxiety (an "emotional disturbance") in the mothering one. The precise data are most difficult to obtain, but "it is demonstrable that the human young in the first months of life . . . exhibits a disturbed performance when the mothering one has an 'emotional disturbance'. . ."[1] Sullivan uses the term "emotional disturbance" very loosely.[2] His central thesis, however, is not thereby invalidated. Anxiety in the infant is his reaction to anxiety in the mothering one. Anxiety "comes by induction from another person,"[3] that person being, naturally, the mothering one.

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[1] See May, Existence, p. 50f and the same author's The Meaning of Anxiety. Existential anxiety will be discussed again in Chap. VI.

[2] It will be remembered that Sullivan uses "satisfaction" to refer to the reduction of the tension of needs and "security" to refer to the reduction of the tension of anxiety. Supra, p. 162.

[3] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 10.

[4] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

How, it may be asked, is the mother's anxiety able to evoke anxiety in the infant? Sullivan's answer is twofold. In the first place, it might be said that there is a predisposition to anxiety in the infant due to his psychobiological helplessness. To use Sullivan's own words: "The infant's capacity for manipulating another person is confined, at the very start, to the sole capacity to call out tenderness by manifesting needs."[4] In other words, the infant can do nothing to cope with his primitive anxiety except to call out tenderness in the mothering one. This strategy is relatively ineffective, however, because the mothering one is "relatively incapable of that response [tenderness] because it is the parental anxiety which induces the infant's anxiety. . ."[5] The second, and more important, factor is, therefore, empathy. The infant empathizes anxiety from the mothering one. Sullivan's own statement on this point is clear. He says:

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[1] Ibid., p. 9.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 43.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

> The tension of anxiety, when present in the mothering one, induces anxiety in the infant. The rationale of this induction--that is, how anxiety in the mother induces anxiety in the infant--is thoroughly obscure. This gap, this failure of our grasp on reality, has given rise to some beautifully plausible and perhaps correct explanations, . . . I bridge the gap simply by referring to it as a manifestation of an indefinite--that is not yet defined--interpersonal process to which I apply the term empathy.[1]

Empathy, incidentally, cannot be referred to any sensory organ or to any vague theory of transmission by some sort of special waves, such as ether waves or air waves. Sullivan felt no need to "localize" or sensualize the term, since it is a purely operational concept, which is useful and for which empirical data can be adduced. The main point, anyway, is that anxiety is empathized by the infant from the mothering one.

Having indicated something of the nature of anxiety, attention is now turned to its functional role. The first thing to be noted is expressed in the following quotation: "Anxiety is a tension in opposition to the tension of needs and to action appropriate to their relief. It is in opposition to the tension of tenderness in the mothering one."[2] The oppositional role of anxiety is a primary and important characteristic. Anxiety is unmanageable partly because it is a self-defeating, opposing, as it does, the tension of needs and the tension of tenderness in the mothering one.[1] "Anxiety always interferes with any other tension with which it coincides."[2] "In fact, one may say flatly that anxiety opposes the satisfaction of needs."[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 41

[2] Ibid., p. 44.

Furthermore, anxiety leads to what Lindgren calls, "perceptual rigidity."[4] In short, anxiety seriously interferes with helpful learning. Of this feature of anxiety, Sullivan says:

> Of all experience of the present, the experience of anxiety is the sort least clearly interpenetrated by elements of the past and of the future; it is the least interpretable and productive of foresight. . . . The explanatory identifying elements of the past and the foresight of relief in the future . . . are, in this realm of anxiety, the easiest to overlook and the hardest to find.[5]

It has been said earlier[6] that Sullivan thinks of anxiety as the major educative influence in life. One indication of what he means by this is given in the following words:

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[1] For a discussion of the tension of tenderness see _ibid_., p. 39f.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 43.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 44.

[4] See H. C. Lindgren, _Psychology of Personal and Social Adjustment_ (New York: American Book Company, 1953), pp. 72-74, 105-107, 361-362.

[5] Sullivan, _The Interpersonal Theory, etc_., p. 44.

[6] _Supra_, p. 166.

> I believe that it is fairly safe to say that anybody and everybody devotes much of his lifetime, a great deal of his energy--talking loosely--and a good part of his effort in dealing with others, to avoiding more anxiety than he already has and, if possible, to getting rid of this anxiety. Many things which seem to be independent entities, processes, or what not, are seen to be, from the standpoint of the theory of anxiety, various techniques for minimizing or avoiding anxiety in living.[1]

Learning, in other words, is in large measure learning to cope with, ward off, minimize and escape intolerable amounts of anxiety.[2] From the developmental point of view, anxiety is educative inasmuch as it leads to the development of a number of significant dynamisms. Sullivan discusses two dynamisms which appear very early in the developmental history: namely, the dynamisms of apathy and somnambulent detachment.[3] Of particular importance to this investigation, however, is the development of the self-system. As preparatory to understanding Sullivan's views on guilt, the development of the self-system is now considered in some detail.

3. The dynamism of the self, or the self-system.--Most dynamisms serve the purpose of satisfying the basic needs of the organism. This is true, for example, of the

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[1] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 11. See also p. 152.

[2] Cf. O. H. Mowrer, Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics (New York: Ronald Press, 1950).

[3] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 55f.

zonal dynamisms, such as the "oral dynamism." The dynamism of the self, or the self-system, develops in order to ward off anxiety. The self-system, therefore, may be thought of as the guardian of one's security.[1] This self-system is built up out of a number of originally primitive "personifications"--a personification being a kind of mental image that one has of oneself and others. Sometime between the sixth and twenty-sixth month, Sullivan theorizes, the infant begins to "prehend"--i.e. perceive in a primitive fashion--the adult as a separate identity and also to "catch on" that his own behavior has much to do with the empathized moods of the significant "other"--mothering one. The earliest personification, therefore, is of this significant mothering one, who in various ways emits signals and clues,[2] including "forbidding gestures," to the infant. Barring the most incredible good fortune, the infant is bound to have two personifications of the mothering one--the "good mother," who gives satisfaction and security, and the "bad mother," who denies satisfaction and induces anxiety.[3] Learning proceeds on the basis of the "anxiety gradient"; i.e., "learning to discriminate increasing from diminishing anxiety and to alter activity in the direction of the latter."[1] As discrimination grows by reason of further interpersonal experience, the beginning personification of Me begins to emerge. This Me personification is tri-partite: good me, bad me, and not me. These three rudimentary personifications are the beginnings of the self-system. It is best to let Sullivan speak for himself on this point:

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[1] The interpersonal nature of anxiety and the resultant dynamisms must not be forgotten.

[2] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 77f.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 122f.

> From the essential desirability of being good-me, and from the increasing ability to be warned by slight increases of anxiety . . . there comes into being the start of an exceedingly important . . . secondary dynamism . . . the self-system.[2]

The dynamism is secondary because "it does not have any particular zones of interaction, any particular physiological apparatus behind it."[3]

While the entire self-system is most significant for personality development and psychotherapeutic considerations, the bad-me is particularly significant for the understanding of guilt. Sullivan does not explicitly establish the relationship, but it seems justifiable to surmise that guilt is developmentally and etiologically related to this particular personification. For this reason, Sullivan's exact words are again cited:

> Bad-me, on the other hand, is the beginning personification which organizes experience in which increas-

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 152f.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 164-165.

[3] *Ibid*.

> ing degrees of anxiety are associated with behavior involving the mothering one in its more-or-less clearly prehended interpersonal setting. . . . The frequent coincidence of certain behavior on the part of the infant with increasing tenseness and increasingly evident forbidding on the part of the mother is the source of the type of experience which is organized as a rudimentary personification . . . bad-me.[1]

It is essential to stress that Sullivan does not identify this type of experience as guilt. As will be shown shortly, Sullivan takes quite a different view of guilt. The experience which is organized into the rudimentary personification of bad-me can only be called, in Sullivanian terms, one particular form of the experience of the tension of anxiety. Nevertheless, such experience, laden as it is with forbidding and increasing anxiety, may legitimately be construed as a prototaxic experience of guilt. Together with the dynamism of malevolence, which will be discussed next, the bad-me would seem to be a fertile area in which the seed of guilt might take root and grow.

By way of concluding this discussion of the self-system, let it be noted that Sullivan believes that it is the product mainly of the irrational aspects of society. Sullivan writes:

> The origin of the self-system can be said to rest on the irrational character of culture, or more specifically, society. . . . If the cultural prescriptions which characterizes any particular society were better adapted to human life, the notions that have grown up about incorporating or introjecting a puni-

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

tive, critical person would not have arisen.[1]

By this assertion Sullivan means that the young child is made to feel anxious for reasons that would not exist in a more rational society; he is forced to adopt unnatural and unrealistic ways of dealing with his anxiety. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sullivan conceives of the self-system's role as being largely negative in character. Although it serves the useful purpose of reducing anxiety, the self-system interferes with one's ability to live constructively with others. He also acknowledges that the self-system as we know it today is "the principal stumbling block to favorable changes in personality," but "that does not alter the fact that it is also the principal influence that stands in the way of unfavorable changes in personality."[2] The implications of these facts for psychiatry, Sullivan maintains, are far-reaching. "This idea of the self-system," he writes, "is simply tremendously important in understanding the vicissitudes of interpersonal relations from here on."[3]

4. The malevolent transformation.--Another "simply tremendously important" event in the early years of life is the rise of the dynamism of malevolence, or what Sullivan

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[1] Ibid., p. 168. This is an obvious open rejection of Freud's concept of the superego. See especially the footnote at the bottom of p. 167.

[2] Ibid., p. 169.

[3] Ibid., p. 170.

calls "the malevolent transformation." When, as it were, the bad-me becomes "the central part of the picture, there is literally the substitution of malevolent . . . behavior when there is a need for tenderness."[1] The type of interpersonal experience which produces this particular pattern of behavior is fairly obvious, namely, frequent and repeated rebuff of any need for tenderness.[2] On the best possible grounds, namely, frequency of occurrence, the child learns a behavioral pattern which is marked by suspicion, fear, distrust, disgust for self, and covertness. Punishment and fear of punishment play their role in reinforcing this behavior pattern.[3] As the parent attempts to inculcate the cultural mores and the cultural morals, the child tends to become "obedient" or "rebellious." These attitudes and concomitant behavioral patterns bear a definite relationship to the already existing personifications of good-me and bad-me. "Rebelliousness tends to be part of the personification of the bad-me."[4] Further parental training of the child to take part in the business of living as a respectable citizen of society involves, ordinarily, the imposition of the concepts of duties and responsibilities. As an important adjunct of such training, the sense of ought is very conspicuous.[5] Very often, such education in the "oughts" and

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 202.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 201.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 203f.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 205.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 206.

"musts" of a civilized society is, in fact, education by anxiety. That is to say, because cultural prescriptions are often glaringly contradictory, because prohibitions are often enforced by threat and fear, because there is often an obvious inconsistency between what the parent commands and what he himself does ("Do as I say, not as I do"), and because the child is simply incapable of meeting some of these demands--for all these reasons--the child is very confused and anxious. This leads to concealment and deception on the child's part. He learns to conceal what is going on in his mind, what actually he has been doing behind someone's back, and thus to deceive the authority figures.[1] All of this can lead to serious later personality disturbances, and to those feelings which are experienced as guilt.

All of the above generalities about childhood acculturation "are background for the circumstances under which the child develops, in the direction, not of being obedient or being rebellious, but of being malevolent."[2] The ways in which this malevolence is manifested in children are many and devious--timidity, mischievousness, being a bully, etc. Unless this early pattern is corrected, malevolence may develop into a basic attitude toward life. Such individuals are not only difficult to live with, but they themselves suffer a great deal of inner conflict and are potentially, at least, good candidates for very serious disorders in living.

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[1] Ibid., p. 207.

[2] Ibid., p. 213.

5. The concept of guilt.--All that has been said thus far about the major concepts of Sullivan's interpersonal theory, about the concept of anxiety, and about the dynamisms of the self and of malevolence, has been by way of creating a framework for his theory of guilt. Sullivan teaches that shame and guilt are "complex anxiety derivatives."[1] As already noted, however, he does not give great attention to guilt *per se*. Therefore, Sullivan's "answers" to the five main questions of this inquiry will be comparatively brief.

A. What is the genesis of guilt?

Sullivan's answer probably is along the following lines: "Inasmuch as I have defined guilt as 'the peculiarly colored anxiety which attends a clearly observed violation of an important governing principle of an individual's personality organization,'[2] it is obvious that we must look for the roots of guilt in the earliest interpersonal experiences of the individual." As already noted, the rudimentary personification of bad-me is the bud which may one day flower into the guilty-me. So, too, the experiences which lead to the malevolent transformation may be inferred to be related to rudimentary feelings of shame and guilt. These would include interpersonal experiences where concealment and deception are prominent characteristics. However, it must be noted that in Sullivan's description of such early experiences there is no explicit identification of such experiences as experiences of guilt. Guilt is a complex "emotion," and such complex emotions develop relatively late. The circumstances under which such complex emotions occur, and their developmental history, Sullivan asserts are most difficult to observe and to analyze accurately. He writes:

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 344.

[2] Sullivan, *Clinical Studies in Psychiatry*, p. 112.

> A group of security operations born of experience which has gone into the development of these complex unpleasant 'emotions' is equally hard for one to observe and analyze. These are movements of thought and the actions by which we, as it were, impute to, or seek to provoke in, the other fellow feelings like embarrassment, shame, humiliation, guilt, or chagrin.[1]

It is obvious, however, that Sullivan insists on the interpersonal nature of such complex emotions. Guilt is the product of unfortunate interpersonal experiences. It is not transcendentally conditioned unless one happens to believe in the transcendental will.[2] Rudimentary personifications and dynamisms may emanate in guilt phenomena, but unlike Freud, Sullivan does not place guilt so early in experience.

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[1] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 379.

[2] Ibid., p. 346.

"Guilt," Sullivan says, "is a function of behavior in central awareness; that is, it occurs in circumstances in which people would know what they are doing . . . and it is the only form of anxiety, I suppose, that most people can experience in which there is such clarity."[1]

To summarize, therefore, it may be asserted that Sullivan attributes the genesis of guilt to interpersonal experiences of the kind that evoke anxiety. The roots of guilt are most certainly to be looked for in the bad-me personification and malevolent transformation; but neither of these dynamism are *necessarily* guilt-oriented. Acculturation, particularly at the later developmental levels, plays a most important role in the establishment of those "governing principles," the violation of which produces true guilt.

B. *How does guilt manifest itself dynamically in personality?*

In Sullivan's view, true guilt is strictly a conscious phenomenon. Therefore, it would be futile to look for the subtle, unconscious manifestations of guilt which played so prominent a role in Freud's theories. Sullivan says:

> Guilt is a drop in euphoria due to our not having lived up to our most important convictions of what we are good for and how we should live--and this drop

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[1] Sullivan, *Clinical Studies, etc.*, pp. 113-114.

> in euphoria--this anxiety--is horribly unpleasant, and like all anxiety, practically always provoking in personal relations, real or fantastic.[1]

It is obvious that Sullivan does not mitigate the seriousness of guilt, but it is also obvious that for him the real trouble-maker is not guilt but anxiety. Anxiety is the mother. Guilt is the troublesome "step-child."[2]

There is, however, a "crazy guilt" which causes no end of trouble to the therapist. Of this, Sullivan says:

> When you hear a person talk about experiencing guilt, he may actually be talking about guilt, or he may be talking about a rationalization by which he escapes clear awareness of anxiety. Very often it is the latter, which is a nuisance, particularly if you are a psychiatrist who falls into unnoted collaborations with this confusion.[3]

This pseudo-guilt, which Sullivan calls "crazy guilt," arises as a defense against anxiety, but it cannot be true guilt for there has been no violation of the individual's governing principles. Again, Sullivan puts the emphasis upon the interpersonal. If a given energy transformation (thought, act, or conation) is not a crime in the interpersonal sense, as demonstrated by the person's everyday behavior, then for him to feel guilty of a particular instance of this thing "is just nonsense. And such nonsense is the queer kind of sublimation by which we hound each other to death--rationalization."[1] What such an individual is really suffering from is a mild form of anxiety. As Sullivan has said: "And so he gets all wound up with a flock of moving thoughts about guilt feelings, which spare him the anxiety and the additional insecurity of perplexity as to why he feels insecure."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 114.

[2] To push the analogy--perhaps too far!--the father of guilt would be culture and not some intra-psychic entity such as Freud's superego, a concept for which Sullivan had little use. For this reason, I have called guilt a "step-child."

[3] Ibid., pp. 112-113.

If it be asked what the psychodynamics of this conversion of anxiety into guilt are, the answer will be found in the developmental story in which anxiety has played so great an educative role. This story has already been told, but it may be useful to repeat a few of the highlights at this point. Anxiety, it will be called, is "like a blow on the head." The infant cannot tolerate it except for a very brief moment. So he learns various and devious means of warding off anxiety. Among these anxiety-coping dynamisms are the bad-me personification, the self-system, the malevolent transformation, etc. He also learns--in childhood and in the juvenile period--the value of certain "propitiatory gestures," such as saying, "I'm sorry."[3] Fear, too, adds its power in enforcing the learning of cultural prescriptions and proscriptions. All of these devices and dynamisms, by means of which anxiety is minimized or escaped, tend to become more or less fixed patterns of interpersonal behavior, despite their tendency to interfere with healthy development.[1] Moreover, many of these patterns are related to what we normally call guilt.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory etc., p. 200.

"True guilt," as Sullivan analyzes it, cannot be said, therefore, to play a very significant role in psychopathology. For true guilt is a fully conscious phenomenon. At worst, it can be a disturbing and disruptive force in interpersonal relations, which--let it be remembered--would include intrapsychic events also, according to Sullivan's theory. "Crazy guilt," on the other hand, can be a psychiatric nuisance and, if not diagnosed accurately, it can lead to some serious clinical errors. It is the "components" of guilt--bad-me, malevolence, patterns of propiation and rebellion--which, if they persist, as dominant patterns of behavior, that lead to the more serious syndromes. In none of the more serious pathological dynamisms does guilt seem to play a major etiological role.[2] This is not to assert, however, that true guilt does not disturb a person profoundly. It must be remembered that, according to Sullivan's formulations, the sense of guilt arises when the person violates an important governing principle of his personality organization.[1] This means that guilt-conflicts will involve the individual's most important behavioral patterns and his most significant values. In short, the _whole_ personality may well be embroiled in the turmoil, and this is probably the case more often than not. For this reason, guilt represents a grave threat to the _security_ of the individual. This means that guilt can arouse anxiety. So the chain reaction is set in motion. Guilt stimulates anxiety which, in turn, may evoke a host of inadequate or inappropriate patterns of interpersonal relations. So, on the one hand, it can be said that guilt seldom leads to serious disturbances in living; because guilt is a function of behavior in central awareness. On the other hand, it must be said that insofar as guilt leads to anxiety-reactions, it is _potentially_ profoundly disintegrating. In the total personality, guilt will reside but not be immediately accessible to awareness. In this sense, therefore, guilt can be "unconscious," or, as Sullivan prefers to say, "inaccessible to awareness." Like all such dynamisms which tend to be heavily covert, guilt will manifest itself in the symbolic operations recalled as dreams. For this reason, guilt may also profoundly affect sleep and result in extreme restlessness or chronic insomnia.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 201 and the whole of Part III, "Patterns of Inadequate or Inappropriate Interpersonal Relations," p. 313f.

[2] Sullivan, Clinical Studies, etc., p. 145f.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 180.

[2] Sullivan, _Clinical Studies_, etc., p. 115.

C. What are some of the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt?

Unfortunately, Sullivan seems not to have found the time to investigate religious phenomena to any great extent.[1] Therefore, what can be said in answer to this question must be largely inferential in character. The general attitude of the Washington School toward religion has been positive and accepting.[2] It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this fact that Sullivan himself, or his views, were "religious" in the formal sense of that term. If anything, he seems to have been a thorough-going naturalistic humanist. The concern of this study is not, of course, to try to decide on the religious "orthodoxy" of Sullivan or his interpersonal theory. Renouncing this concern, then, it is possible to make certain inferences with respect to Sullivan's views about religious phenomena and the role of guilt therein.

Religion in general is an aspect of culture, and the role of culture in the development of personality has been noted briefly already. Sullivan was particularly, and usually unfavorably, impressed by the irrational aspects of the processes of acculturation. Insofar as religious values and religious morals are irrational, or irrationally impressed upon the growing child, we may be sure they would have incurred Sullivan's censure. He was an outspoken critic of much in contemporary culture and contemporary methods of acculturation. It is perfectly possible, of course, for prototaxic and parataxic modes of thinking to persist in religious matters, quite as much as in other areas of living. No doubt, in his extensive experience with schizophrenic disorders, Sullivan had ample opportunity to observe the sick uses of religion.[1] On the positive side, however, it may be inferred that Sullivan had an appreciation for the wholesome role religion can play in interpersonal relations. Both the doctrinal and social aspects of religion can aid in the important acquisition of "orientation in living."[2] Furthermore, wholesome religious training can facilitate the syntaxic development of the "lust dynamism."[3] By the same token, of course, puritanical attitudes toward sex and the overemphasis of the "spirit vs. flesh" dichotomy can have deleterious effects on the developmental course of this important dynamism.[4]

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[1] A brief reference to the Irish as pagans is made in The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 303f.

[2] See Psychiatry, X, No. 3 (August, 1947), 335-337.

One repeated emphasis of Sullivan's is worthy of special mention, and this is his rejection of voluntaristic notions. Frequently, Sullivan uses such expressions as "coming to grips" with anxiety and "confronting" anxiety, but he is careful to inform his students that he intended no voluntaristic meanings. He writes:

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[1] Cf. Boisen, op. cit., for a study of the religious elements in schizophrenia.

[2] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 243f.

[3] See the important discussions of this dynamism in ibid., especially p. 257f.

[4] Ibid., p. 272.

> There seems to be very little profit in psychiatry from dependence on any such idea as the mysterious power of the will. . . . I would like to warn psychiatrists that the less voluntaristic their language, and the more utterly free their thinking from convictions about the will, the further they will be able to get in understanding and perhaps favorably influencing their patients.[1]

Now, it is known that voluntaristic notions play a large role in much of the dogma of Christian theology, especially in matters pertaining to sin and guilt. Without the notion of a "free will," the doctrine of original sin, for example, doesn't make much sense. Unless a man is capable of free choice, how can he be said to be "sinful" or "guilty"? Indeed, the whole weight of Christian tradition is on the side of insisting that man is responsible for his sin and guilt, because he has chosen to rebel against his Creator, But what if there is no such thing as "will," free or determined? To say the least, and without going into all the ramifications of the matter at this time, this issue calls for further exploration. It may well be a point of critically important divergence between psychological and theological views of man.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 301-302.

To return, however, to Sullivan's views, he states:

> The appearance of anxiety is in no sense connected with any mythological or real will; it is connected with experience which has been incorporated into and become a part of the self-system and with the foresight of increasing anxiety in connection with the self-system.[1]

It would be unjustified to make a straight-line relation here between what Sullivan says about anxiety and subsequent experiences of guilt, for reasons already explained. In Sullivan's theory, one cannot "jump" from anxiety to guilt. It is possible, however, to move from guilt "back to" anxiety. So there is at least partial justification for asserting that in Sullivan's view guilt, in its more rudimentary forms, is not to be explained on the basis of will. Guilt, like anxiety, is the product of interpersonal experience which, in this case, is for the most part disjunctive. It is difficult to reconcile such an understanding of guilt with the formulations usually found in Christian theology.

In his discussion of "Restrictions in Freedom of Living,"[2] Sullivan comes a little closer to the specific question under consideration, namely, the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt. This particular discussion concerns the self-system's tendency to arrest development and to resist favorable changes in personality.[3] Prominent among such security operations are "ritualistic avoidances" and "ritualistic preoccupations."[1] Sullivan has religion in mind when he says, "And God knows the world is filled with ritual avoidances and preoccupations in the name of religion."[2] Such behavior is not confined by any means to things religious, but ritual avoidances, obsessional practices and propitiatory gestures are often a prominent part of religious systems for coping with guilt.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 301. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 305f.

[3] It should be remembered that Sullivan viewed the self-system as primarily a defensive and rigid dynamism.

D. What are the effective methods and techniques of therapy with respect to guilt problems?

Sullivan's general answer to such a question is "Interpersonal psychiatry, of course." However, it is to be remembered that Sullivan insists that "crazy guilt" and "real guilt" are to be treated differently. In the former case, the therapeutic problem is to disintegrate the rationalization, which the alleged guilt really is, in order to get at the underlying anxiety. As to the latter, Sullivan teaches:

> But in the case where guilt is really guilt . . . there one has a much simpler therapeutic problem. And it is a problem to be handled in quite a different way--namely, by finding out what the circumstances were under which this occurred, because a strong ideal does not ordinarily rest and let things happen which violate it.[3]

It is safe to assume that in such cases the therapist will end up dealing with some anxiety problem because guilt is, after all, a peculiar form of anxiety.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 306-307. [2] Ibid., p. 308.

[3] Sullivan, Clinical Studies, p. 115.

It might be noted, before concluding this brief discussion of therapeutic indications, that Sullivan is not at all persuaded that psychiatry is a panacea. Anxiety so interrupts and interferes with learning, and at so early a date, that "the overwhelming conviction for the necessity of change is . . . utterly lacking in people who suffer a great deal of anxiety."[1] Anxiety-produced resistances are profound, pervasive and relatively impregnable. When an individual has been severely "warped," either by inherent defect or by defective learning experiences, his chances for change are slim.

> The only chance that such a person has then--except by an act of God--is through psychiatry. And how small that chance is has become more and more overwhelmingly apparent to me the longer I live.[2]

The only postscript that this investigator can add to such a statement is that he knows of no intelligent or empirical basis for judging whether Sullivan is being facetious or serious in referring to "an act of God." It is evident, however, that Sullivan thought and taught that mental health is a community problem, as evidenced by his writings and his work with the World Federation for Mental Health.[3] Significant changes in personality will come about by a significant reduction in the irrational aspects of culture.

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[1] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 301.

[2] Ibid., p. 298.

[3] See Hall and Lindzey, op. cit., pp. 147-155.

E. What value judgment is to be made with respect to the role and function of guilt in human personality?

In attempting to answer this question in terms of Sullivan's theory, the investigator is again forced to rely largely on inferences and implications. No specific data are available. Certain it is that Sullivan considered anxiety to be the major etiological factor in mental disorders. It must be emphasized again, however, that anxiety is strictly an interpersonal concept. The divergence from Freud is marked at this point. While Freud's view has its social element--the infantile fear of loss of object (mother, genitalia)--his view is much more biological and intra-personal. For Sullivan, anxiety pertains hardly at all to biological factors--the tension of needs--and almost entirely to the interpersonal situation--the existence of anxiety in the mothering one. Anxiety is the product of disturbed interpersonal relations and of breakdowns in communication; and anxiety is the cause of further disturbance in interpersonal relations and communication, which the psychiatrist treats under the general category of "mental disorder."

Does Sullivan, then, adjudge all anxiety to be evil or bad? The question is really quite meaningless so far as

Sullivan's theory is concerned. It is an academic question, because anxiety is an inevitable aspect of living as humans experience life. Metaphysical judgments are beyond the pale of Sullivan's concern. Insofar as appropriate and adequate interpersonal relations are valuable--and Sullivan believes they are, obviously--to that extent anxiety would have to be judged a disvalue. Sullivan does not discuss the important question posed by Rollo May: Are anxiety and conflict evil in themselves? As a clinician concerned to formulate a psychiatric theory, Sullivan is naturally more concerned with the disruptive and disjunctive power of anxiety.

What about guilt, though? Again the answer rests more on logical inference than empirical data. Inasmuch as Sullivan views guilt as a less disturbing form of anxiety, it is logical to assume that he views guilt as less "evil" than anxiety. It is, of course, quite necessary for the child to become socialized, this being the major task of the later developmental stages. In each stage, guilt plays an ambiguous role. It can further the process of healthy socialization, or it can further the perpetuation of inadequate and inappropriate adjustment. The only criterion for an intelligent value judgment, Sullivan seems to have said, is the pragmatic one. If guilt functions so as to facilitate maturity in interpersonal situations, then it is good. If it functions in the opposite direction, it is bad. At any rate, it is quite unnecessary for the agents of acculturation to seek to induce or enhance the sense of guilt--there being more than enough normally present.

6. Summary of the chapter.--This chapter was devoted to an analysis of Henry Stack Sullivan's interpersonal theory of psychiatry and personality with a view to obtaining a clear view of his understanding of guilt.

The first section consisted of a brief presentation of Sullivan's major theoretical concepts. Included were his emphasis upon the interpersonal nature of psychiatry, the importance of the developmental approach, and the crucial role of communication. A brief account was given of Sullivan's "heuristic stages of development" and his definition of "modes of interaction," "tensions," "energy transformations," and "dynamisms."

Section two sought to elucidate the controlling concept in Sullivan's theory, the concept of anxiety. Anxiety has been defined by Sullivan as "the major educative influence in life" and the tension which pertains primarily to the person's communal existence. Anxiety is hardly connected at all with the individual's physiochemical needs. It is related directly to his interpersonal needs. Anxiety is "like a blow on the head"; for the infant it is entirely intolerable and unmanageable. Subjectively, it is akin to such "uncanny emotions" as horror, dread, and loathing. While related to the infant's biological helplessness, anxiety is "empathized" from the mothering one. An "emotional disturbance" in the mothering one evokes anxiety in the infant. Anxiety plays a crucial role in the infant's subsequent personality development. It opposes the satisfaction of needs and prevents, or seriously interferes with, profiting from the past or exercising foresight with respect to the future. Learning is, in large measure, learning to cope with anxiety.

The third section discusses one of the most important effects of anxiety--the development of the self-system. This dynamism is built up out of prototaxic and parataxic personifications of "good-mother," "bad-mother," and, subsequently, "good-me," "bad-me," and "not-me." The bad-me is especially significant for guilt-theory. The role of culture in the forming of the self-system is important.

Section four discusses the malevolent transformation--a process wherein the bad-me becomes the central part of the person's interpersonal experience. This dynamism is also important for understanding guilt.

The fifth and concluding section of the chapter discusses the concept of guilt. The discussion is structured in terms of the five basic questions which have formed the framework of this investigation. The findings may be summarized by repeating the questions and supplying what the investigator believes would have been Sullivan's answers:

A. What is the genesis of guilt?--Guilt is "a peculiarly colored anxiety." Its deepest roots, therefore, coincide with the rise of anxiety, namely, interpersonal experiences which evoke anxiety. In the bad-me personification, the malevolent dynamism and the irrational aspects of acculturation will be found contributing factors. True guilt, however, is a function of behavior in central awareness; therefore, it is to be differentiated from anxiety and is to be distinguished as a complex anxiety derivative.

B. How does guilt manifest itself in person-" ality?--In devious ways, guilt is experienced as a horribly unpleasant drop in euphoria. More commonly, the psychiatrist will be confronted by a "crazy guilt," which is really a rationalization of anxiety. So anxiety can be converted into this pseudo-guilt. True guilt, however, since it arises when the person violates one of his important governing principles, has the power to "trigger off" anxiety. True guilt, moreover, involves the whole personality in a devastating conflict. Therefore, it may take up its residence in other parts of the personality, be inaccessible to awareness, appear in the symbolic operations recalled as dreams, and disturb sleep.

C. What are the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt?--Sullivan does not analyze religious phenomena to any great extent. While his "school" has generally displayed an accepting attitude toward religion, Sullivan's views are naturalistic and humanistic. The investigator offered certain inferences to the effect that anxiety and guilt may lead to immature as well as mature religious practices. Sullivan explicitly rejects voluntaristic concepts, and it is suggested that this may be a point of conflict between his views and much traditional Christianity. Guilt is not to be explained by reference to a mythological or real will. "God knows the world is filled with ritual avoidances and preoccupations in the name of religion," says Sullivan.[1]

D. What are the therapeutic indications?--Sullivan offers his interpersonal theory and practice of psychiatry. The limitations of even this psychiatry are very real in treating anxiety disorders. Radical changes in personality wait upon radical changes in culture in the direction of minimizing its more irrational aspects.

E. What value judgment does Sullivan make with respect to guilt?--He makes none explicitly. It can be inferred, however, that Sullivan was guided by purely pragmatic criteria.

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[1] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 308.

CHAPTER VI

PAUL TILLICH

1. General characteristics of Tillich's system.--Paul Tillich is a leading, contemporary Christian theologian. His systematic theology rests upon the ontological concept of being, existentially analyzed. God, he defines as "being-itself,"[1] and proceeds to build a theological system in terms of an existentialist analysis of being. Thus Tillich's linear relation to Kierkegaard's existentialism is apparent and freely acknowledged by him.[2] In clear and concise language, Tillich discusses the existentialist attitude and Existentialism and distinguishes between them. He writes: "When Kierkegaard broke away from Hegel's system of essences he did two things: He proclaimed an existential attitude and he instigated a philosophy of existence."[3] The existential attitude is one of involvement

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[1] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

[2] See, e.g., Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 125f. Also, Tillich, "Kierkegaard as Existential Thinker," Union Review, IV (December 1942), 5-7.

[3] Ibid., p. 125. cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 19-26.

in contrast to a merely theoretical or detached attitude. It signifies participation in a situation, especially a cognitive situation, with the whole of one's existence. As a way of knowing, existential knowledge is based on an encounter in which both the subject and the object are transformed by the very act of knowing. This is the first and primary meaning of "existential," namely existential as the attitude of participating with one's own existence in some other existence. The other meaning designates a content and not an attitude. It points to a special form of philosophy: to Existentialism.[1]

Neither the attitude nor the philosophy is a novelty. "Platonism as well as classical Christian theology have the Existentialist point of view . . . but neither of them is Existentialist in the technical sense of the term."[2] Schelling was the first to use the term "existence" in contradicting philosophical Essentialism, and he greatly influenced Kierkegaard.[3] However, "much of the material which is discussed today by depth psychology and contemporary Existentialism was not unknown to the religious 'analysts' of the Middle Ages. . . . The greatest poetic expression of the Existentialist point of view in the Middle

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[1] Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 123f. cf. the discussion on p. 126f, "The Existentialist Point of View."

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

Ages is Dante's Divine Comedia."[1] It is in the present century, however, that the existentialist attitude has appeared in its most vivid and threatening form. "It is the expression of the anxiety of meaninglessness and of the attempt to take this anxiety into the courage to be as oneself."[2]

For Tillich, the existentialist attitude is the point of view _par excellence_ for Christian theology. "Existentialism is a natural ally of Christianity."[3] Tillich asserts that:

> Existentialism is the good luck of Christian theology. It has helped to rediscover the classical Christian interpretation of human existence. . . . This positive use refers not only to existentialist philosophy but also to analytic psychology, literature, poetry, drama, and art.[4]

Time and again Tillich insists existentialism and Christian theology should become allies, and in analyzing the character of existence in all its manifestations, help should be sought from every possible source. One of the richest of these allies is modern depth psychology. The existential analysis should include the unconscious as well as the conscious aspects of human existence, and in this task, depth psychology can be of great assistance.

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 128-129.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 139.

[3] Tillich, _Systematic Theology Vol. II_, p. 27.

[4] _Ibid_. cf. Paul Tillich, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Theology," _Pastoral Psychology_, IX, No. 87 (October 1958), p. 9f.

> Depth psychology has discovered a side of human existence which should not be covered up again by idealistic or moralistic fears and postulates[1]. . . . [It has provided tools] which give unexpected possibilities of discovering the intrinsic claims of a human being.[2]

Throughout his writings, Tillich displays knowledge of and appreciation for the insights of modern dynamic psychology.[3] Reminiscent of Sullivan he writes: "Only in the continuous encounter with other persons does the person become and remain a person."[4] In another place he states: "Man becomes man in personal encounters. Only by meeting a 'thou' does man realize he is an 'ego.' No natural object within the whole universe can do this to him."[5]

In summary, therefore, it can be said that Paul Tillich is a Christian systematic theologian who is philosophically, existentially, and dynamically oriented. He approaches the theological task with the existential attitude, is open to the insights of dynamic psychology, and presents a systematic view which can be characterized as

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[1] Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 33.

[2] Ibid., p. 85.

[3] For example in Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 27 and elsewhere. See also two articles by Tillich: "The Relation of Religion and Health," Review of Religion, X (May, 1946), 348-384; and "Psychotherapy and A Christian Interpretation of Human Nature," Review of Religion, XIII (March 1949), 264-268.

[4] Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 91.

[5] Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, p. 78.

Christian Existentialism.

2. Man's existential state.--Like Kierkegaard, Tillich analyzes man's predicament from a philosophical and theological point of view. According to this view, "man's existential situation is a state of estrangement from his essential nature."[1] Existence "is the process in which a man becomes a thing and ceases to be a person."[2] To exist means to be estranged--estranged from one's true nature, from fellow-man, and from God. The best symbol for this is to be found in the Biblical doctrine of the "Fall." This myth "has universal anthropological significance."[3] According to Tillich:

> The story of Genesis, Chapters 1-3, if taken as a myth can guide our description of the transition from essential to existential being. It is the profoundest and richest expression of man's awareness of his existential estrangement and provides the scheme in which the transition from essence to existence can be treated. It points first, to the possibility of the Fall; second, to its motives; third, to the event itself; and, fourth, to its consequences.[4]

For the purposes of this study, it is not necessary to go into much detail on each of these four points. As for the possibility of the "Fall," Tillich has recourse to a line of reasoning already encountered in Kierkegaard's The Concept of Dread. The clue to how the transition from essence to existence is possible is to be found in the doctrine of finite freedom. "It is finite freedom which makes possible the transition from essence to existence," states Tillich.[1] Prior to this transition, man is in a state of "dreaming innocence," a state which must be understood as one of potentiality, not actuality.[2] "The symbol 'Adam before the Fall' must be understood as the dreaming innocence of undecided potentialities."[3] But if man is to actualize his potentialities, the transition from essence to existence must be made. Man is not only finite, as is every creature, but, unlike any other creature, man is aware of his finitude. This awareness is "anxiety."[4] Anxiety "expresses the awareness of being finite, of being a mixture of being and non-being, or of being threatened by non-being. All creatures are driven by anxiety; for finitude and anxiety are the same thing. But in man freedom is united with anxiety. One could call man's freedom 'freedom in anxiety' or 'anxious freedom.'"[5] "Man is caught between the desire to actualize his freedom and the demand to preserve his dreaming innocence."[6] He decides for actualization. Thus the motive for making the transition from essence to existence is finite freedom and anxiety.

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[1] Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. II, p. 25.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 29. [4] Ibid., p. 31.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 33.

[3] Ibid., p. 34.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[6] Ibid.

> Man experiences the anxiety of losing himself by not actualizing himself and his potentialities and the anxiety of losing himself by actualizing himself and his potentialities. He stands between the preservation of his dreaming innocence without experiencing the actuality of being and the loss of his innocence through knowledge, power and guilt. The anxiety of this situation is the state of temptation. Man decides for self-actualization, thus producing the end of dreaming innocence.[1]

The consequence of the transition from essence to existence is, of course, that man ends up in the existential predicament--estranged and guilty. How, it may be asked, is it that man is guilty? Is man responsible for making the transition, and if he is, were it not better to actualize himself rather than to remain forever in the state of potentiality? The answer to these and all similar objections which might be raised is not simple but paradoxical.[2] In all finite freedom, there is an element of destiny, so that while man decides for self-actualization, his decision is both free and destined.

> Man is responsible for the transition from essence to existence because he has finite freedom and because all dimensions of reality are united in him. . . . On the other hand, we have seen that man's freedom is imbedded in universal destiny and that therefore the transition from essence to existence has both moral and tragic character.[3]

However paradoxical this may sound, or however unsatisfactory to the intellect such a description may seem, the paradox is, according to Tillich, an existential fact. The paradox cannot be resolved. Therefore, the existential state of man is not only one of anxiety but of guilt and sin. Sin and estrangement are not the same thing, however.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

[2] An understanding of what he means by "paradox" and "paradoxical" is essential to an understanding of Tillich's system. See Systematic Theology Vol. II, Chap. I.

[3] Ibid., p. 40.

> Sin expresses most sharply the personal character of estrangement over against its tragic side. It expresses personal freedom in contrast to tragic guilt and the universal destiny of estrangement. . . . Man's predicament is estrangement, but his estrangement is sin. It is not a state of things, like the laws of nature, but a matter of both personal freedom and universal destiny.[1]

Strictly speaking, "_sin_ is a religious concept designating the opposite of faith,"[2] whereas _estrangement_ is an ontological concept. However, an important tool for the reinterpretation of _sin_ is _estrangement_.[3] The important point, so far as this study is concerned, is that the consequence of the transition from essence to existence is that man is anxious and guilty. In other words, and according to Tillich's analysis, _anxiety and guilt are existential "givens"_; i.e., anxiety and guilt are inevitable aspects of every human being's existential state. One of Tillich's interpreters has put the matter well, as follows: "Unless man goes beyond innocence (potentiality) he cannot mature as a responsible person; but there is no way of leaving innocence without entering the sphere of conflicts and of moral distinctions where one becomes sinful and guilty."[1]

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 46.

[2] Paul Tillich, _Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 55.

[3] Tillich, _Systematic Theology Vol. II_, p. 46f.

3. Further exposition of existential anxiety and guilt.--All persons are subject to existential anxiety. This anxiety may be reduced to its simplest form as the threat of non-being.[2] "The first assertion about the nature of anxiety is this: anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible non-being."[3] Again, "anxiety is finitude, experienced as one's own finitude."[4] All finite beings are at least latently aware that they must die, and this produces anxiety. This is natural and normal anxiety.

This natural and normal anxiety, however, is not to be confused with fear. Fear is specific. It is being afraid of *something*. Anxiety is unspecific. Its "object" is *nothing*.

> Fear and anxiety are distinguished but not separated. They are immanent within each other: The sting of fear is anxiety, and anxiety strives toward fear. . . . It is impossible for a finite being to stand naked anxiety for more than a flash of time. So anxiety strives to become fear, because fear can be met by courage.[5]

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[1] David E. Roberts, "Tillich's Doctrine of Man," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, ed. Charles Kegley and Robert Bretall (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 126.

[2] Cf. Kierkegaard's discussion of dread, *supra*, Chap. III.

[3] Tillich, *The Courage To Be*, p. 35.

[4] *Ibid*. [5] *Ibid*., pp. 37-39.

Disagreeing with Freud, Tillich maintains that anxiety cannot be reduced to fear. But fear can be reduced to anxiety.[1] Underlying all fear and present as the frightening element in it, is the anxiety of ultimate non-being.[2]

> The human mind is not only, as Calvin has said, a permanent factory of idols, it is also a permanent factory of fears--the first in order to escape God, the second in order to escape anxiety.[3]

So the human mind attempts to transform anxiety into fear, but these attempts are ultimately vain.

> The basic anxiety, the anxiety of finite being about the threat of non-being, cannot be eliminated. It belongs to existence itself.[4]

There are three main types of this anxiety to be distinguished, according to the three directions in which it threatens non-being.

> Non-being threatens man's ontic self-affirmation, relatively in terms of fate, absolutely in terms of death. It threatens man's spiritual self-affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness, absolutely in terms of nothingness. It threatens man's moral self-affirmation, relatively in terms of guilt, absolutely in terms of condemnation.[5]

The three forms of anxiety, then, are the anxiety of death, the anxiety of meaninglessness, and the anxiety of condemnation. All three forms are existential in that such anxiety belongs to existence as such and not to an abnormal state of mind as in neurotic and psychotic anxiety. Tillich goes on to indicate three epochs of Western civilization in which one of the three forms was more predominant than the others--ontic anxiety dominated at the end of the ancient period, moral at the end of the Medieval, and spiritual anxiety at the end of the modern period.[1]

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[1] Cf. Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety.

[2] Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 38.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 39.

[4] *Ibid*. cf. Rollo May, (ed.) Existence, p. 50f.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 41.

Tillich defines pathological anxiety as "a state of existential anxiety under special conditions."[2] He says: "Neurotic anxiety is . . . the inability to take existential anxiety upon oneself."[3] Normally, anxiety turns man to courage--to the "courage to be"; i.e., the courage to take anxiety upon oneself. The courage to be is the courage to affirm oneself in spite of the contradictions in one's nature.[4] It is the courage to affirm oneself in spite of the threats of non-being. This courage does not remove anxiety, but it takes the anxiety of non-being into itself. It is self-affirmation "in spite of," namely in spite of non-being. The only other alternative is despair.[5]

He who does not succeed in taking his anxiety upon

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 57. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 74

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 13f. (Italics are mine.)

[5] Cf. Kierkegaard's analysis in *Sickness Unto Death* and the discussion of despair in Chap. III above. See also Tillich's discussion in *The Courage To Be*, p. 55f.

> himself can succeed in avoiding the extreme situation of despair by escaping into neurosis. Neurosis is the way of avoiding non-being by avoiding being.[1]

It should be clear from the above that guilt, as Tillich understands it, is a specialized form of existential anxiety--a position similar to, but not identical with, that taken by Kierkegaard, Freud and Sullivan. Existentially, man experiences "a profound ambiguity between good and evil which permeates everything he does, because it permeates his personal being as such. . . . _The awareness of this ambiguity is the feeling of guilt_."[2]

Under the conditions of estrangement, anxiety has a different character, brought on by the element of guilt. The loss of one's potential eternity is experienced as something for which one is responsible in spite of its universal tragic quality. In other words, ontic and spiritual anxiety awaken moral anxiety. "The anxiety of one type is immanent in the anxieties of the other types."[3] The anxiety of guilt is present in every moment of moral self-awareness. Man knows his task is to fulfill his destiny--to become what he is supposed to become and to actualize what he is potentially. But he also knows he fails in the moral task. This knowledge, this "knowing with" or "conscience," results in the feeling of guilt. Driven by the normal, existential anxiety of guilt, the person tries to avoid this anxiety (usually called the uneasy conscience) by avoiding guilt. He resorts to moral self-discipline and tries to transform the anxiety of guilt into moral action regardless of its imperfection and ambiguity. If he be courageous (or religious), he takes non-being into his moral self-affirmation. If he be desperate, he may try the way of self-renunciation, even to the point of self-negation and suicide. But, according to Tillich, there is no exit even in suicide; for suicide can liberate from the anxiety of fate and death but not from the anxiety of guilt.

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[1] Tillich, _The Courage To Be_, p. 65f.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 52. Italics are mine. "Guilt is ontological," says May, _Existence_, p. 55.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 54.

> The experience, therefore, that suicide is no way of escaping guilt must be understood in terms of the qualitative character of the moral demand, and of the qualitative character of its rejection. Guilt and rejection are qualitatively, not quantitatively, infinite.[1]

Man cannot remove the imperfection which is implied in his existential situation--his estrangement from true being. The neurotic tries to escape moral anxiety in limited, fixed and unrealistic ways. In this light, the compulsive and obsessional neuroses are to be understood.

> The anxiety of feeling guilty, the horror of feeling condemned, are so strong that they make responsible decisions and any kind of moral action almost impossible. . . . Here also the separation from reality has the consequence that the consciousness of guilt is misplaced. The moralistic self-defense of the neurotic makes him see guilt where there is no guilt

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[1] Ibid., p. 55f.

> or where one is guilty only in a very indirect way. Yet the awareness of real guilt and the self-condemnation which is identical with man's existential self-estrangement are repressed.[1]

While Tillich emphasizes the existential etiology of guilt, it would be erroneous to suppose that he leaves no place for the influence of social experience. He remarks that the anxiety of guilt and condemnation is deeply rooted in the American mind because of the influence of puritanism and the later evangelical-pietistic movements. He states: "It is the social group in which one participates productively that judges, forgives, and restores."[2] While he does not specifically discuss the issue, it would seem safe to assume that Tillich would allow place for the influence of particular patterns of child training and moral instruction. Yet, and it must be emphasized, the root cause of the anxiety of guilt is man's existential state of estrangement, "*The transition from essence to existence results in personal guilt and universal tragedy*."[3] There is no way of escaping this existential anxiety of guilt.[4]

4. *Religion and guilt therapy*.--"The centuries of

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 75-76. cf. Sullivan's concept of "crazy guilt" and Freud's discussion of "unconscious guilt." *Supra*, Chaps. V and IV respectively.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 111.

[3] Tillich, *Systematic Theology Vol. II*., p. 44. Italics are mine.

[4] Tillich, *The Courage To Be*, p. 55.

puritan and bourgeois repression of vital strivings have produced almost as many guilt feelings as the preaching of hell and purgatory in the Middle Ages," according to Tillich.[1] Religion does not cause guilt or anxiety, but when used so as to reduce man's openness to reality, especially to the reality which is himself, it "can protect and feed a potentially neurotic state."[2] For this reason, "much enthusiastic reaction of religious appeal must be considered with suspicion from the point of view of realistic self-affirmation."[3] Nor is religion to be regarded as a panacea for man's anxieties.

> Pathological anxiety, once established, is an object of medical healing. Existential anxiety is an object of priestly help. Neither the medical nor priestly function is bound to its vocational representatives. The goal of both of them is helping men to reach full self-affirmation, to attain the courage to be.[4]

In a significant discussion on "Anxiety, Religion and Medicine,"[5] Tillich discusses "the terms of the alliance"[6] for psychotherapy and religion. His view is that both pastors and psychotherapists need a doctrine of man which presupposes an ontology. He does not agree with those medical practitioners who insist that all anxiety is pathological, and maintains that until a sharp distinction between existential and pathological anxiety is admitted on both sides, there can be no fruitful cooperation between religion and psychotherapy.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 173.

[2] Ibid., p. 73.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[5] Ibid., pp. 70f.

[6] The phrase is Outler's. Albert C. Outler, Psychotherapy and the Christian Message.

The ultimate answer to guilt and all existential anxiety is to be found in religion rightly understood and used. "Religion," says Tillich, "is the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself."[2] The courage to face one's own guilt leads to the question of salvation instead of renunciation. The question is: How can I affirm myself though guilty? Tillich finds his answer in the Reformation doctrine of "justification by grace."[3]

> Luther, and in fact the whole period, experienced the anxiety of guilt and condemnation as the main form of their anxiety. The courage to affirm oneself in spite of this anxiety is the courage we have called the courage of confidence. It is rooted in the personal, total, and immediate certainty of divine forgiveness. One could say that the courage to be is the courage to accept oneself as accepted in spite of being unacceptable. . . . This is the genuine meaning of the Paulinian-Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith.[4]

In "accepting acceptance" even though one feels himself to be unacceptable, this, Tillich insists, is the key to guilt therapy. Obviously, this is no mere intellectual enterprise. This is an existential experience in which one participates with the whole of one's being. In short, the individual is grasped by God Himself who declares him forgiven and accepted though guilty.

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[1] Tillich, The Courage To Be, pp. 70-72; also 65f.

[2] Ibid., p. 156.

[3] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 86.

[4] Tillich, The Courage To Be, pp. 163-164.

> Self-affirmation in spite of the anxiety of guilt and condemnation presupposes participation in something which transcends the self. In the communion of healing, for example the psychoanalytic situation, the patient participates in the healing power of the helper by whom he is accepted although he feels himself unacceptable.[1]

However, medical healing is transcended by true religious healing, for religious healing calls into help the ultimate power of being--itself, i.e., God. "The acceptance by God, his forgiving and justifying act, is the only ultimate source of the courage to be which is able to take the anxiety of guilt and condemnation to itself."[2] Nothing less than this, than God, will do. In another place, Tillich says:

> Sin is estrangement; grace is reconciliation. Precisely because God's reconciling grace is unconditional, man does not need to look at his own condition and the degree of his guilt. He has the certainty of total forgiveness in the situation of total guilt.[3]

This is accomplished in Jesus Christ, the New Being who overcomes man's existential estrangement.[4] "To experience the New Being in Jesus as the Christ means to experience the power in him which has conquered existential estrangement in himself and in everyone who participates in him."[1] The symbol for this is the Atonement. No one of the classical theories of atonement is sufficient in itself, but all express important aspects of the event.[2] The decisive thing is the act itself.

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[1] Ibid., p. 165.

[2] Ibid., p. 166.

[3] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 58-59.

[4] Ibid., p. 118f., especially p. 125f.

> The divine act overcomes the estrangement between God and man in so far as it is a matter of human guilt. In atonement, human guilt is removed as a factor which separates man from God. But this divine act is effective only if man reacts and accepts the removal of guilt between man and God, namely, the divine offer of reconciliation in spite of guilt.[3]

By faith, in other words, man is reconciled, forgiven, and saved. More accurately, and as the Paulinian-Lutheran tradition has it, man is saved by grace through faith.[4]

By an analysis of Tillich's views on the question of healing, the clearest understanding of his thought, in terms of its similarity and divergence from psychoanalytic[5] views, is to be obtained. Tillich believes that "both existentialism and depth psychology are interested in the description of man's existential predicament."[6] Clear thinking about these matters is facilitated, however, by the introduction of theological judgments. Tillich reminds his readers that "the relation between man's essential nature and his existential predicament is the first and basic question that theology has asked, wherever it encounters existentialist analyses and psychoanalytic material."[1] In the Christian tradition, there are three fundamental concepts. These are: (1) "*Esse qua esse bonum est*"; (2) the universal fall; and (3) the possibility of salvation. The first concept is a basic dogma of Christianity which means that being as being is good, or, in the Biblical mythological form: God saw everything he had created, and behold, it was good. Insofar as anthropology is concerned, the Christian theory insists that man *in esse*--i.e., before the Fall, before estrangement--was good. The second dogma, the universal fall, insists that in the transition from essential goodness to existential estrangement, every man and all men, in all times, are involved. In short, man is existentially evil. The third element, however, is the most important so far as the present point is concerned. It is the insistence that "beyond" existential estrangement there is a "third" through which the cleavage between *esse* and *existence* is overcome and healed. In other words, the third concept refers to the reality of the New Being; or, in philosophical terms, "this means that man's essential and existential nature points to his theological nature."[1] By distinguishing clearly among these three elements, and by keeping the distinctions in mind, it is possible not only to avoid confusion, but also to see more sharply wherein Christian existentialism and psychoanalytic views are similar and wherein they differ.

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[1] Ibid., p. 125. [2] Ibid., p. 165f.

[3] Ibid., p. 170.

[4] Cf. Tillich, The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 3-14.

[5] The term is used here to include Sullivan's theory.

[6] Tillich, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Theology," op. cit., p. 12.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Confining attention to the third element--healing--existential analysis[2] and Christian existentialism both attack the existential basis of disease. As Tillich says: "Here we have the difference between the healing of an acute illness and the healing of the existential presuppositions of every disease and of every healthy existence."[3] In other words, and to repeat, pathological anxiety is the domain of theology. Tillich does not believe that a non-religious existential analysis can heal the fundamental disruption in man's being. He writes, in unequivocal language, as follows:

> I would say that neither Freudianism nor any purely existential consideration can heal these fundamental presuppositions. Many psychoanalysts try to do it; they try with their methods to overcome the existential negativity, anxiety, estrangement, meaninglessness, guilt. They deny they are universal, that they are existential in this sense. They call all anxiety, all guilt, all emptiness, illnesses which can be overcome as any illness can be, and they try to remove them. But this is impossible. The existential struc-

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] As in Sartre and May.

[3] Tillich, *op. cit*., p. 15.

tures cannot be healed by the most refined techniques. They are objects of salvation.[1]

It is obvious from the foregoing that Tillich believes guilt to be of two kinds: existential and pathological. The difference is qualitative, not simply quantitative. Existential guilt differs from pathological guilt in kind, not simply in degree. For this reason, the two kinds of guilt must be treated--in the literal sense of therapy--differently. To repeat: "Pathological anxiety, once established is an object of medical healing; existential anxiety is an object of priestly help."[2]

It might well be asked: Why cannot existential analysis, such as practiced by Binswanger,[3] heal the rupture in man's being? The answer to such a question is, indeed, complex and lies beyond the immediate scope of this investigation. It may be worthwhile, however, to indicate the direction in which the answer is to be found, according to Tillich's system.[4] Briefly, Tillich's answer is this: Nothing less than the power of being-itself, God, can heal the breach between essence and existence. God is the God beyond the dichotomy of essence and existence. He is the

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 77.

[3] May (ed.), Existence, p. 191f.

[4] This issue is really a central theme of Tillich's systematic theology, especially as expressed in Systematic Theology, II, q.v.

God--beyond--God; i.e., beyond the ordinary conceptions of God which make Him an object alongside of, even though Supreme, other objects. In God the dichotomies of existence--subject--object, essence-existence, good-evil--are transcended. Apart from religion, that is apart from being grasped by the power of being-itself, Tillich contends, the polarities of existence cannot be overcome. For this reason, an atheistic existentialism, like Sartre's, is necessarily hopeless and literally helpless, because all such an existentialism can do is to make man aware of his estrangement.[1] In short, such existentialism can make man aware of his anxiety but offer him only either despair or bravado. Tillich's position, of course, reflects a faith; but all existentialists agree that man's fundamental choice is always a faith, good or bad.[2]

5. Tillich's answers to the five basic questions.--These "answers" can be given quite briefly because the questions have been implied in the preceding digest of Tillich's views. It should be remarked, also, that the investigator's reliance on comparatively few of Dr. Tillich's works was at the specific recommendation of the theologian himself in personal correspondence with the investigator. The following attempts to formulate Tillich's "answers" are, of

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[1] Tillich, "Psychoanalyses, Existentialism, and Theology," op. cit., p. 14.

[2] Cf. the discussion in Stern, op. cit., p. 152f.

course, solely the author's formulations. They will serve as a summary to the entire chapter.

A. The genesis of guilt.

Guilt is ultimately existential in character. It is ontic. It is traceable to the fact of man's finite freedom. It arises out of man's existential anxiety, and is one form of such anxiety. Guilt represents the loss of "dreaming innocence" by the decision for self-actualization. This decision is both free and not free, i.e., in all finite freedom there is an element of universal destiny. This paradox of freedom is not resolvable by human action nor is it to be explained by human reason. It is an existential fact. In making the transition from essence to existence, man becomes anxious and guilty. Stated in more psychological terms, the same truth may be approximated by saying that in the course of his self-actualization, a person inevitably experiences a measure of self-deception and self-defeat. This experience is the experience of existential guilt.

B. The dynamic manifestations of guilt.

Tillich is willing to accept the manifold pathological syndromes in which guilt is a dynamic factor as evidence of the individual's attempts to cope with existential guilt by converting it into pathological guilt. In this sense, it can be said that pathological guilt is the _symptom_ of which existential guilt is the presupposition.

However, Tillich also sees the creative and redemptive possibilities in guilt, both existential and pathological. Tillich accepts Boisen's basic thesis that suffering is remedial.[1] "Self-blame, even to the point of morbidity, may not be in itself an evil but an attempt at cure which makes or breaks the sufferer," says Boisen.[2] In the light of the findings of this investigation, there is reason to believe that Tillich would concur with Boisen's view. Therefore, guilt may manifest itself primarily in neurotic mechanisms, or it may manifest itself as a constructive and creative effort to find wholeness, i.e., to overcome the estrangement of existence. Tillich is well aware, however, that the weight of clinical evidence is on the side of the more neurotic manifestations of guilt.

C. The religious concomitants of the sense of guilt.

As might be implied from the comments on the previous question, the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt may be essentially negative or they may be essentially positive. Negatively, guilt may express itself in resentment, rebellion and hatred of God. It may also manifest itself in religious delusions described so well by Boisen. Positively, guilt may lead to genuine repentance, confession and contrition and so be the first steps in a redeeming religious experience. A non-neurotic awareness of existential guiltiness may also encourage the growth of the Christian virtues of charity and forbearance.

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[1] Boisen, op. cit., p. 25.

[2] Ibid., p. 38.

D. Therapeutic indications.

The unequivocal answer given by Tillich is religious faith, by which he means being grasped by the power of being-itself. Such salvation involves a dynamic and interpersonal experience of Jesus, the Christ, the New Being. As for the place of the Church, Tillich's third volume of his systematic theology promises to discuss this subject.

E. The value judgment to be made with respect to the role and function of guilt in human personality.

In answer to this question, the distinction between existential and pathological guilt is crucial. Pathological guilt is, for the most part, disintegrative and disruptive, hence bad--a disvalue. Of course, the potential value of even pathological guilt makes this form of guilt a strictly relative evil. The relation is to the eventual outcome, a point well-made by Boisen's study.

What about existential guilt? It seems that one must conclude that Tillich judges it to be an existential good, or value. For without the awareness of the true condition of man's existence, would man ever seek God, or become genuinely religious? This is the value of the existential analysis, that it has made modern man aware once more of the tragic and radically evil state of his existence.[1] In doing this, existentialism is "the good luck of Christian theology" and its most useful handmaiden.

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[1] Tillich, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Theology," op. cit.

CHAPTER VII

RECAPITULATION

It has been hypothesized[1] that there are significant differences between psychological and theological views of guilt. Furthermore, it has been asserted that the differences are identifiable on both the theoretical and the practical levels. That is to say, psychology and theology hold different views both as to the etiology of guilt and as to the therapeutic management of guilt. The attempt to find support for the hypothesis was limited to the analysis of four representative views. On the psychological side, the views of Freud and Sullivan were analyzed; and on the theological side, the views of Kierkegaard and Tillich were analyzed. In each case, the analysis sought to provide answers to the following five questions:

1. How does guilt arise in personality, i.e., what is the genesis of guilt?

2. How does guilt manifest itself dynamically in personality? What are its symptomological manifestations? How do persons attempt to cope with guilt?

3. What are some of the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt?

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[1] See Hypothesis, Chap. II, p. 49, supra.

4. What are the effective methods and techniques of therapy with respect to guilt problems?

5. What value judgment is to be placed on the role and function of guilt in human personality?

This chapter attempts to summarize the data with respect to the hypothesis, instead of attempting to summarize all the data, because a summary has been provided already at the end of each chapter.

1. The genesis of guilt.--It has been found that the psychological views of this study (Freud and Sullivan) emphasize genetic and developmental factors, whereas the representatives of theology (Kierkegaard and Tillich) emphasize existential and metaphysical factors.

Both Freud and Sullivan regard guilt as a differentiated form of anxiety. Therefore, the genesis of guilt is to be sought, according to them, in an analysis of the genesis of anxiety. With respect to this latter concept, both men point to the helplessness and extended dependency of the infant as a primary etiological factor. Although Freud's views are much more biological and mechanistic than Sullivan's, this difference does not affect materially the point under consideration. The point is that for both Freud and Sullivan, anxiety is ultimately attributable to the the physiological and psychological helplessness of the human infant. Freud taught that anxiety is the reaction to the danger-situation of non-gratification and loss of object, the danger being magnified by phylogenetic deposits in the Oedipus complex, due to the infant's utter helplessness and dependency. Similarly, in Sullivan's theory, anxiety is etiologically related to the infant's helplessness and dependency, even though Sullivan insists, in contradistinction to Freud, that anxiety has nothing to do whatsoever with the physiochemical requirements of the organism. It is nonetheless clear that the infant's helplessness--his utter inability to tolerate or to cope with anxiety--is the *prima facie* reason for his experiencing the "emotional disturbance" of the mothering one as anxiety.

In contrast to this emphasis upon genetic dependency, which is characteristic of the psychological views, Kierkegaard and Tillich focus their analysis upon the phylogenetic dependency--i.e. the finitude--of man. It is true that neither theologian denies the importance of genetic factors, but neither do they devote much attention nor, apparently, much significance to such factors. According to the theological analysis presented in this study, anxiety is the product of man's existential estrangement. Such anxiety is only incidentally, not causally, related to man's biological and psychological helplessness during infancy. In short, the theological position is this: anxiety pertains hardly at all to man-as-animal; it pertains most of all to man-as-human--that unique synthesis of body, mind and spirit. Again, the difference between the psychological and the theological analysis of anxiety may be stated as this: theology holds that anxiety derives ultimately from the human predicament, i.e. from the fact that man is estranged; psychology holds that anxiety derives ultimately from man's biological and psychological helplessness, and from the developmental experiences determined by this fact. Strictly speaking, therefore, in the psychological view anxiety is learned. In the theological view, it is innate, something with which "fallen man" is born, or "born into."

It is the thesis of this investigation that this difference is significant, and that this significance will be exhibited in the discussion which follows. It is asserted that this difference helps to account for the fact that clinical psychology and psychiatry, in the past, have tended to view anxiety as neurotic and, potentially at least, as pathological. Furthermore, it is on the basis of this analytic difference that Tillich insists that normal anxiety must be distinguished from pathological anxiety.

It may be objected that nowhere do either Freud or Sullivan explicitly declare that all anxiety is neurotic. On the basis of a strict interpretation of the data, this objection must be allowed. However, such an objection seems to rest mainly on "an argument from silence," which is generally acknowledged to be the weakest possible form of argument. By the same token, it can be argued that nowhere do Freud and Sullivan explicitly declare that all anxiety is not neurotic. Such trivialities of logic, however, do not contribute much to man's knowledge. It seems fairly obvious that the gist of both Freud's and Sullivan's theories is that anxiety is the primary deterrent to desirable developments in personality. It can hardly be doubted that both men devoted much of their energy to an analysis of the malignant role of anxiety. If either of them recognized a normal, benevolent kind of anxiety, it is certain that neither of them devoted much space to it in their writings. Unless it is true that psychology in general has tended to view all anxiety as pathological, there is little basis for May's assertion that "the most crucial issue in contemporary psychotherapy . . . is whether the aim is to help the person gain freedom from anxiety or rather to help him confront anxiety experiences with the aim of enlarging his freedom."[1]

As noted above, the psychologists view guilt as a differentiated form of anxiety. It was found that Freud considered guilt to be the experience of tension between the demands of conscience and the actual attainments of the ego;[2] or, as Fenichel states,[3] guilt is "a topically defined anxiety." Psychoanalytically, guilt is the ego's fear of the superego, which fear is aroused as the individual passes through the oedipal conflict. For Freud, the significant developmental events are to be understood in terms of the oedipus conflict, which conflict also includes certain phylogenetic elements, namely, an archaic heritage of unconscious guilt. The nexus of this phylogenetic element, however, is strictly biological and psychological, and not at all ontological, certainly not theological! In fact, Freud maintained that it was the unconscious sense of guilt about incestuous desires which gave rise to all religion.[1] In any case, it is as each individual passes through his own oedipus conflict that the superego is formed and guilt arises. Sullivan, on the other hand, found no need to resort to such mythological explanations. Sufficient for him were the normal processes of acculturation and the prevailing practices of child-rearing. In the course of the expanding interpersonal relations, and sometime in puberty and early adolescence, the individual develops "governing principles" for his own life. When those principles are violated, he experiences true guilt. In spite of these differences, however, both Freud and Sullivan trace the genesis of guilt to the normal processes of development in our culture. Sullivan specifically rejects voluntaristic concepts of a mythological will, and neither Freud nor

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[1] May, "Introduction" to Guntrip, op. cit., p. 7.

[2] Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 49.

[3] Fenichel, op. cit., p. 134. See also Chap. IV, supra.

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[1] Freud, Totem and Taboo, op. cit.; cf. Freud, A General Introduction, etc., op. cit., p. 291.

Sullivan have recourse to ontological concepts in explaining how guilt arises in human personality.

In contrast to the psychological views, it was found that Kierkegaard and Tillich trace the genesis of guilt to man's existential state of estrangement and finitude. Guilt, like anxiety, is ontic, belonging to existence as such. Existential guilt, which is perfectly normal for man, is qualitatively different from pathological guilt. The former is the product of the transition from essence to existence and is identical with man's existential self-estrangement. It comes only by the "qualitative leap." It represents the loss of "dreaming innocence" by the free-yet-determined choice of self-actualization. Neurotic guilt, on the other hand, arises by the attempted repression of existential guilt. Neurotic guilt represents the refusal of the individual to admit his existential guilt into awareness. As there is a normal anxiety which is existentially determined, so there is a normal guilt which is likewise existentially determined.

It may be asked whether this difference with respect to the genesis of guilt is a "real" difference or mainly a difference in terminology. "After all," someone may say, "Freud and Sullivan, being psychiatrists, would naturally focus on genetic and developmental factors; and, by the same token, Kierkegaard and Tillich would naturally focus on ontological factors. But they are talking about the same thing, albeit they are approaching the data at different levels." Such a position has been espoused by Bergler, who writes:

> The religious and scientific approaches to the genesis of conscience start, of necessity, at different points. The religious approach assumes an act or manifestation of God as the basis of conscience. The scientific approach describes clinically observed facts. There is no contradiction between the two approaches; belief and clinical observation work on completely different psychic levels.[1]

In answer to such a position, which is held not only by psychologists but by some religious writers as well,[2] a number of objections may be voiced. In the first place, it is evident that not all religious views "assume an act or manifestation of God as the basis of conscience." As this investigation has shown, such an assumption is not made by Christian existentialism. More to the point, however, is the objection that Tillich, at least, would undoubtedly insist that he, too, was describing "clinically observed facts." In other words, Tillich and May both insist that existential anxiety and guilt are not simply products of analysis but are, in fact, aspects of man's existence. Furthermore, the essence of the existentialist's criticism of psychoanalytic theories is precisely that the analysis of human experience has not been carried far enough. Freud stopped with complexes, instincts, the unconscious, and topographical structures.

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[1] Bergler, op. cit., p. 1.

[2] See Joseph F. Fletcher, "Psychiatry and Religion: Conflict or Synthesis," Journal of Pastoral Care, VI, No. 6 (Summer, 1952), pp. 12-18.

But these, according to the viewpoint of existential psychoanalysis, are not irreducible.[1] More fundamental than any of these is what Sartre calls "the original choice,"[2] or what May and Tillich refer to as the existential conditions. May asserts: "Actually, the sense of being--that is, the ontological sense--is presupposed for the solution of other problems."[3] In short, existentialists generally, whether they be theologians or psychotherapists, insist that their analysis is simply necessary to account for the structure and significance of anxiety and guilt. The contrast, therefore, is not, as Bergler suggests, between "religious and scientific approaches." Rather, the contrast is between existentialist and psychoanalytic approaches, be the existentialist views theistic, as in the case of Kierkegaard and Tillich, or be they agnostic, as in the case of Sartre and the European existential analysts generally.

In the light of the above discussion, this investigator believes Bergler's contention that "there is no contradiction between the two approaches" is invalid. Any psychological theory which refuses to include ontological analysis in its understanding of the genesis of anxiety and guilt differs significantly from Christian existentialism, as well as differing significantly from existential psychoanalysis. The full significance of this difference will be made more explicit in the balance of this chapter and in the next chapter.

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[1] See Stern, op. cit., pp. 103-223; and May (ed.), Existence, especially pp. 37-91.

[2] Sartre, L'Etre et le Neant, op. cit., p. 657f.

[3] May (ed.), Existence, p. 47.

Before turning to the second question, it is necessary to digress briefly in order to acknowledge certain limitations of this investigation. By arbitrarily limiting the investigation to the four representatives, other views were necessarily excluded. On the psychological side, the limitation does not appear to have resulted in serious misrepresentation. Stein's study of other than psychoanalytic theories does not reveal any less emphasis upon genetic and developmental factors nor any greater recognition of ontological factors.[1] Jourard[2] has introduced recently what seems to be somewhat of a novelty in psychological literature. He devotes a chapter of his book to a discussion of "Conscience and Guilt in Healthy Personality!"[3] An analysis of the chapter reveals, however, that Jourard relies heavily on psychoanalytic theories. In discussing how the conscience is acquired, Jourard writes: "The conscience is gradually acquired during the process of growing up by means of identification. Identification is the name given to the process of adopting traits of some valued model."[1] As for guilt, Jourard says: "When a person behaves in opposition to his conscience he experiences guilt, just as he received punishment from his parents when they caught him behaving contrary to their expectations."[2] This view, it will be recognized, represents a kind of eclectic synthesis of Freud's and Sullivan's views. Jourard does note, however, that Mowrer differs from the orthodox psychoanalytic theory of the role of conscience in the development of neurosis. This difference, however, has more significance with respect to the role of guilt in producing maladjustments. So it will be discussed in the next section. Aside from the existential analysts, the views of Freud and Sullivan are fairly representative of contemporary psychology with respect to the genesis of guilt.

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[1] Stein, op. cit., pp. 44-66.

[2] Sidney M. Jourard, Personal Adjustment (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958).

[3] Ibid., pp. 363-393.

With respect to Christian theology, limiting the investigation to Kierkegaard and Tillich resulted in no serious misrepresentation. Both are existentialists. In the main, Christian existentialism seems more amenable to a synthesis with the insights of dynamic psychology than does, say, strict Calvinism or Fundamentalism. As noted, particularly in the hands of Tillich, existential Christian theology is genuinely appreciative of the insights gained from depth analysis. Such an appreciation and generally cordial spirit can hardly be said to characterize all Christian theology. Aside from this "temperamental" difference, however, the differences between Christian existentialism and other types of modern theology with respect to the genesis of guilt are not marked.[1] Bicknell has expressed a point of view which would probably be subscribed to in essence by all Christian theologians alike. He said:

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[1] Ibid., p. 368.

[2] Ibid., p. 383.

> Psychology can teach us nothing about the essential nature of sin or original sin. It has thrown much light upon the psychical machinery of sin . . . But from the standpoint of pure theology the idea of sin still remains unaffected. Our acceptance or rejection of the Christian view of sin must be determined on other grounds than psychology. It is manifest that no considerations based upon the alleged findings of psychology can at all lessen the urgency of the problem of forgiveness.[2]

While Bicknell has spoken of sin, his observations are related directly to guilt also, because, as Mackintosh has said, "when a Christian man seeks to give himself an account of his experience in being pardoned, he is compelled to fix on the idea of his guilt."[3] In the Christian view, guilt is the experience of one's personal sinfulness.[1] Neither psychology nor any other human wisdom can resolve the paradox by which man sins by necessity yet by his free choice. As both Kierkegaard and Tillich have insisted, sin enters by the "Qualitative leap," and this process does not admit of psychological explanation. In this respect--the paradoxical nature of sin and guilt--the views of contemporary Christian theology differ sharply from the views of modern dynamic psychology. It is contended, furthermore, that this difference is equally valid with respect to Christian existentialism and to existential analysis. The latter theory is not explicitly religious, which means, among other things, that in its view guilt is not inextricably bound up with sin. In Christian existentialism it is impossible to become aware of guilt without, at the same moment, becoming aware of sin. In fact, as Kierkegaard made plain, the more religious a person is, the more guilt he will experience, because he becomes that much more aware of the heinous character of sin.

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[1] See H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology.

[2] Quoted in Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, pp. 61-62.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

To summarize the discussion of the genesis of guilt, psychological and theological views differ in the following respects:

A. The determinative role assigned to genetic and developmental factors by psychology in contrast to the emphasis upon the role of ontological and metaphysical factors by theology;

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[1] Cf. Isaiah 6.

B. The insistence by the existentialists (psychologists and theologians alike) upon a sharp distinction between normal (existential) anxiety and guilt and neurotic (pathological) anxiety and guilt, this insistence not being voiced by either Freud or Sullivan;

C. The contention of Christian theology that sin and guilt are inextricably interwoven, this view not being shared either by psychoanalytic or existential analysts.

2. How does guilt manifest itself dynamically in personality? What are the symptomalogical manifestations? How do persons attempt to cope with guilt?--It has been discovered that all four representatives, with slight differences, acknowledged that guilt can and does frequently manifest itself in pathological syndromes. Inasmuch as the differences with respect to this issue--cf. Sullivan's "less serious" view of guilt as a clinical problem as compared to Freud's view--have been discussed in some detail in the course of the exposition of each of the four views, no further attention will be paid at this time to these differences. Rather, attention will be focused on what the writer believes are more significant differences.

One way to get at the difference between the psychological and the theological views, with respect to the question at hand, is to ask: Does the experience of guilt lead inevitably, or even usually, to the formation of pathological symptoms? It is contended on the basis of the data discovered in this investigation that Freud and Sullivan would be more or less forced to answer such a question affirmatively. Of course, both men would undoubtedly recoil from such a word as "inevitably." Nevertheless, as has been noted several times already, neither man had much to say about the positive potential of anxiety and guilt. On the other hand, both Freud and Sullivan wrote at length about the deleterious effects of these two "culprits"--anxiety and guilt. What is true of the two representatives seems to be truly representative of psychology as a whole, with few notable exceptions. Jourard does acknowledge that conscience and guilt "serve the very important function of augmenting social control over behavior, and insuring conformity with the social value-system";[1] but he nonetheless devotes most of his discussion to the _unhealthy_ conscience and the unhealthy sense of guilt. Mowrer[2] differs from Freud in that he maintains that a neurotic is not a person with an over-strict conscience, who must repress his sexuality in order to remain guilt-free. Instead, Mowrer sees the neurotic as a person who persists beyond childhood in the pursuit of irresponsible pleasures, including sexuality, and who represses his guilt and his conscience. Neurotic symptoms, in Mowrer's view, therefore, arise as defenses against guilt. Consequently, the aim of therapy is not to render the conscience more lenient, but to make it conscious, so that a person will feel more guilt, and seek in the future to obey his conscience rather than ignore or repress it. This modification of Freudian theory by Mowrer, however, can hardly be said to argue for the benign effects of anxiety and guilt. Guilt, in Mowrer's view, still gives rise mainly to neurotic defenses. The notable exception to the general tendency of psychologists to view guilt almost entirely negatively is to be found in the more recent writings of Rollo May, as already noted. May insists on the recognition of the ontic character of anxiety and guilt and endorses Tillich's concept of taking both up into one's courageous self-affirmation.[1] In a somewhat similar fashion, Guntrip acknowledges that the ability to feel guilty is desirable. Guntrip relies heavily on Fairbairn's reconstructions of Freudian theory. In discussing whether or not psychotherapy seeks to destroy all moral values, Guntrip says:

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[1] Jourard, _op. cit._, p. 364.

[2] O. H. Mowrer, _Psychotherapy: Theory and Research_ (New York: Ronald Press, 1953), p. 572f.

> The answer to these doubts and fears is quite definite. The patient's sense of moral values must not be weakened or undermined. The fact that he feels guilty about his anti-social trends is part of his motivation

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[1] May, (ed.), Existence, p. 50f.

> for wanting to change them. If he could not feel guilty, psychotherapy would become virtually impossible. The capacity for feeling guilty about hurting other people is part of a socialized personality and in itself a mature thing.[1]

As one reads on in Guntrip's book, however, one finds him devoting much space and much attention, in the usual psychological fashion, to the _dangers_ in neurotic and morbid guilt. The following passage reveals Guntrip's tendency to psychologize:

> To some extent, varying from person to person, all human beings live with a part of themselves shut up or imprisoned in a secret unconscious mental world where they feel unloved, unvalued, unwanted, rejected, frustrated, blamed, condemned; and therefore frightened, lonely, insecure, angry, and enraged, and guilty. . . . There can be little doubt that here we have a clear view of those facts about human nature that caused the religious dogmas of Hell and original sin to arise.[2]

In other words, as Guntrip suggests, the religious dogmas have arisen from feelings of rejection, blame, condemnation, etc. Such a position is not, after all, so very different from Freud's. Against all such psychologisms, Christian theology stands opposed and insists on the revealed nature of its truth.

Christian theology, moreover, insists on the potential value in experiences of anxiety and guilt. This feature is prominent in the writings of both Kierkegaard and Tillich. It was discovered that Kierkegaard saw the creative possibilities in both despair and dread. Despair, which is the sickness unto death, can lead man to saving faith. Similarly, dread, which is the experience of the threat of non-being, can lead man to search for forgiveness and salvation. In his isolation and fragmentation, man seeks relatedness and wholeness. Tillich is even more specific than Kierkegaard. While acknowledging the frequency with which existential guilt tends to be transformed into neurotic guilt, Tillich nonetheless stresses the creative possibilities in both forms of guilt. It was asserted that Tillich would concur in Boisen's assertion that even morbid guilt "may not be in itself an evil but an attempt at cure which makes or breaks the sufferer."[1] Guilt, therefore, may manifest itself primarily in neurotic mechanisms or in a creative and courageous effort to overcome the estrangements of existence. Tillich suggests, in The Courage To Be, that this latter and more desirable outcome is one of the more important reasons for distinguishing between normal and pathological anxiety and guilt.[2] This contrast between psychoanalytic and Christian views becomes most apparent in terms of healing. So it will be discussed further in the section devoted to that subject.

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[1] Guntrip, _op. cit_., p. 179.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 76.

Before leaving the subject of the manifestations of guilt, a further word of clarification and comparison of Christian and non-Christian existentialism is offered. It has been noted that the European existential analysts agree with Kierkegaard and Tillich in tracing anxiety and guilt to the structure of being as such. The following words of Medard Boss are especially clear:

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[1] Boisen, op. cit., p. 25.

[2] See especially Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 70f.

> If you lock up potentialities, you are guilty against what is given you in your origin, in your "core." In this existential condition of being indebted and being guilty are founded all guilt feelings, in whatever thousand and one concrete forms and malformations they may appear.[1]

Boss insists the patient is guilty, not merely feels guilty, or has guilt-feelings. Up to this point, all existentialists are in agreement, be they theistic or non-theistic. May makes it clear, however, that existential analysis is not necessarily nor explicitly religious. He writes:

> Nor is the guilt exclusively linked up with the religious aspects of this, or any, patient's experience. We can be as guilty by refusing to accept the anal, genital, or any other, corporeal aspects of life as the intellectual and spiritual aspects.[2]

It is a mistake to assume that existentialism, per se, leads always to religious faith as the completely atheistic Existentialism of Heidigger and Sartre makes clear. Existential analysis can lead, as in the instances just cited, to extreme pessimism and outright atheism. The reason that Existentialism is "the good luck of Christian theology" is not because it inevitably leads man to faith, but because it leads man to see how desperate and hopeless his condition really is.[1] It is religious faith, not simply existential analysis, which sees creative potential in anxiety and guilt.

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[1] May (ed.), Existence, p. 53.

[2] Ibid., p. 54.

The difference between psychology and theology with respect to the manifestations of guilt in human personality may be summarized thus: psychology tends to see guilt mainly in terms of pathological potential, whereas Christian theology, while not blind to the pathological potential, tends to see much more creative potential in guilt. The writer submits that this is an important and significant difference. No evidence was found, in either the psychological views or the theological views, to support the conclusion that guilt always manifests itself pathologically. In fact, all four representatives infer that a sense of guilt is a normal part of human experience. The only conclusion justified by the data is that the psychologists tend to be more aware of the pathological potential in guilt, and the theologians tend to be more aware of the redemptive potential.

Implied in the foregoing discussion is the fact that persons attempt to cope with guilt basically in one of two ways: (1) either by repressing it or converting it into some neurotic symptom; or (2) by accepting it and seeking some form of "salvation." Freud emphasized the repressive aspect and believed that an unconscious sense of guilt lay at the root of many neurotic symptoms. Unconscious guilt also acts as a resistance to therapy, Freud found. It also, he maintained, gave rise to religion, which is in itself a neurotic attempt to solve the problem. While Freud did acknowledge that the superego normally should never seek to function under present cultural conditions, he saw very little that was healthy in guilt.

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[1] Cf. Tillich, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism and Theology," op. cit.

Since for him guilt is a function of behavior in central awareness, Sullivan did not see true guilt as a very serious clinical problem. To be sure, guilt could cause personality disturbances, but the worst feature of guilt is a pseudo type which Sullivan called "crazy guilt." This kind of guilt could be a real psychiatric nuisance and mask anxiety. Anxiety, according to Sullivan's views, could be converted into "crazy guilt"; but true guilt was seldom a cause of serious anxiety. Sullivan implied, therefore, that most individuals would attempt to cope with guilt in a rational way. However, he did not have much to say about the role of guilt as productive of greater adequacy in interpersonal relations.

From the theological point of view, Kierkegaard and Tillich were found to assert that persons attempt to cope with anxiety and guilt by rebellion, pride, despair, or by believing and faith. In theological language, it is impossible to understand guilt apart from the whole concept of sin. Whatever is said of sin in any given theological system may be said with equal validity about guilt; for guilt is nothing more nor less than the existential awareness of sin. Both Kierkegaard and Tillich are Paulinian and evangelical in their views of sin, guilt and salvation. As the individual becomes aware of _his_ sin, he, _ipso facto_, becomes aware of _his_ guilt. Confronting his guilt, he may attempt to convert it into some neurotic guilt, into pietistic moralism, into censorious puritanism, or he may rebel, or despair, or fall victim of "the sickness unto death," or be in dread. All of which states _may be_ the preconditions of believing, of faith, and of salvation. These states may be described by psychology, and Tillich feels that Christianity is indebted to depth psychology for a profound and accurate description of man's existential state. Both Tillich and Kierkegaard insist, however, that psychology is unable to _explain_ these states; i.e. psychology cannot tell man how anxiety becomes guilt and sin.

The difference between psychology and theology is marked, also, at this point of how persons seek to cope with guilt. In general, psychology teaches that persons seek to cope with guilt by neurotic means; theology teaches that persons tend to cope with guilt by religious means. Freud went so far as to insist that the religious means _per_ se are neurotic. Inasmuch as it is difficult to reconcile these two points of view, it is submitted that this is further evidence of a significant difference between them.

3. What are some of the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt?--Aside from what has been presented under the two previous headings, no significant difference was found with respect to this question. All four representatives acknowledged that the sense of guilt can, and often does, lead to the neurotic use of religion. The significant difference concerns whether or not religion itself, and *in toto*, is judged to be neurotic. Of the four representatives, Freud alone argued that religion is the mass neurosis of mankind. It was noted that Sullivan did not express himself on the subject, but that the general attitude of the "Washington School" has been positive toward religion. In the light of these findings, it must be concluded that the hypothesis is not supported at this point.

4. What are the effective methods and techniques of therapy with respect to guilt problems?--In the light of the data, it may be concluded that at this point the differences between psychology and theology are most marked. Tillich has expressed the essential difference in unambiguous manner in the following words:

> Here we have the difference between the healing of an acute illness and the healing of the existential presuppositions of every disease and every healthy exis-

> tence. . . . I would say that neither Freudianism nor any purely existentialist consideration can heal these fundamental presuppositions. Many psychoanalysts try to do it; they try with their methods to overcome the existential negativity, estrangement, meaninglessness, guilt. They deny that they are universal, that they are existential in this sense. They call all anxiety, all guilt, all emptiness, all meaninglessness, illnesses which can be overcome as any illness can be, and they try to remove them. But this is impossible. The existential structures cannot be healed by the most refined techniques. They are objects of salvation. The analyst can be an instrument of salvation as every friend, every parent, every child can be an instrument of salvation. But as analyst he cannot bring salvation by means of his medical methods, for this requires the healing of the center of the person.[1]

The above lengthy passage has been quoted because it sets the viewpoint of Christian theology in sharpest contrast to the psychological viewpoint. It may well be objected that Tillich's assertions are sheer dogmatism, but whether they are or not is beside the point. The point is that Christian theology, generally, refuses to admit that psychology or psychotherapy can provide any ultimate cure to the sickness of man. Outler states: "Man's sins must be forgiven by God."[2] In a similar vein, Bonnell has said: "There's one remedy and only one for guilt--the forgiveness of Almighty God. It alone is adequate, for it cleanses, lightens and transforms a burdened and desperate soul."[3] Of course, none of the clergymen mentioned deny the value of psychotherapy. As Tillich has said, medical healing has its place; namely, in treating pathological forms of anxiety and guilt. The above passage points yet once again to the basic difference at the level of theory. For Christian theology, guilt is not something man has; guilt is something man is. From the psychological point of view, "guilt" is ultimately reducible to guilt-feelings. In sharp contrast, Christian theology insists that guilt belongs to man qua man. In Biblical language:

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[1] Tillich, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Theology," op. cit., p. 15.

[2] Outler, op. cit., p. 235.

[3] John S. Bonnell, "Anxiety--The Sickness of Modern Civilization," Pastoral Psychology, VIII, No. 74 (May 1957), p. 13.

> None is righteous, no, not one;
> No one understands, no one seeks for God.
> All have turned aside, together they have gone wrong;
> No one does good, not even one.[1]

If it be asked, "But why cannot existential analysis heal man since it also recognizes the ontic character of guilt?" Tillich's answer is that nothing but the Power-of-being-itself can overcome the estrangement of being. The full answer, of course, involves a complete systematic theology, such as Tillich has written, but this matter lies beyond the scope of this investigation.

In terms of therapy, the hypothesis is supported. The data indicate that modern dynamic psychology and contemporary Christian theology are unreconciled, despite growing evidence of cooperation between psychotherapists and clergymen.[1]

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[1] Romans 3: 10-12.

5. What value judgment is to be placed on the role and function of guilt in human personality?--The investigation discovered no direct data on the basis of which this question can be answered. However, it was believed that certain inferences were justified in the light of the findings. The theological position, as represented by Kierkegaard and Tillich, implies that insofar as anxiety and guilt make men aware of his ultimate dependency upon God, and so lead him to saving faith, these experiences are good; i.e., they are valuable. Tillich recognized the disvalue of pathological anxiety and guilt, but it was concluded that he would adjudge even these to be not absolutely evil in and of themselves. Even pathological guilt has instrumental value, because it is often the predisposing factor which motivates man to seek the intrinsic value, namely, salvation.

A similar logic led to the inference that Freud and Sullivan would be disposed to see anxiety and guilt as primarily disvalues, because they tended to see less of the creative and more of the destructive potential in these experiences. Insofar as "adjustment" is the goal of life, anxiety and guilt would have to be adjudged as bad or evil in direct ratio to the degree to which they lead to "maladjustments." The evidence is clear that both Freud and Sullivan, each in his own way, saw anxiety as a major etiological factor in serious disorders in living. Since both also saw guilt as a specific form of anxiety, it is justifiable to infer that they would also see guilt as productive of serious disorders in living. The data support this conjecture. Therefore, it is concluded that, from the psychological point, guilt is a disvalue. At present at least, the viewpoint of much dynamic psychology is that anxiety and guilt are evils to be eliminated through therapy. May's suggestion that these experiences are to be taken up in one's search for authentic self-hood represents a somewhat new and thus far, a minority opinion.

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[1] Further evidence of this divergence will be found in MacNiell, op. cit., and in Outler, op. cit.

The conclusion is that Christian theology values guilt as the presupposition of salvation; psychology disvalues guilt as a major predisposing factor in psychopathology. The hypothesis is supported.

Summary.--It is maintained that the data support the following hypothesis: Not only similarities but significant differences with respect to guilt exist between psychology and theology. These differences exist on the theoretical and on the therapeutic levels.

The data were drawn from four representative views. So, strictly speaking, the hypotehsis is supported only with respect to these four bodies of data. However, the investigator believes that the four bodies of data are sufficiently representative of modern dynamic psychology and contemporary Christian existential theology to justify generalization. The most marked differences may be summarized as follows:

1. Genesis of guilt: Psychology teaches that guilt is learned, and it stresses genetic and developmental experiences as the source of guilt feelings. Existential theology teaches that guilt is inherent in man, part of his existential nature, and it stresses man's finitude and sin. Man is guilty, not simply possessed of guilt feelings.

2. The manifestations of guilt in personality: Psychology distinguishes between normal and neurotic guilt, but the difference is one of degree not kind. It tends to emphasize the pathological potential in guilt. Existential theology insists on distinguishing between existential and pathological guilt, the difference being qualitative, not simply quantitative. It tends to emphasize the religious potential in guilt.

3. The religious concomitants of the sense of guilt: Both disciplines acknowledge that guilt can lead to the neurotic use of religion. Freud taught that religion itself is neurotic. Sullivan was non-committal. Theology teaches that Christianity is a healthy and wholesome antidote to guilt.

4. Guilt therapy: Tillich and Kierkegaard, as well as most contemporary theologians, are willing to admit that psychotherapy is valid for coping with neurotic guilt.

Christian theology generally, however, insists that it alone possesses the only ultimate solution to the problems of guilt and sin.

5. Value judgments: Modern psychology regards axiological judgment to lie outside of its proper scope as a science. It was inferred, however, that psychology would tend to regard guilt as a disvalue and something to be got rid of through therapy--at least, unconscious and neurotic guilt. Christian existential theology sees the creative and redemptive potential in sin and guilt--not that sin and guilt, *per se*, are good or valuable--but that these are predisposing factors toward wholeness and salvation.

The above-data support the thesis that there are marked differences between psychology and (specifically existential) theology with respect to guilt. The *significance* of this difference has not been demonstrated adequately. This is the task of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The study of representatives of contemporary Christian existential theology and of modern dynamic psychology concerning guilt feelings has revealed thus far that there are marked, or pronounced, differences between the two. Pronounced disparity, such as has been revealed by this investigation, is one dimension of significance.[1] This concluding chapter will attempt to present further indications of the significance of this difference in terms of the following hypotheses:

1. The major significance of these differences insofar as psychology is concerned is in the realm of theory. In short, it is hypothesized that psychology can learn some important lessons from Christian existentialism, not only with respect to the understanding of guilt but also with respect to the understanding of its own nature as a science of man.

2. It is hypothesized that the major significance of the aforementioned differences, insofar as theology is

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[1] Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Fifth Edition, says: "Significant--1. Having a meaning; especially, full of import; expressive. 2. Suggesting or contain some covert or special meaning. 3. Important; momentous."

concerned, lies in the realm of therapy; i.e., in relation to pastoral counseling and practical theology. In short, it is assumed that "Christian soul care" has much to learn from dynamic psychology.

3. Finally, it is hypothesized that the findings of this investigation will be significant, at least as suggestions, insofar as the future relations of theology and psychology are concerned.

For convenience sake, these hypotheses will be referred to simply by their numerical designations--1, 2, and 3. The hypotheses are heuristic propositions, and the discussion which follows is offered in a heuristic spirit.

1. The first hypothesis implies that modern psychological theory is deficient as a general theory of man. It may be contended at once that modern psychology does not purport to be a general theory of man but restricts itself to a scientific description and analysis of behavior and experience. The following definition from English and English relates to this point:

> Psychology: 1. A branch of science dealing with behavior, acts, or mental processes, and with the mind, self, or person who acts or behaves or has the mental processes. The subject matter of psychology is variously conceived or described. . . . Nonetheless, the problems attacked and the scientific activities of psychologists have considerable unity.[1]

Before going on to the second half of this definition, let it be noted that psychology, even in its strictly scientific aspect, does deal with persons. The "problems attacked" and the "scientific activities of psychologists" are concerned with persons. The following part of the definition points to the significance of this fact:

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[1] H. B. English and A. C. English, A Comprehensive Dictionary, etc., op. cit., p. 419.

> Psychology: 2. a branch of philosophy, generally regarded as a part of metaphysics. Originally psychology was both a science dealing with empirical facts and their relations, and a philosophical interpretation of such facts. A fairly definite separation between philosophical and scientific psychology has now been effected and psychology, unless specifically designated as philosophical, now practically always refers to the empirical science. Relationships remain. A philosophic discipline deals with the basic assumptions of science in general and of psychology in particular; and there are implications for philosophy of the findings of psychological science which constitute a PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY.[1]

The import of the Existentialist's claim is that psychology must, when considering anxiety and guilt, pay attention to the metaphysical aspects. In short, Existentialists claim that psychology, whether it wishes to or not, is involved in dealing with the metaphysical aspects of man's nature. Existentialists are not alone in this claim. Papenek asserts that "the problem of the 'real,' innate nature of man must be faced by every thinking person and especially every psychotherapist."[2] Brierly, a psychoanalyst, has admitted the need to go beyond psychological analysis to ontological analysis,[1] and Vogt has called upon psychotherapists to become aware of the presuppositions which underlie their practice.[2] Furthermore, it is evident from the writings of Freud and Sullivan they were concerned not only with the nature of man's psychological disorders but also with the nature of man himself. Whether it is acknowledged or not, therefore, modern dynamic psychology implies a theory of man in the same way that theory underlies every particular science. A theory of the nature of the physical universe underlies modern Biology. A theory of the nature of man underlies modern Psychology.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 419-420.

[2] Helene Papenek, "Ethical Values and Psychotherapy," op. cit., p. 160. See also the discussion in Chap. 1, p.21f supra.

A scientific theory, of course, is not arrived at a priori but inductively. Existentialism would not only agree with this principle but insist upon it. Finitude, the Existentialists claim, is an empirical fact--much more empirical, in fact, than Freud's oedipus complex.[3] Man experiences his finitude and the Existentialists contend that this experience holds the clue to the understanding of human anxiety. The truth or error of the Existentialists' claim as opposed to the psychoanalysts' claim cannot be determined, therefore, by charging that the former is based on a priori reasoning whereas the latter is based on a posteriori reasoning. Both are logical inferences based on experiential, hence empirical, facts. The division of psychology into its scientific and its philosophical aspects, referred in the definition above, is an academic convenience. So long as man is the focus of concern in psychology, both scientific and philosophic elements will be involved ipso facto.

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[1] Marjorie Brierly, Trends in Psychoanalysis (London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd. and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1951), pp. 169, 233-234.

[2] Vogt, op. cit.

[3] Cf. May, (ed.), Existence, where the claim is also made that existential analysts are more empirical than positivists, p. 62.

If it be allowed, then, that psychology does, at least, imply a general theory of man, the question of its theoretical adequacy is a legitimate question. As is well known, psychoanalysis, particularly Freud's original formulation, has been criticized from a number of points of view. In a sense, every subsequent modification of Freud's theory, such as those of Jung, Adler, Rank, Horney, Sullivan, et al, may be thought of as attempts to make up for some of the inadequacies of the original formulation. These criticisms have been concerned with both theory and therapy. Outside of the psychoanalytic camp, other criticisms, some amounting to wholesale rejections, have arisen. Eysenck, for example, has contended that psychoanalysis is indefensibly unscientific.[1] He cites the following deficiencies:

(1). Psychoanalytic conclusions are based on unreliable data.[2]
(2). Psychoanalysts overgeneralize their conclusions.[3]

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[1] H. J. Eysenck, Uses and Abuses of Psychology (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1953), pp. 221-243.

[2] Ibid., p. 235.

[3] Ibid., p. 236.

(3). Psychoanalysts apply their putative principles to general social phenomena without proof of their applicability.[1]

(4). Where Freudian hypotheses are used to guide research, this research is often illustrative of preconceptions, rather than a crucial test of the hypothesis.[2]

(5). Psychoanalytic arguments from facts beg the question.[3]

On the other hand, Hall and Lindzey have indicated that such criticisms as voiced by Eysenck are also applicable to all personality theories, and, furthermore, that Eysenck's own theoretical formulations lack comprehensiveness.[4] The general issue of the relative merit of various contemporary personality theories, however, lies beyond the scope of this investigation. The reference to criticisms of psychoanalytic theories is introduced simply to illustrate the fact that other than Existentialists have questioned the adequacy of these formulations. The specific concern of this investigation is, of course, the relative adequacy of psychological theories with respect to guilt.

Existentialists agree that anxiety and guilt arise from man's existential predicament as a finite being. May asserts that:

> This is a radical statement with far-reaching implications. It is an existential approach which cuts through

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 237. [2] *Ibid*., p. 238.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 239.

[4] Hall and Lindzey, *op. cit*., pp. 413-417; 543-545.

> the dense fog which has obscured much of the psychological discussion of guilt--discussions that have proceeded on the assumption that we can deal only with some vague "guilt feelings," as though it did not matter whether guilt was real or not.[1]

It is clear from the context that May means by "real," existentially real. May continues in a vein which illuminates further the significance of this different conception of guilt. He asks:

> Has not this reduction of guilt to mere guilt feelings contributed considerably to the lack of reality and the sense of illusion in much psychotherapy? Has it not also tended to confirm the patient's neurosis in that it implicitly opens the way for him not to take his guilt seriously and to make peace with the fact that he has indeed forfeited his own being? Boss's approach is radically existential in that it takes the real phenomena with respect, here the real phenomena being guilt.[2]

The import of these words is that much modern psychotherapy has been limited in its effectiveness because the theoretical presuppositions underlying it have been inadequate. This investigation has revealed that both Freud and Sullivan acknowledged real difficulties in dealing with guilt. Freud confessed that the unconscious sense of guilt was a most potent resistance to analytic therapy.[3] Sullivan encountered difficulty not so much with what he called "true guilt" but with what he called "crazy guilt," which he identified as anxiety masquerading as guilt. Anxiety-produced resistances, however, are profound, pervasive, and relatively impregnable. Against these, even psychiatry is quite helpless. So dynamic psychology, as represented in the psychoanalytic tradition, finds itself relatively incapable of dealing effectively with anxiety and guilt. Existential analysis believes it knows the reason; namely, that these theories have not penetrated to the real nature of anxiety and guilt. Psychoanalytic theories, by reducing all guilt to guilt feelings, have blinded their adherents to the real nature of guilt and, consequently, rendered their practitioners, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, relatively ineffective. Existentialists call upon contemporary psychologists and psychiatrists to forsake their positivistic bias in order to realize the ontic nature of anxiety and guilt. In short, modern psychology will be a more adequate theory of man only when, and to the extent that, it finds a more adequate philosophical basis than the logical positivism of naturalistic science. This is the core of the Existentialist critique.

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[1] May (ed.), Existence, p. 54.

[2] Ibid. See also p. 55, four characteristics of ontological guilt.

[3] Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 149f.

The same point may be made by insisting that psychology cannot ultimately divorce itself from values. Fromm's views on this subject have been cited already.[2] Guntrip has argued that psychotherapy does, in fact, assume a value system. He writes:

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[1] Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory, etc., p. 298.
[2] Supra, p. 11.

> In order that psychotherapy may be carried on at all, both the therapist and the patient must in the long run accept maturity of personality as a value that carries obligation with it. . . . The time has come for us to transcend without discarding the purely technological, mechanistic, scientific approach to man. . . . Persons act from motives, not mechanistic causes, and motives and values are bound up together.[1]

Freud assumed that a life controlled by conscious reason (ego-controlled) was better (sic!) than a life dominated by unconscious impulses (id and superego controlled). His entire life, in fact, reveals a great devotion to certain values, e.g., psychic health, rational living, freedom from repression, etc. Similarly, Sullivan's life and work were value-centered. Psychology in general believes it is valuable to seek to understand, predict and, perhaps, even control human behavior. All of this implies value judgment, evaluation, and dedication to certain values. A recent book reveals that not only philosophers and theologians, but also psychologists, sociologists and cultural anthropologists are becoming more concerned with values.[2] Man is an evaluator, and any comprehensive science of man must take this fact seriously. Moreover, values imply moral judgments. "Good" and "bad," "good" and "evil" are inextricably interwoven with "right" and "wrong." Man is concerned with moral values and moral values are among the most important values mankind has held. As Guntrip says, "Moral values are our preception of, and loyalty to, those qualities of mature personality that are necessary if we are to sustain constructive and not destructive human relationships."[1] No comprehensive theory of man can omit from its purview the moral aspects of human life. Psychology may disclaim any interest in values and in moral issues, but it has, in fact, always been concerned with them.[2] Certainly, wherever guilt is concerned, values and morals are inevitably involved. Even if a purely developmental concept of guilt be accepted, the question still remains: How is it that the values and morals of parents and society become the values and morals of the child? To say that such values and morals are "introjected," "incorporated," "swallowed," or whatever explains nothing[3]--especially when no psychologist has yet given an adequate explanation of the dynamics of such processes. If followed to its logical conclusion, the psychological account of how guilt arises in personality reduces either to infinite regression--the child takes over the morals and values of the parent who took them over from his parent who got them from his parent, et cetera, ad infinitum--or to postulating some trans-historical event as Freud did with his oedipus myth. Is it not as "scientific" and as reasonable to accept the Existentialist contentions that anxiety and guilt arise from the character of being itself? And, furthermore, that man is by nature a valuator and a moral being? This, the writer submits, is a more parsimonious and a more adequate theory of man than the position espoused by a science of man which purports to be amoral. As Sartre[1] has contended, by intentionally separating psychology from all considerations of value, Freud cut the nerve of all morality, for in Freud's view, a man can never be said to be "bad," "evil," or "guilty." He can only be described as being "sick," "maladjusted," or under the control of infantile dynamics. This criticism applies to Sullivan and all positivistic psychologies with equal validity.[2] By refusing to allow any place to voluntaristic concepts, the individual is reduced ultimately to the sum product of his innate capacities modified by his experience and learning. Essentially, such a view reduces man to being a victim of his inheritance and developmental experience, over either of which the individual has very little or no control. Carried to its logical conclusion, such a view ends in determinism and the actual denial of any significant or definable concept of the individual.[1] Furthermore, such a view undermines the concept of moral responsibility, for, in the last analysis, no individual has any control over the inherited or developmental factors.

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[1] Guntrip, op. cit., pp. 163-165.

[2] A. H. Maslow (ed.), New Knowledge in Human Values (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959).

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[1] Guntrip, op. cit., pp. 163-165.

[2] See Vogt, op. cit., pp. 118-130.

[3] Cf. May (ed.), Existence, p. 64.

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[1] Sartre, op. cit.

[2] May (ed.), Existence, p. 64, for a trenchant criticism of Sullivan's interpersonal theory.

In what ways would the inclusion of existential elements increase the adequacy of the psychological understanding of guilt? Without an ontology of guilt, psychology is hard pressed to account for the reality of normal guilt at all. The analysis of the psychological theories of guilt presented in this study has revealed that neither Freud nor Sullivan displayed an appreciation for the constructive role of guilt in personality. For Freud, guilt is essentially infantile and neurotic. Sullivan had to make the distinction between "true" and "crazy" guilt in order to account for the more disturbing forms of guilt; but he, no more than Freud, could find a place for normal and constructive guilt. As May has argued, the inadequacy of both theories lies in their failure to relate man truly to his "world"--to the _Umwelt_, the _Mitwelt_, and the _Eigenwelt_.[2] For this reason, neither Freud nor Sullivan saw that a profound source of guilt lies in the denial or the forfeiture of one's own potentialities, namely in the choice of non-actualization of myself. This is guilt in its most personal form. It does not arise from the "incorporation" of parental prohibitions nor from the act of "empathizing" the anxiety of the mothering one, nor from any other external source. The source of this guilt is purely and strictly within being-in-the world--in this case, being-in-the Eigenwelt. This is one form of ontological guilt. To quote Binswanger again: "If you lock up potentialities, you are guilty against (or indebted to, as the German word may be translated) what is given you in your origin, in your 'core.'"[1] The offense is against one's own self, and awareness of this offense corresponds chronologically with the awareness of self. This awareness, if repressed, or if its true nature is repressed, may lead to neurotic guilt. The finer possibility, however, is that such guilt will lead to increased creativity in the use of one's own potentialities. Sullivan suggests that persons live for "security"--relief from anxiety. He does not necessarily endorse this, but neither does he see much going beyond security-oriented living. The Existentialists open the vista to another possibility, namely, living creatively--courageously engaged in actualizing one's own potentialities. This form of ontological guilt, which arises with respect to Eigenwelt, is, therefore, normal and wholesome.

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[1] It is clear that Sullivan actually had no concept of the individual or true person. For him, the only reality was "interpersonal relations"; but he did not actually relate the person to his world or to other persons. cf. May's criticism cited in the previous footnote.

[2] May (ed.), _Existence_, pp. 55-65.

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[1] Ibid., p. 53.

May has discussed the other two forms of ontological guilt--that which arises with respect to Mitwelt and that which arises with respect to Umwelt.[1] The point of his discussion is simply that "ontological guilt does not lead to symptom formation unless repressed, but has constructive effects in personality."[2] Such an understanding of guilt is more comprehensive, and provides a more adequate basis for therapy, than the traditional psychological interpretations of guilt. Furthermore, the existential analysis opens the door to more creative research possibilities with respect to guilt on both the theoretical and therapeutic levels.

The view being espoused in these pages is, therefore, that psychological theory will be enriched by the incorporation of the existentialist analysis of anxiety and guilt. What has been said thus far, however, has not referred particularly to Christian existentialism. Although an apologetic for Christian existentialism in preference to secular existentialism lies beyond the limits of this study, a few comments supporting the superiority of Christian existentialism must be offered because it has been contended that modern psychology can learn some valuable lessons from Christian existentialism, not merely from existentialism alone.

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[1] Ibid., p. 54f. [2] Ibid., p. 55.

It is well known that the existentialism of Sartre is extremely pessimistic. Tillich has commented that depth psychology and, particularly, existential analysis has "helped theology to re-discover the demonic structures that determine our consciousness and our decisions."[1] In short, both depth psychology and modern existentialism have helped to illumine the desperateness of the human predicament; but neither analysis offers any hope beyond human resourcefulness. Apart from a religious view, man has no way out of his awful predicament save himself or some other equally desperate human. (We are speaking in ultimates, not relativities.) The situation is analagous to a drowning man whose only hope is another drowning man. Expressed philosophically, this means that there is no way to "get from" existere to esse. In fact, in a secular existentialism, existere is all there is; there is no esse--no real world beyond this existential world. Expressed psychologically, this means that authentic self-hood must always be an ideal. Ultimately, this ideal can never be realized, for finitude--death--has the last word. Expressed religiously, the position of non-religious existentialism means that man cannot save himself and there is no other Being to save him. As Sartre has said, man's fundamental project is to become

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[1] Tillich, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Theology," op. cit., p. 16.

God, but this, too, is ultimately an illusion.[1] In contrast to all such pessimistic views stands Christian existentialism with its claims of the God-who-is-being-itself and who is "mighty to save." Christian existentialism is essentially hopeful. It claims that in Christ, the New Being, the estrangement of existence has been overcome, not only for Him, but for all who are "in Christ." If these claims are true, then certainly Christian existentialism is more hopeful. Then, too, Christianity offers the only ultimate "cure" for ontological guilt and anxiety.

The discussion in this section has offered observations which have attempted to show that Psychology as a science does in fact assume a general theory of man. Furthermore, it has been contended that modern psychological theories are deficient in a number of respects, and that the inclusion of existential elements would help to correct these deficiencies. In particular, it was argued that the existential analysis of guilt is more adequate than psychological theories which attempt to reduce all guilt to guilt feelings. Evidence for this position was deduced from the moderate success of psychoanalytically-oriented therapies in dealing with guilt problems. It was further contended that modern psychology will be a more adequate theory of man by forsaking its current positivistic basis and adopting an existential basis. This contention was further argued by insisting that psychology cannot be divorced from questions of values and morals. In this connection, it was pointed out that psychotherapists and psychiatrists in general do in fact subscribe to values, such as the value of mental health. It was contended that the existential theory is more parsimonious than, and equally scientific as, Freud's or Sullivan's theory. Man is a valuator and moral being. Furthermore, it was argued that modern psychological theories which stress genetic and developmental factors to the exclusion of all else, and which allow no place for voluntaristic concepts, actually deny individualism and undermine the concept of moral responsibility. Finally, certain observations were introduced in an effort to show the superiority of religious, as opposed to secular, existentialism.

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[1] See A. Stern, op. cit., p. 206f.

This section will be concluded by a few heuristic suggestions. The question arises: How might the superior adequacy of any theory of man be demonstrated? Aside from philosophical demonstrations, certain empirical techniques might be employed. As it pertains specifically to guilt, a hypothesis might be that the existential analysis of guilt provides a better theoretical basis for psychotherapy than, say, a psychoanalytic or Sullivanian basis. Before such a hypothesis could be investigated, a number of preliminary steps would have to be taken. For one thing, it would be necessary to establish the empirically verifiable relationship between a given theory and a given therapy. Research into this question is very much needed. Once this relationship was established, it would be necessary to translate "better" into some quantified, measurable terms. The implication is, of course, that "better" means more effective; but this latter term is hardly less ambiguous than the former. What is needed is more empirical research into the effectiveness of psychotherapy per se. Aside from the subjective opinions of the therapists or their patients, what empirical criteria have been established for the evaluation of the effectiveness of psychotherapy? This is an area which stands in need of much more research than it has received in the past.[1]

It has been contended also that Christian existentialism is superior to secular existentialism because religion offers hope and salvation. Again the need is to devise some means by which such claimed superiority can be validated empirically. Are Christians, for example, actually less anxiety-driven and less guilt-ridden than non-Christians? It might be possible to devise reliable instruments to measure the degree of anxiety and guilt as well as the overall psychic health of individuals. Using such instruments, representative samples could be tested and the question answered in terms of statistical significance.

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[1] Cf. H. J. Eysenck, op. cit., pp. 193-208.

Dodson has attempted to do this in a limited way with seminarians.[1] He found the seminarians to be significantly more guilt-oriented than non-seminarians.

Tillich, as well as other Christian writers, has claimed that religion alone is the only cure for existential anxiety and guilt. This claim could be investigated by means of a careful analysis of the therapeutic efficacy of existential analysts, such as Boss, who do not claim to be religious. Granting that effectiveness has been empirically defined, are such secular existential analysts less effective than religious "healers"--teachers, preachers, and counselors? In short, what evidence do Christian existentialists offer in support of their claims other than the claims themselves, documented, perhaps, by appropriate scriptural passages? Certainly, the claims of Christians that they alone possess the only real answer to the problem of human guilt calls for further empirical validation, nor will a mere nose-count do.

May, Tillich, and Existentialists generally stress the creative potential in anxiety and guilt. Boisen goes so far as to assert that even morbid guilt is not evil *per se*. The question posed by all such claims is: How can they be verified? One familiar type of argument is to cite cases like Jesus, Paul, Augustine of Hippo, Fox, Bunyan, et cetera, all of whom might be considered to have manifested abnormal traits. "Yet," so the argument runs, "look what such supposedly pathological personalities have contributed to the history of mankind." There is, of course, a certain validity to such argument. For one thing, it is certainly true that one cannot use an individual's psychic health or illness as an argument for or against the validity of his ideas, because on this basis both Freud's and Sullivan's ideas might have to be rejected. Aside from this caution, however, what is the validity of such arguments? Anton Boisen recovered from schizophrenia and found the experience to be productive of a new and better integration. Of the one hundred seventy-three fellow-patients who comprised his study, however, how many shared a similarly integrative fate? Only seven had finished their year of probation and seemed free of psychotic ideas and attitudes.[1] Boisen did find, however, that one hundred thirty patients gave evidence of the concealment reaction, the most frequent form of which was externalization of conscience.[2] In general, where there is self-blame and a sense of guilt, the prognosis is better than in the case of the "drifters"; i.e., individuals who have lost all sense of guilt.[3] The numbers are so small, however, as to make the results inconclusive.[4]

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[1] Dodson, *op. cit.*, p. 112f.

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[1] Boisen, op. cit., p. 44.

[2] Ibid., p. 35.

[3] Ibid., p. 38.

[4] Ibid., p. 18.

The question still remains, therefore, as to how existential and religious claims as to the value of guilt might be verified empirically. The clinical literature presents abundant evidence of the negative value of guilt. What is needed is further evidence of the role of guilt in healthy personality. What is needed are experimental designs which would make it possible to test empirically the positive and creative potential of guilt.

While the position has been taken in the above discussion that psychology would be enriched by incorporating the concepts from existential analysis, the writer does not mean that psychology should become less scientific and more philosophical. Existential analysis does not call for less, but more, empiricism. Existentialism claims to provide a more adequate theoretical structure for psychology and psychotherapy. It does not propose a new therapeutic technique[1] nor does it recommend that psychotherapists and psychiatrists should forsake their historic relationships with modern science. What is needed is more empirical research and more adequately designed experiments. While modern psychology has learned much by experiments using an essentially "borrowed" design and methodology--borrowed, that is, from other sciences such as physics and biology,--the pressing present need is for psychology to develop its own appropri-

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[1] May (ed.), Existence, p. 5.

ate research methods. Psychoanalysts have been right, in the writer's opinion, in their insistence that their theories cannot be validated by the traditional designs of experimental psychology, but call for research techniques appropriate to the specific theories. A similar necessity rests upon psychology as a whole. In the past, psychological experimentation and research have been concerned with segmental aspects of human behavior and experience. The findings have been valuable, but the present need is for holistic studies.[1] The present need is for research and experimentation which will take as the point of departure, Dasein--the whole man as a being-in-his-world.[2]

2. It has been hypothesized that the major significance of the differences between psychological and theological understandings of guilt insofar as theology is concerned will be in the realm of therapy. "Therapy," in this connection, refers mainly to what is usually called "practical theology": namely, pastoral counseling, pastoral psychology and care, preaching, fellowship activities, and church administration. However, the hypothesis does not exclude the possibility that systematic theology may also profit from the insights of modern psychology.

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[1] Cf. A. Angyal, Foundations for A Science of Personality (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1941).

[2] Cf. Vogt, op. cit., p. 189. Vogt contends, "What is observed in the patient and what is interpreted to him is almost completely determined by the analyst's philosophy of human nature, his theory of personality development and psychopathology, and his general conception of reality."

Before launching into the discussion proper, it may be well to summarize briefly the more prominent points of difference. The difference with respect to the genesis of guilt has been the focal point of the discussion in the preceding section. So, perhaps, very little more needs to be said in this respect. In terms of how guilt manifests itself in personality, the crux of the difference was found to be that psychology emphasizes the pathological potential in guilt, while theology emphasizes the constructive and creative potential. At the point of the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt, the divergence between psychological and theological views is most marked in the case of Freud's view that the unconscious sense of guilt has given rise to the religions of mankind, which, in turn, are to be considered as essentially mass obsessional neuroses. The point of deepest cleavage as far as guilt therapy is concerned is the theological claim that religion alone is the only cure for existential guilt. Finally, it was discovered that psychology tends to value guilt negatively whereas theology tends to value it positively. The significance of these differences for Christian theology will be discussed now.

A. Genetic factors.--The psychological theories analyzed in this study trace guilt to the presence of anxiety in the human infant. Although there are some differences between Freud and Sullivan as to how and when anxiety becomes transformed into guilt, these differences are not related materially to the point under consideration. Nor have the views investigated in this study differed in tracing guilt to anxiety. For all four men considered--Kierkegaard, Freud, Sullivan and Tillich--guilt is a specific form of anxiety. The difference is, rather, whether or not the ontological character of anxiety and guilt is acknowledged or not. The psychological theories have not recognized the ontological character. Instead, they attribute the rise of anxiety to the biological helplessness of the human infant, and the rise of guilt to the incorporation--or some equally mechanistic process--of parental prohibitions and punishments. The inadequacy of this theory has been discussed. However, this criticism was not intended to imply that biological, genetic and developmental factors are unimportant. Quite to the contrary, Christianity is indebted to Freud and to modern dynamic psychology in general for calling attention to the importance of these factors.

Specifically, the psychological analysis of the genesis of anxiety and guilt is particularly relevant to the philosophy and practices of Christian nurture and education. An educational philosophy which assumes that children are born evil and that the task of education is to convict them of this evil, and to lead them from "being bad" to "being good" is indefensible from the psychological point of view. Whether the human infant is understood from the existential or the psychoanalytical point of view, it is patent that he is already full of Angst by reason of his biological helplessness and/or finitude. It is quite unnecessary, therefore, to increase the infant's Angst artificially! It is clear that what every infant needs is love--both agape and caritas. Furthermore, the psychologists have made it clear how easily, and naturally, Angst becomes transformed into neurotic guilt. Practices of child care and of education which are moralistic and punitive simply accelerate this malevolent transformation. Of particular relevance in this connection is Sullivan's discussion of this malevolent transformation; because he has shown how the "bad-me" can come to dominate the personality. When this happens, the foundations are laid for serious disturbances in living. As a specific case in point, one wonders about the possible detrimental effects of teaching young children that they are "sinners with black hearts"[1] whose only hope is to give their hearts to Jesus and so be saved. The religious instruction of the young too often has consisted of Bible stories and Bible verses in which the depravity of man and the wrath of God upon sinners have been emphasized. Nor is it uncommon, even in this enlightened day, for parents to reinforce their supposed moral instruction by means which can only result in aggravating the sense of "bad-me" and the feeling of guilt. In the light of the psychological findings, such practices are seen to be not only quite unnecessary but also definitely harmful. Christian education is well-advised to guide both its philosophy and its practices by the empirically validated principles of scientific psychology. One of the tasks of all education--secular and Christian alike--is to help each child to actualize himself. The task cannot be accomplished by practices and procedures which encourage malformations and the development of neurotic structures of personality. Insofar as Christian education has failed to appreciate the genetic and developmental aspects of anxiety and guilt, it stands in need of correction by the insights of modern dynamic psychology. Dollard and Miller have presented evidence that neuroses are learned.[1] It behooves Christian parents and educators to examine their practices of child care and education in the light of such findings.

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[1] The writer has had a number of parents report to him that their children had been told exactly this in Sunday School and weekday classes of religious education conducted by some Fundamentalist churches.

Freud may well have been wrong in his pan-sexualism, but his discovery of infantile sexuality marked a significant step forward in understanding human behavior. Moreover, his relating guilt to sexuality, while mistaken as a comprehensive theory of guilt-formation, nonetheless contains valuable insights for Christian theology. Freud's em-

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[1] John Dollard and Neal E. Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950).

phasis upon the naturalness of sex served not only to shatter Victorian and Puritanical notions about sex, it also helped to remind Christian theology that sex _per se_ is not evil. Led astray largely by Calvinistic Puritanism, much Christian preaching and teaching had forgotten that in historic Christian theology not sex but concupiscence--sexual lust--was evil. Children, as well as adults, were made to feel guilty because they experienced these evil "desires of the flesh."[1] The result was often an unhealthy repression or suppression. A premium was put upon being a-sexual and "spiritual," i.e., upon denying sexual impulses to awareness. The results of such unrealistic and essentially unhealthy attitudes toward sex have been described abundantly in the clinical literature, particularly the psychoanalytic literature. Unfortunately, however, many Christians have not learned the lesson, nor have they bothered to try to understand Freud truly. Rather, a considerable segment of Christianity has been content to misinterpret and to misread Freud, and to dismiss him and psychoanalysis generally as being immoral and licentious--even lewd. Nor is a wholesome program of sex education, yet characteristic of all Christian churches. For the most part, sex education is left to the home or to the school, the Church either choosing to shirk the responsibility entirely or contenting itself with innocuous discussions in youth groups about dating. The result is that the general impression left upon the young is that sex and religion don't mix, and, further, that sex is essentially naughty or bad. Sexual feelings, therefore, remain productive of guilt for many religious persons. Dodson, for example, found that seminarians were significantly more troubled by sex than non-seminarians.[1] Christian education, as well as Christian theology, will profit by giving more serious attention to the dynamic role of sex in human personality. Specifically, Christian preachers and teachers can guide children and parents in developing a more wholesome and less guilt-oriented attitude toward sex.

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[1] Cf. Cole, _Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis_.

B. The manifestations of guilt.--In the light of the findings of this investigation, there can be little doubt that guilt often leads to psychopathological formations. While existential analysts insist that ontological guilt does not lead to symptom formation, they are fully aware of how easily such guilt can be converted into neurotic guilt. Freud in particular has demonstrated how the unconscious sense of guilt is often an etiological factor in many major and minor personality disorders. This knowledge of the high pathological potential of guilt is of considerable importance to Christian theology. Tillich says:

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[1] Dodson, op. cit., p. 114f.

> And it is indeed important to know that theology had to learn from the psychoanalytic method the meaning of grace. . . . The word grace, which had lost any meaning, has gained a new meaning by the way in which the analyst deals with his patient. He accepts him. He does not say, "You are acceptable," but he accepts him, and that is the way in which, according to religious symbolism, God deals with us; and it is the way every minister and every Christian should deal with the other person.[1]

Tillich emphasizes both the theoretical and the practical importance of the psychoanalyst's recognition and acceptance of the patient as a person-in-need-of-help. Christian pastors and Christian preachers must realize that the majority of their parishioners do not need condemnation but help. If this is true, sermons which censoriously stress man's sinfulness are not only superfluous, they are potentially harmful. This is not to say that all sermons should be smoothingly syrupy--not at all. The criticism refers not so much to the content as to the spirit of the sermon and of the preacher, especially. Whether preacher, pastoral counselor, Christian teacher, or simply a parishioner, every Christian should deal with every other person graciously--in the sense indicated by Tillich--and acceptingly. Since the average person already suffers under a burden of guilt, and because guilt is so productive of serious disturbances in living, it behooves all who are concerned for the welfare of persons to act toward others in ways which do not encourage guilt to be transformed into psychopathological formations. Pastors particularly should realize that guilt is often the product of love-frustration.[1] What the pastor's parishioners often need, therefore, is not condemnatory moralism but opportunities to express and to experience love. The modern clergyman frequently finds himself in conflict between the responsibility to accept and to care for sinners and the responsibility to attack and to condemn sin. The dilemma is real; but might it not be resolved to some extent if the clergyman remembers that his primary responsibility is toward persons and that he has been commanded to love, to accept and to forgive all men as God in Christ has loved, accepted and forgiven him? Jesus said, "Judge not, lest ye be judged." Does this not mean that the attitude of judgment is self-condemnatory? Certainly, the clergyman has a responsibility to pronounce judgment upon sin; but he must always do so as one who himself is under judgment, and who lives not by judgment but by grace.

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[1] Tillich, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Theology," op. cit., p. 16.

These considerations have specific relevance for the clergyman as a counselor and as an acknowledged leader of a community of persons. For one thing, such considerations suggest that a pastoral counselor should be as free as possible himself from neurotic guilt, for unless he has pretty well resolved his own guilt problems, he cannot help others with theirs. This suggests the value of psychotherapy for ministers and seminarians. Gaining freedom from neurotic guilt, as indeed gaining freedom from all neurotic dynamisms, is not an intellectual enterprise. No doubt, a genuinely religious experience can free one from neurotic guilt. No doubt also, however, that this process can be facilitated by good psychotherapy. Furthermore, psychotherapy itself can be a religious experience. Secondly, the pathological potential of guilt makes it quite necessary that modern clergymen shall have had sound training in clinical and abnormal psychology, otherwise he is apt either to "spiritualize" pathological disturbances or simply fail to recognize them as such. This has particular significance for the referral practices of clergymen. Hersch has found that Protestant ministers are ambivalent and in conflict about their roles as psychotherapists, about the value of clinical training, and about referrals.[1] Although based on a relatively small and restricted sample of ninety-four clergymen in the Los Angeles area, Hersch's findings are quite reliable. He compared the referral preferences of ministers, educators and chaplains, using a survey method, and found significant differences. Hersch concludes: "Clergymen need a more adequate understanding of contemporary scientific psychology in order to care for and make intelligent referrals of parishioners who are in need of specialized counseling or psychotherapy."[1] This conclusion is particularly relevant to guilt problems. It has been noted that Christian theology generally tends to value guilt as the prelude to saving faith. On this basis, it is understandable that clergymen frequently become over-zealous in their attempts to convince individuals of their need for turning to God because of their sin and guilt. Such considerations, however, do not mitigate the potential harm which can be done to people in whom neurotic guilt is already over-severe. If clergymen had the more adequate understanding which Hersch suggests is needed, then, perhaps, they would be more disposed to make indicated professional referrals. Tillich has said that neurotic anxiety and guilt are objects of medical healing, and he is quite right. Unfortunately, many clergymen do not seem convinced of this fact, or are lax in making referrals, or are simply unprepared to distinguish between neurotic and normal guilt. Certainly more sophistication on the part of clergymen with respect to the pathology of guilt would save them from confusing morbid guilt reactions with genuine spiritual humility. The psychodynamically oriented clergyman would recognize many religious practices as symptoms of, say, obsessive-compulsive disorders.

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[1] Cf. Guntrip, op. cit., p. 61; also Suttie, op. cit.

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[1] Paul S. Hersch, "A Study of Recommended Criteria for Guiding the Clergyman in His Care and Referral of Parishioners Who Are In Need of Specialized Counseling or Psychotherapy," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Religion, University of Southern California, 1958).

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

Greater appreciation for the pathological dimension of guilt has significance also for the group life of the average church. Too often, church groups are structured in such a way as to be non-redemptive; i.e., the structure of the group is such that the group processes reinforce rather than resolve or relieve neurotic tendencies. Moreover, it is not uncommon to find church groups which are dominated by neurotic individuals. Neurotic guilt commonly masquerades as piety or "spirituality." Thus the individual who is seeking to atone for a neurotic and, oft-times, an unconscious sense of guilt will be judged by others to be very moral, pious and spiritual. It is not difficult for such a person to get himself into a place of leadership in a church group. In such a position, his guilt-dominated behavior can be very threatening and destructive. Because groups tend to be conservative and static, the influence and permanency of such a leader can be powerful. Unless the minister is aware of these possibilities, considerable damage to his church and to himself can result.

Church groups themselves can become characterized by neurotic guilt. Such a group may be mistaken for the spiritual elite of a local church, because its members are more zealous, more pious, and more intensively "religious" than others. Such a group is characteristically exclusive, separatist, and censorious. It is fearful lest it be contaminated by less holy individuals. So it tends to exclude others. Following the admonition in the Epistle of James, it seeks to keep itself "clean and unspotted by the world." So it draws apart and separates itself from the bulk of the church membership. Because its members have a great need to repress their own guilt, they feel themselves to be holier and more pure than others. So the group develops a censorious and judgmental attitude toward all outsiders. This is the essence of Pharisaism. Such a group, for reasons already noted, can become very powerful in a local church. It frequently has the final voice in selecting a minister, who, naturally, will tend to be like the group. In this way, the church as a whole becomes characterized and dominated by an essentially neurotic process and spirit. This has happened sufficiently often in the history of American Protestantism, at least, that whole segments of the population who really need the help which the Christian Church might offer have had to turn in other directions for such help. A notable example is Alcoholic Anonymous.

Thus far the discussion has concentrated on the value for theology and clergymen of recognizing the pathological potential of guilt. This study, however, has discovered that the existential analysis of guilt recognizes the creative and constructive potential of guilt. Can theology and clergymen capitalize on this dimension of guilt? The writer believes so. In fact, he believes that the delineation of the normal and creative aspects of guilt is one of the most important fruits of this investigation. The influence of psychoanalysis has been widespread and neither secular nor pastoral psychotherapy has escaped that influence. If the psychoanalytic account of guilt were the only and all-sufficient explanation, then Christian theology would have to forsake its historic position with respect to sin--especially the doctrine of the Atonement--and Christian psychotherapists would have to either lead a schizophrenic existence or be extremely careful not to talk about human sinfulness and guilt. A certain amount of both tendencies is apparent on the contemporary scene. The clinically trained pastor has felt that he has had to wear two hats, so to speak.[1] While counseling, he is a psychologist and follows the lead of Freud, Sullivan, or perhaps, Rogers. While preaching, on the other hand, he is a Christian and is guided by Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Luther and even Calvin, perhaps. He is not at all sure how to reconcile the two roles, nor is he even sure that they can be reconciled. If his clinical orientation is largely Freudian, he is aware of the evil in man's nature, but he also realizes this evil is essentially merely infantile.[2] If he is a Rogerian, he is quite convinced that man is essentially good.[1] Neither of which views, however, fit in very well with what he has learned in systematic theology. The net result is a "split" between his psychology and his theology, and, since he is both psychologist and theologian, a schism in himself.

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[1] This is largely based on my own experience, but I do not think my experience is unique.

[2] See Paul W. Pruyser, "Toward A Doctrine of Man in Psychiatry and Theology," Pastoral Psychology, IX, 82 (March 1958), pp. 9-13.

Existentialism offers real hope to such a "schizoid" pastor. The _content_ of this hope has been outlined already. Guilt is not due simply to infantile "hangovers." Guilt belongs to man _qua_ man. Nor is all guilt pathological. Pastor X need not fear lest in discussing sin and guilt, in the pulpit or in the study, he will cause his parishioners to become more neurotic. He may derive reassurance from Mowrer's contention that the _repression_ of guilt leads to neurosis and from May's assertion that ontological guilt does not lead to symptom formation but to more creative efforts toward authentic self-hood. These are no mean gains.

C. _The religious concomitants of the sense of guilt._--The crux of the divergence between psychology and theology at this point is Freud's contention that the unconscious sense of guilt lies at the root of all religion. Trueblood has written cogently of "the challenge of Freud." He says, "Any philosophy which professes to deal with religious truth in contemporary terms must come to grips with

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[1] See _Pastoral Psychology_, IX, 85 (June 1958), the entire issue.

Freud's teaching in regard to religion."[1] This investigator agrees with Trueblood's thesis that Freud and Christianity are ultimately irreconcilable at this point. He does not agree with Biddle, or any others, who contend that "Freud's basic quarrel was not with religion but with religious dogma."[2] Freud's position on religion is unequivocal. Primitive religion arose as an attempt to overcome the unconscious sense of guilt.[3] Contemporary religion is essentially an illusion and a mass obsessional neurosis.[4] The fact that clergymen such as Pfister, and more recently, Devlin, have become psychoanalysts does not minimize the seriousness of Freud's attack upon Christianity. Both Freud and historic Christian faith cannot be true. Nor will it do say that one can accept Freud's metapsychology but reject his metaphysics. Psychoanalysis is a wisdom about life, not simply a therapeutic technique. Its technique derives from its view of human nature, not vice versa. So far as the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt are concerned, Freud's basic contention is either right and Christianity is wrong; or Christianity is right and Freud is wrong.

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[1] D. E. Trueblood, "The Challenge of Freud," Pastoral Psychology, IX, 85 (June 1958), pp. 37-44.

[2] Biddle, op. cit., p. 2.

[3] This is the burden of the argument in Freud, Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism.

[4] Freud, The Future of An Illusion, the entire book.

It is not the purpose of this investigation to try to refute Freud's attack upon religion. Such attempts are numerous and the Bibliography lists a number of such studies. Suttie has written one of the most cogent of such refutations.[1] This study has presented also some of Tillich's criticisms, which seem valid to the investigator. The main concern of this study has been to enunciate the difference between Freud's views and those of Christian theology, and to emphasize the need to choose between the two. Outler has stated the Christian position as follows:

> The Christian will ask the psychotherapists that they explore yet once again, and further, the assumptions of their analysis of the moral life. They must either buttress and make explicit their naturalistic religion and their humanistic ethic . . .; or else they must be willing to consider the real option of the Christian message as an ample context for all the positive values of the psychological ethic. . .[2]

Outler refers primarily to the moral and ethical issues, but his remarks are equally relevant to the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt. Either guilt arises from the presuppositions described by Christian existentialism and Christianity represents a wholesome method of coping with guilt, or guilt and Christianity alike are neurotic. This is not to exclude other possibilities, nor is it to deny the fact that both guilt and religion may be, in a given case, neurotic. The contrast here is between the Freudian and the

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[1] Suttie, op. cit.

[2] Outler, op. cit., pp. 240-241.

Christian view. The point is that both cannot be ultimately correct, true, and right.

As shown in this investigation, both Kierkegaard and Tillich acknowledge that guilt can become neurotic. Both men, moreover, are aware that religion can be, and often is, used neurotically. This fact is widely acknowledged by Christian writers.[1] Long before Freud, Christians were aware of the perversions of religion.[2] Furthermore, contemporary theologians are grateful for the insights of psychoanalysis. Billy Graham recently wrote in his syndicated newspaper column: "Religion is not a cure-all. . . . If the disturbance is purely a mental one, then a competent psychiatrist might give satisfactory help."[3] The day of religion versus psychology and psychiatry seems to be on the wane. But few Christians will wish to concede that Freud was right in his contention that religion is the mass neurosis of mankind. Christians will agree that man needs religion because he is guilty, but they can never agree that the sense of guilt is the sole cause of their Christian faith or of their Church. Christians do not look upon their prayers, their sacraments, or their fellowship as essentially infantile and ineffectual ways of overcoming their Oedipal guilt. In short, Christian theology cannot accept Freud's psychologism. Trueblood has put the issue bluntly and adequately:

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[1] E.g., C. A. Wise, Religion in Illness and Health (New York: Harper & Bros., 1942) and many other books on pastoral psychology.

[2] See, e.g., any standard history of Christian doctrine or any standard history of the Christian Church.

[3] Billy Graham, "Christ Is Answer to Sin Problem," Copyright, 1958, Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate.

> If Freud cannot be answered, the chance that an honest religious faith can be held by civilized men and women is slight. Intelligent faith must find some valid solution to the problem presented by Freudianism, as it earlier had to find solutions to the problems presented by Copernicanism and Darwinism. . . . The simple truth is that, if the Freudian position is fully warranted, there is no way, by revelation or any other way, in which an honest and intelligent person can be a believer in God in any objective sense.[1]

D. Guilt therapy.--It has been found that Kierkegaard and Tillich have contended that Christian faith is the only solution to the problems of existential guilt and anxiety. This view is representative of contemporary Christianity as a whole. While it is understandable, perhaps even admirable, this investigation has not discovered any empirical basis for such a claim. It has been suggested that research is needed to verify this claim and some suggestions were made as to the form which such research might take. Until such evidence is forthcoming, the Christian claim is scientifically unsubstantiated. Tillich has offered theological and philsophical arguments in support of this claim, but such arguments are, in the opinion of the investigator, limited to philosophical propositions. They are not cogent with respect to behavioral data. Whatever its metaphysical source, guilt manifests itself in human behavior and experience. A therapeutic claim refers to such empirical data. It can be validated, therefore, only on an empirical basis, not on a metaphysical basis. If the existential analysis of guilt provides a more adequate theory for guilt therapy, the adequacy must be demonstrated empirically. In short, existential analysis must produce better therapeutic results. Such results will be a cogent argument in favor of the theory. Another cogent argument may be purely formal; i.e., it may be demonstrated that the existential theory is more comprehensive, more coherent, and more consistent. Therefore, the theory would be more adequate and, by the standards of philosophy, more true. All such arguments may be adduced to support the superior adequacy of existential theory and therapy. The Christian claim is, however, not simply that it is more adequate or superior. The Christian claim is that it alone is the only ultimate cure for guilt. This is a claim which must be accepted or rejected on faith. This investigation has not revealed any empirical basis for accepting or rejecting the Christian claim.

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[1] Trueblood, op. cit., p. 38.

E. The value of guilt.--Much of what has been said in this chapter already is relevant to the differing value put upon guilt by psychology and by theology. It has been shown that contemporary Christian theology tends to value guilt, especially ontological guilt positively. Modern dynamic psychology tends to value guilt negatively. The significance of this difference for psychology was discussed in the first section in connection with Hypothesis One. It was argued that modern psychology needs to develop a concept of normal guilt, and an appreciation for the healthy role of guilt in personality. The discussion of the second hypothesis has emphasized at several points that Christian theology, particularly in its applied aspects--teaching, preaching, and counseling--will be benefitted by a deeper appreciation of the pathological potential of guilt. It has been suggested also that additional research is needed to verify the constructive role of guilt. Little more can be added to these observations which bear upon the question of the relative value or disvalue of guilt in human personality.

Some additional but brief comments do seem in order, however, with respect to the Christian attitude toward guilt. It is clear, for one thing, that even from the point of view of Christian existentialism guilt is strictly an instrumental and not an intrinsic good. The value of guilt is that it may lead to more creative efforts in the achievement of authentic self-hood. This is guilt's value with respect to the Eigenwelt. Similarly, with respect to the Mitwelt and the Umwelt, existential guilt may lead to more creative and more intense efforts to overcome the estrangements of human existence. That guilt may emanate in these desirable outcomes is the aim of existential analysis. It should also be the aim of pastoral counseling. Expressed religiously, the value of guilt is that it shatters man's pride and inclines him toward true faith. All of this, however, refers to guilt as an instrumental, not an intrinsic, good. Christian theology errs when and if it treats guilt as intrinsically valuable, whether the error be made on the theoretical or the practical level. At times, Christianity in the hands of its practitioners has seemed sadistic and masochistic. Some of Jonathan Edwards' sermons, for example, seem quite sadistic--as though either God or Edwards derived satisfaction from contemplating the fate of the damned. On the other hand, the history of Christianity has been besmirched periodically by a kind of ascetism which borders on pathological masochism--the ascetics deriving morbid satisfaction from their suffering and guilt. This same truth may be expressed theologically by saying that Christianity is essentially a gospel. There is no "good news" in guilt per se. The only value of guilt lies in its power to open the eyes, ears, mind and heart of the sinner to the good news of God in Christ Jesus.

There is another aspect of this matter which is worthy of mention. One way to get at this aspect is to ask:

"Does Christianity deliver man from the sense of guilt?" Mackintosh has answered this question in a way which seems valid to the investigator. He wrote:

> In one who knows God as faithfully and unchangeably Redeemer, there is an abiding sense of guilt. . . . But whereas before reconciliation with God the feeling of guilt is purely disabling and suffuses the moral life with the consciousness of radical failure, later, as an undertone of felt unworthiness, it aids him in fostering that humility and receptiveness apart from which the life of God cannot be ours.[1]

As we have seen, Tillich points to the same truth when he writes of the experience of "accepting acceptance though unacceptable."[2] In the Christian understanding, therefore, guilt is never "gotten rid of" in this life. This life is a process of becoming, and as long as there is becomingness, there will be guilt. Nor is the aim of Christianity, either as a system or a therapy, to relieve the individual of all sense of guilt. The aim of Christianity is to enable the individual to accept his guilt and to use it creatively in a progressive overcoming of the estrangement of his existence--his separation from his Eigenwelt, Mitwelt and Umwelt.

3. The third hypothesis concerns the significance of the differences discovered by this study for the future relations of psychology and theology. This matter will be

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[1] Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness p. 76.

[2] See Chap. VI, supra, and Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 163f.

discussed in quite general terms. The reason for this general discussion is not because the matter is less important. Rather, there are a number of other reasons, some of which are: (a) This matter has already been discussed extensively in the literature; (b) much of what has been presented heretofore in this study has touched upon this matter; (c) there are reasonable limits to any single research effort, and these limits may have been exceeded already by the investigator.

The subject matter of the future relations of psychology and religion is a field so broad in scope as to lie beyond the defined limits of this study. In the main, it may be said that the two disciplines converge most importantly at the point of psychotherapy and Christian soul care. As already indicated, the literature on this aspect of the problem is voluminous and is increasingly rapid.[1] A survey of this literature reveals three main classes or types, which roughly parallel three positions taken with respect to the issue. First, there is what might be called the old view of religion versus psychology. This view sees the two disciplines as unalterably and unreconcilably opposed. This position seems to be definitely a minority position nowadays. There are a few orthodox psychoanalysts, such as Jones and Fenichel, who still hold to the essentials of Freud's opposition to religion, but their number seems to be decreasing or, at least, becoming less vocal. On the Christian side, Runestam seems to be reverting to the older view.[1] A more modern version of this essentially antagonistic position, however, is to be found in more meliorative views. On the psychological side, this ameliorating view is reflected in the more recent writings of Jung, such as in his Answer to Job. Essentially, the attack is that of psychologism. Religion per se is not attacked after the manner of Freud. Rather, religion is explained by psychology, and, in Jung's case, almost explained away without remainder. For example, the belief in God is a psychological fact. Jung is clear on this point.[2] He is equally clear, however, that such psychological facts, qua psychology, tell us quite a bit about the subject and almost nothing about the object of such beliefs. The most which Jung's position can establish is that people do believe in God. As to whether or not the object of such beliefs is real in anything but the psychological sense, Jung is mute. This is simply a veiled form of logical positivism. It sounds more religious, but it isn't.

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[1] See, e.g., the Annual Directories of Pastoral Psychology for the past several years.

It has been contended that psychology must pay attention to the metaphysical aspects of anxiety and guilt.[1] Christian existential theology contends also that psychology must give serious consideration to the religious aspects of experiences of guilt.[2] In this view, therefore, it is not enough, when analyzing guilt, simply to establish the _subjective_ validity of such experiences. Nor is it adequate to establish the subjective validity of the belief in God. To do as Jung has done is to beg the question; for the question concerns the _objective_ validity of religious beliefs. To refuse to take a stand on this issue is to refuse to confront the significant questions.

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[1] Runestam, op. cit.

[2] C. Jung, Answer to Job, especially the opening chapter.

An important heuristic question concerns whether or not it is legitimate and necessary to require psychologists to deal with metaphysical questions. What will the effect on scientific psychology and psychotherapy be? Research is needed before such questions can be answered reliably.

On the theological side, Tillich represents a somewhat meliorative version of a similar kind of ultimate opposition. Tillich is genuinely appreciative of the service which depth psychology has rendered Christian theology.[3] In the last analysis, however, Tillich is convinced that Christianity and Christianity alone has the whole truth about life, even as it has the only cure for guilt. To be sure, Tillich is not so naive as to assert that Christianity as we know it has this absolute and final truth. But Christ is the Truth and the Way and the Life. Neither psychoanalysis, nor psychology, nor any other science, can supplant Christianity. They can supplement. They cannot supplant. Of course, such loyalty to the Faith is admirable. This is not the point in question. The point is that such a view represents a kind of friendly enmity or penultimate cooperation. Ultimately, the choice must be either/or--either psychology or theology.

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[1] _Supra_, p.255f.

[2] This is the insistence of both Kierkegaard and Tillich.

[3] See Tillich, "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism and Theology," _op. cit_., pp. 15-17.

The second class of literature represents a position which amounts to a double standard of theory and practice. Like East and West in Kipling's poem, psychology is psychology and theology is theology and "never the twain shall meet." The trouble is, of course, that they do meet precisely at the point of man and specifically at the point of guilt. This investigation has revealed that psychology and theology differ in five important respects insofar as guilt is concerned. These differences are both theoretical and therapeutic. Furthermore, it has been contended that it is impossible to separate completely the theoretical and the therapeutic. If the differences are real, and if the contention is valid, then a division of labor between the two disciplines is simply a convenience. It is convenient and advisable, for example, to advocate as a general principle that neurotic guilt is the object of medical healing and that existential guilt is the object of priestly healing. But this bifurcation and division of labor is largely academic. It is one and the same individual who is the subject of both kinds of guilt and who will be, therefore, the subject of both kinds of healing. Who shall determine when he needs one or the other kind of help, and how shall the decision be reached? If the differences are largely differences of terminology, then, of course, there is little or no problem. It really doesn't matter if the "patient" goes to an atheistic psychoanalyst or to his Christian pastor. If, however, the differences are real, as this investigation has indicated, then it will matter profoundly. This does not mean, of course, that a Christian pastor and a non-Christian psychotherapist cannot work together at more or less superficial levels. Nor does it mean that such teamwork might not result in benefit to the patient--possibly even to the pastor and the therapist. At the more profound levels, however, there must be either a choice of one as opposed to the other, or a parting of the ways, or an unresolved conflict in the mind of the patient as well as between the pastor and the therapist. There are significant differences between modern dynamic psychology and contemporary Christian theology with respect to guilt. It is this writer's thesis that the cause of neither discipline is advanced by ignoring or glossing over these differences.

The third body of literature, of which there is less than the other two, represents the position which the writer is advocating. This position is that the future relations of the two disciplines will be best advanced by a frank recognition of these differences, by further research aimed at defining more precisely the exact nature of these differences, and by further communication and conversation between representatives of the two disciplines. It is crucial that the right spirit and frame of mind shall characterize these interchanges. Both sides must forsake unwarranted pride and dogmatism. What is needed is investigation, particularly empirical investigation, not apologetics--Christian or psychological. Christian theologians and ministers should cease selecting from scientific psychology what fits their purposes while neglecting what does not. If a fact or a truth has been established scientifically and by recognized empirical findings, then Christians must accept this fact or truth even if it does not fit into their present theological position. Theology must be ready and willing to be reconstituted in the light of new knowledge. It is idolatry to imagine that contemporary theology has the full and final grasp on the whole truth. It is profoundly irreligious to assume that God can reveal no new knowledge about human nature. It is strictly unscientific to believe that man can learn nothing more about himself.

It is sheer dogmatism to assert that any existing theological system is the final and complete theory of guilt and its sole cure.

Dogmatism is no less a sin on the part of psychology nor is it any more admirable or excusable when it parades as "scientific fact." As this study has shown, modern psychological theories of guilt are inadequate and incomplete. Contemporary psychotherapy and psychiatry are relatively ineffective when it comes to the more profound problems of guilt. Furthermore, the claims of modern psychotherapy and psychiatry as to the effectiveness of their therapy, as well as the accuracy of their theories, rests more on theory than on empirically validated fact. As Sullivan has acknowledged, modern psychology is full of disturbing "gaps" in knowledge. What psychology knows about personality disorders is precious little. What it knows about normal personality is even less. It is long on description and short on genuine explanation. Honest psychologists will admit this. Furthermore, psychology has sometimes erred in the past and been guilty of "scientism." Its empiricism has been very narrowly conceived, as in the Behaviorist school. In its eagerness to become a science, it has largely borrowed its concepts and methods from other sciences. It has eschewed those philosophical problems which underlie all scientific endeavor but which are peculiarly pertinent to the science which studies human behavior and experience. Indeed, psychology has not been without its "sins of omission and commission."

The contention of the writer is not simply that both psychology and theology need to repent, wholesome as that might be. The position being advocated is that the differences with respect to guilt which this investigation has revealed constitute a promising focal point for mutual and independent investigation, and communication. The position taken by the writer is purely heuristic. He is interested in the reconstruction and further advancement of both disciplines, for the ultimate good of mankind. Specifically, the writer believes existential analysis needs to be further studied and investigated in order to see if it will yield greater psychotherapeutic gains. The question of the necessity of a Christian context for existential analysis also needs to be subjected to experimental testing. The "real" nature of man needs to be explored as fully as possible by each discipline separately and by both disciplines working together. Research is needed to determine at what point and in what way quantitative differences become qualitative differences. Is normal guilt, for example, different in kind or simply different in degree from neurotic guilt? For that matter, are there qualitative or only quantitative differences between normality and abnormality? How can present religious practices be modified so as to be less productive of neurotic guilt and more productive of creative guilt? What are the true dynamic processes by which conscience and the sense of moral responsibility are formed? Or is conscience and the sense of the "ought" inherent in man? How can the concept of the imago dei be translated into an operational construct so that it may be investigated empirically? How are the cultural mores and morals "incorporated," i.e. what are the dynamics of such processes? If, as Sullivan contends, our present cultural prescriptions and prohibitions are unrealistic, how might they be changed? That is, in what manner are the mores and morals of a society changed? Specifically, what changes are needed, and who shall decide this question? If values are not the proper concern of psychologists, then whose concern are they? Are they the concern of the religionists and moralists who, in the opinion of some psychologists, have already done a singularly poor job in this area? Psychologists have had much to say about the processes of education, but who is to decide what the aims of education are to be? Sullivan has said that an individual feels guilty when he violates one of the governing principles of his life, but if voluntaristic notions cannot be allowed, how is it that a given individual has arrived at the principles which will govern his life? If he did not choose them, then how did he get them? It cannot be contended seriously that such principles are always the product of the individual's educational and social experiences, for such an argument does not account for the numerous cases of divergence. On such grounds, how can one account for a Schweitzer, a Ghandi, or a Jesus?

These are some of the questions and the kinds of questions which call for answering, and are a challenge to both theologians and psychologists to greater heuristic effort. It is the writer's contention that the future relations of psychology and theology will be more productive if these questions are faced humbly and courageously by each discipline separately and by both together. Psychology and theology need not agree at every point in order to investigate these problems nor in order to work productively together. Finally, it is contended that neither discipline has reached its final form. A true reconstruction of both psychology and theology in the light of new findings is needed.

4. Summary.--This chapter has sought to indicate the significance of the differences revealed by the investigation with respect to the psychological and the theological understanding of guilt. The discussion focused around three hypotheses. Briefly stated these hypotheses were:

A. That the major significance of the differences for psychology are in the realm of theory;

B. That the major significance of the differences for theology are in the realm of therapy, or practical theology;

C. That the major significance of these differences for the future relationship of the two disciplines are in terms of heuristic suggestions. The discussion has offered suggestions in support of these hypotheses.

Conclusions

This investigation has found that there are differences between modern dynamic psychology (Freud and Sullivan) and contemporary Christian existential theology (Kierkegaard and Tillich) concerning guilt feelings. While the analysis was limited to the views of two men in each discipline, data were offered to indicate that the views analyzed were representative.

The differences were found to exist on both the theoretical and the therapeutic levels. Marked differences were found to exist at the following five points: (1) the genesis of guilt, (2) the manifestations of guilt, (3) the religious concomitants of the sense of guilt, (4) the therapy of guilt, and (5) the value of guilt in human personality. On the basis of these marked differences, it is concluded that modern dynamic psychology and contemporary Christian existential theology differ significantly concerning guilt feelings. The first hypothesis of the study is supported by the data.

Hypotheses two, three and four (discussed in this final chapter as 1, 2 and 3) were not supported in the strictly scientific sense. On the other hand, neither were they refuted. These hypotheses were discussed in attempt to show the further significance of the differences. Support or refutation of the hypotheses await further research. Nevertheless, it is concluded that the discussion of them has illustrated more fully the significance of the differences.

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